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Financing State Electoral Campaigns in Massachusetts in
1970: The Case for Reform (February 1975)
Guy C. Clifford, B.S., Tufts College
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. George T. Sulzner
This inquiry is confined to elections for offices in
Massachusetts state government in 1970. Its purposes are
threefold: first, to establish the cost of campaigning, the
sources of funds, and the rewards for contributions; second,
to explore the commonwealth's response since the 1970 elec-
tion to the problem of ceunpaign finance; emd third, to sug-
gest what should be done by state government to remedy the
deficiencies in Massachusetts' system of campaign finance.
To accomplish the inquiry's objectives the following
sources of information were essential: the campaign finance
reports submitted by candidates and committees to the secre-
tary of state in compliance with state law; other public
records, documents, and publications; accounts about cam-
paign finance in the press, particularly in the Boston Globe ;
numerous interviews with persons, public and private, who
were knowledgeable a±)out campaign finance in Massachusetts;
and a miscellany of materials, published and unpublished,
the latter provided by elected officials and other public
personnel, private groups, and individual citizens.
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It was determined that a total of about $5,500,000
was spent in the Bay State in 1970 on behalf of all candi-
dates for six statewide offices, the eight-member Governor's
Council, and the 240-member state legislature. In general,
the larger the size of the electoral district, the more
powerful and prestigious the office, and the more competi-
tive the ccunpaign, the greater the cost of the campaign.
Incumbency was decidedly advantageous. Although a few cam-
paigns were extremely expensive, many campaigns were under-
financed.
Most of the funds which financed these campaigns
were raised by committees established on behalf of candi-
dates. The fund-raising efforts by the two major political
parties were much less important, and with one exception,
there was virtually no fund raising by organized interest
groups. Although there was some evidence of self-financing,
the typical candidate did not use his personal funds. The
lucrative testimonial dinner was a major source of funds for
some candidates, and large contributions ($500 or more) were
important to some candidates at all levels, but especially
to gubernatorial candidates.
Two rewards for campaign contributions, jobs and
access, were examined. Although the patronage available to
other elected state officials was discussed, attention cen-
tered on certain judicial and executive-branch appointments
viii
by the incumbent Governor, and appointments by the incumbent
Attorney General. Access to legislators and administrators
was illustrated by three case studies; two involved campaign
contributions by lobbyists to legislators and elected execu-
tives, and one by bankers to the incumbent Treasurer.
Enough evidence was advanced to support the conclusion that
"money talks" in Massachusetts politics; politicians are
responsive to persons who support their campaigns finan-
cially.
There has been a serious and constructive response
since 1970 by many public officials and private parties to
the problem of campaign finance. Substantial changes in the
state's campaign finance law have been enacted, especially
by Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts
of 1973, and by the voters' approval of an initiative peti-
tion in 1974. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this
inquiry supports the conclusion that some form of public
subsidy of electoral campaigns in Massachusetts, especially
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In a modern society money is a major resource which
enables people to accomplish many things. Money is conver-
tible: it can employ the energy, talents, and services of
people; it can purchase material goods; and for those who
have enough, it can buy leisure and the time to follow what-
ever pursuits are desired. Money is one basis for power; it
can protect and advance the interests of those who employ it
effectively. Money shapes human behavior; it affects not
only the lives of those who possess it, but of persons who
are dependent on its use by those who have it. In short,
money "counts." While the author would agree with those
people who argue that there is much money cannot buy, he
would insist, at the same time, that money is important in
many areas of life. Politics is no exception.
Justification for an Inquiry into Campaign
Finance in Massachusetts
Nominations and elections are central to a democratic
order, and money, however provided, is essential for the con-
duct of electoral campaigns. To the extent that the wealth
of some individuals and groups unduly influences the choices
of who the candidates will be, and who will ultimately govern.
1
2the practice diverges from the democratic ideal. Elections
should not be so expensive as to bar able men and women of
modest means from participating as candidates, nor should
any candidate have to become unduly obligated to others
simply because they have the resources necessary to finance
campaigns. If those who are chosen to govern are overly
responsive to their financial supporters, the democratic
ideal is further compromised. Campaign contributions should
not "buy" appointments and contracts; they should not block
or guarantee the enactment of legislation, nor impede the
enforcement of existing statutes or administrative rules.
Access to public officials should not be limited to those
who make campaign contributions. Furthermore, how campaign
funds are spent is as important as how campaigns are funded.
The electorate deserves the opportunity to learn about can-
didates and what they stand for. Comnunicating with a mass
electorate is expensive. There must be adequate money pro-
vided for this purpose, and the money spent should be well
used. False image building and the avoidance of issues are
not consistent with the democratic ideal of an informed
electorate choosing its governors in a responsible way. The
campaigns should be adequately funded, informative, and allow
the voters to make intelligent choices. The financing of
the electoral process, clearly, is vitally important. Money
should not be the determinant of who runs, who wins, and how
3the victors conduct themselves, once elected.
Any inquiry into campaign finance, for the reasons
offered, is important. In addition, it is timely. For more
than two years there has been an unprecedented coverage in
the mass media of Watergate, a term intended to include not
only the break-in itself, but events prior and subsequent to
that incident. Millions of Americans today have a greater
understanding of the cost of presidential elections, the size
and sources of contributions, the uses to which sc^e of the
money went, and the rewards which some sought or received.
From this scandalous chapter in our history, not yet fully
written, many citizens have had some of their suspicions
reinforced about the role of money in politics. Many have
more than a passing acquaintance with the "milk fund," the
ITT settlement, illegal corporate contributions, ambassador-
ships for sale, the use of campaign contributions to buy the
silence of pcurticipants in the break-in and cover-up, and the
personal enrichment attained by some persons in public office.
Thoughtful citizens in the Bay State c«mnot help but speculate
about the financing of electoral campaigns in their own
state, and wonder whether such abuses are a way of life in
their state and local governments.
In addition to its importance and timeliness, an
inquiry into ceunpaign finance in Massachusetts can be justi-
fied because the topic is too-little-understood. The average
4citizen's participation in politics is essentially confined
to the act of voting; only a very few make campaign contri-
butions. Although most citizens have had little or no direct
personal experience with campaign finance, there are some
with more than a passing acquaintance or interest. Among
them are candidates, campaign aides responsible for financing
elections, bureaucrats who administer the campaign finance
law, legislators assigned to committees whose jurisdiction
includes Ceunpaign finance, political party officials, lobby-
ists, members of the press, individuals and groups whose
interests are clearly affected by public decisions on a
recurring basis, and the Massachusetts branch of John Gard-
ner's citizens' lobby. Common Cause. The list is not meamt
to be all-inclusive—surely many political scientists would
be ranked among the informed—but is presented to help
explain why campaign finance is not widely understood. Cam-
paign finance is a rather sensitive subject for most of
those mentioned; they do not readily volunteer information
about it, nor have they made it their business to inform the
general public. The two principal exceptions are the press
and Common Cause/Massachusetts.
A major reason why the public is poorly informed
generally about campaign finance in Massachusetts is that,
spart from the accounts in the press, little has been
written about it. Although the Citizens' Research Foundation
5of Princeton, New Jersey has published about twenty valuable
works about campaign finance since 1960, including several
state studies, none deals with Massachusetts. There is not,
in fact, one published book devoted exclusively to the sub-
ject, nor is much research or writing in progress, according
to the director of the Citizens' Research Foundation,^ and
several persons associated with Ccanmon Cause/Massachusetts,
the state legislature's joint Committee on Election Laws,
and the commonwealth's Division of Public Records. One
factor explaining this is that campaign finance data is not
very inviting to reseeurchers. To review and digest the cam-
paign finance reports available for public inspection is a
very tedious and time-consuming task. Although it could be
done, the summary statements issued after each election by
the secretary of state are not detailed enough to be of much
value to researchers. And, until Common Cause/Massachusetts
was established in 1971, there was no permanently organized
group in the state with an interest in gathering, analyzing
and publicizing information about the topic.
There has, nonetheless, been some attention given
campaign finance in the Bay State. About a decade ago,
Rubin's thesis about the state's newly enacted full dis-
closure law, and its initial tests in the 1962 and 1964
^Letter from Herbert E. Alexander, Director, Citi-
zens' Research Foundation, September 16, 1971.
6elections, was written. 2 At about the same time Levin's
Kennedy Campaigning appeared. In his discussion of the 1964
campaign for the U.S. Senate, Levin devoted one chapter,
-Serious Money," to the deficiencies of the 1962 campaign
finance law and the ways the candidates circumvented it.*^
Atkins' Getting Elected , a book published in 1973, dis-
appointingly included very little of value—contrary to its
title's promise—in its brief chapter about campaign
finance.^ The most recently published book, Mileur and
Sulzner's Campaigning for the Massachusetts Senate , devotes
considerable attention to the cost and funding of the Senate
elections in 1968, and is valueUale for that reason to stu-
dents of campaign finance.
^
In the last two or three yecurs, three other book-
length works, all unpublished, have been written. The first,
a dissertation by a sociologist about the funding of
^Gertrude S. Rubin, "Regulation of Campaign Finance:
The Massachusetts Full Disclosure Law, 1962-64," (Senior
Honors thesis. Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 1965).
Murray B. Levin, Kennedy Campaigning; The System
and the Style as Practiced~by Senator Edward Kennedy (Boston;
Beacon Press, 1966)
.
^Chester G. Atkins with Barry Hock and Bob Martin,
Getting Elected; A Guide to Winning State and Local Office
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973)
.
5Jerome M. Mileur and George T. Sulzner, Campaigning
for the Massachusetts Senate; Electioneering Outside the
Political Limelight (Amherst, Mass. ; University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 1974)
.
7Massachusetts Congressman Robert P. Drinan's extremely
expensive 1970 campaign, was completed in 1974.6 The second,
a senior honors thesis about campaign finance in Massachu-
setts, was not available for review when it was completed in
mid-1974; it will be, when revised by the author to protect
her confidential sources.*^ The third, a manuscript completed
early in 1974 by Representative Francis C. Lapointe (Democrat-
Chicopee) of the Election Laws Committee, is not yet pub-
lished. Nor will Lapointe, helpful to the author on numerous
occasions, allow his four-state study to be reviewed until
then.
Although little has been written about campaign
finance in Massachusetts, a number of works, most of them
dealing with various problems associated with the financing
of federal campaigns, have been published recently. Some of
the problems discussed are similar to those in the Bay State.
These works were not used in researching this study, but they
were valuable in providing a perspective on a complex subject.
They include Alexander's Money in Politics
,
Adamany's Cam-
paign Finance in America , and Election Reform; Basic Refer-
ences , a by-product of the U.S. Senate's Watergate
^Judy Stull, "The Sociological Dimensions of the
New Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1974)
.
''patricia Taaffe, a 1974 graduate of Wellesley
College, researched her thesis while employed in Lieutenant
Governor Donald R. Dwight's office in Boston.
8Investigation. 8 Alexander's book examines the pros and cons
of a variety of campaign finance reform proposals and offers
his suggestions, intended to provide adequate money to
finance campaigns and to insure competition between the
political parties. Adamany's book explores federal and state
elections in Connecticut, especially in 1966 and 1968. Using
his conception of money as a political resource which is
convertible for campaign purposes, Adamany examines how well
politicians have used it. He is also concerned with ade-
quately funding campaigns and maintaining competition.
Adamany thinks there is a massive unrepresentativeness in the
manner in which campaigns are financed. Election Reform is
valuable because it contains chapters not only from Alexander
and Adamany's books, but excerpts from many other recent
writings as well. It also includes a very extensive and
varied bibliography on campaign finance.
Scope of the Inquiry
This study was confined to elections for state
offices in Massachusetts in 1970. The decision to limit the
inquiry to the Bay State was made for two reasons: (1) the
^Herbert E. Alexander, Money in Politics (Washington,
D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972) ; David W. Adamany, Campaign
Finance in America (Belmont, Cal.: Duxbury Press, 1972)
;
United States Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, Election Reform; Basic References , Pursuant to
S. Res. 60, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1973)
.
9author's familiarity with the state's politics and government,
and (2) the feasibility of research. Confining the study to
the Bay State facilitated its accomplishment, whereas a study
involving one or more other states would have required addi-
tional time to become familiar with their political systems.
The feasibility of research was a more compelling reason,
however, for confining the study to caiapaign finance in Massa-
chusetts. Considerations of time, convenience, and cost—but
most importantly, access to information—virtually dictated
that decision. The proximity of the author's home in Bridge-
water to the state capital, Boston, assured reasonable access
to campaign finance reports and other public records, and to
public officials. State House reporters, members of private
groups, political party personnel, and other knowledgeable
persons.
A second way the study was confined was to examine
only the campaign finance of candidates for the Bay State's
six statewide executive offices, the Governor's Council, and
the state legislature. Every four years (in even-numbered
yecirs) the voters in Massachusetts elect a governor, lieu-
tenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state,
treasurer and receiver general, and auditor. Every two years
(also in even-numbered years) they also elect eight members
to the Governor's Council and the entire state legislature,
forty senators and 240 representatives. Although all of
10
these offices are not always contested in the primary or
general election, there are literally hundreds of candidates
involved in any given election year. In order to ensure that
the inquiry would be manageable, a decision was made to limit
it to campaigns for these offices. As important as many of
them are, all federal, county, city, and town offices, there-
fore, were deliberately excluded.
A third way in which the study was confined was to
examine only the 1970 election. The decision to focus upon
that year's csunpaigns was made because 1970 was the most
recent year in which en election for statewide offices had
been held. The big prize in Massachusetts politics is the
governor's office. The gubernatorial campaign usually
attracts the most money, and the winner is in a position to
dispense many rewards. To have omitted any consideration of
that campaign seemed unwise. Moreover, the decision to
write about campaign finance was made several months before
the November, 1972 election. It was intended that the study
be as up-to-date as possible, but the campaign finance
reports for the 1972 election would not have been available
until late in that year. The reports for legislative and
councillor campaigns in 1970 were already available for
study, and would be, until the end of 1974. Hence, the
decision to focus the inquiry upon the 1970 campaign.
11
Confining the inquiry to campaign finance in
Massachusetts in 1970 seemed reasonable, but was not wholly
advantageous. By limiting the study to one state, the bene-
fits of a comparative study of campaign finance in two or
more states had to be foregone. By confining it to state-
wide, councillor, and legislative campaigns, whatever find-
ings which would have resulted from a broader study embracing
federal, county, and municipal offices had to be sacrificed.
And by focusing only upon campaigns in 1970, no comparison
of the cost of campaigning, the sources of funds, and the
rewards for contributions for that election year with the
findings of any other year was possible.
Objectives
Politicians in Massachusetts, as in almost every
other state in the nation, today rely on private contribu-
tions to finance their campaigns for public office, and that
was surely the case in 1970. Three important questions
which immediately occur about the campaigns in 1970 are:
(1) what did they cost? (2) how were they funded? (3) what
rewards did those who made contributions receive? Although
other questions arise, the answers to these three should
certainly assist public officials, private groups, and
individual citizens to appraise the Bay State's system of
campaign finance more intelligently. The answer to a fourth
question—what has the response been by Massachusetts state
12
government to the situation since 1970?--should allow
judgments about the adequacy of this response, and of the
necessity for further reform of the way by which electoral
campaigns are financed. These four questions are central
to the purposes of this inquiry into campaign finance in
Massachusetts in 1970, which briefly stated, are threefold:
first, to establish the cost of campaigning, the sources of
funds, and the rewards for contributions; second, to explore
the commonwealth's response since the 1970 election to the
problem of campaign finance; and third, to suggest what
should be done by state government to remedy the deficiencies
in Massachusetts' system of campaign finance. Chapters II,
III, and IV address themselves to the first tliree questions
about costs, funding, and rewards; Chapter V treats the fourth
question about the nature and adequacy of the state's
response since 1970.
In Chapter II the cost of c€irnpaigning for the six
statewide executive offices, the Governor's Council, and the
state legislature are explored. The primary objective in
this chapter is to establish how much was spent in campaigns
for these offices in 1970. A secondary objective is to make
a judgment about how much statewide, councillor, and legis-
lative campaigns ought to cost. In making this judgment for
each office, five factors, in addition to the actual costs
incurred in 1970, are taken into account: (1) the size of
13
the constituency, (2) the power and prestige of the office,
(3) electoral competition, (4) the impact of incumbency, and
(5) the limitation on media expenditures imposed by law in
1972.
In Chapter III, the funding of electoral campaigns
for statewide, councillor, and state legislative offices is
examined. The principal objective is to establish the rela-
tive importance of the fund-raising efforts by candidates and
their campaign committees, political parties, and interest
groups. In exploring the funding of campaigns by candidates
and their committees, notice is taken of the great variety of
ways by which funds are raised, but emphasis is given to one
common and lucrative technique used, the testimonial dinner.
In addition, the importance of large contributions to the
1970 campaigns of statewide, councillor, and legislative can-
didates is explored.
In Chapter IV, an effort is made to relate some of
the rewards dispensed by elected officials to individuals who
made large contributions to their 1970 campaigns. Although
several kinds of rewards are available to these officials,
the discussion in this chapter is necessarily limited, for
reasons explained in Chapter IV, to only two of them: appoint-
ments and access. While discussing the patronage available
to all state elected officials, Chapter IV mainly treats cer-
tain judicial and executive appointments of Governor
14
Francis W. Sargent and the appointments of assistant attorneys
general by Attorney General Robert H. Quinn. In addition, it
explores access to legislators and administrators, using
three case studies which involve campaign contributions by
State House lobbyists William F. Malloy and Bruce D. Kinlin
to legislators and elected executives, and contributions by
several Massachusetts bankers to Treasurer Robert Q. Crane.
The difficulties inherent in this admittedly limited effort
to connect the "giving and the getting" are noted later in
this chapter, and in Chapter IV.
In Chapter V, the legislative response by Massachu-
setts state government since the 1970 election is examined.
Beginning in 1972, five major efforts were made to amend the
commonwealth's campaign finance law, three of them successful.
These are discussed with the primary objective of providing
an understanding of the substantive changes enacted by
Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts of
1973, and the Quinlan initiative petition of 1974, which
should allow a judgment about the adequacy of the govern-
ment's response to the problem of campaign finance in the
Bay State. Having explored and appraised this response, the
author was led to the conclusion that a partial public sub-
sidy of campaigns, especially statewide contests, is desir-
able.
Sources of Inforroation
To accomplish the study's three objectives, the
author relied upon a variety of sources, principally cam-
paign finance reports, and other public records and publi-
cations; accounts about campaign finance in the press,
especially in the Boston Globe ; numerous interviews with
persons, public and private, who were knowledgeable about
various facets of campaign finance in Massachusetts; and a
miscellany of materials, largely unpublished, provided by
elected officials and other public personnel, private groups,
and individual citizens.
The public records maintained by the secretary of
state were indispensable, especially the campaign finance
reports submitted to the Division of Public Records by can-
didates and committees in compliance with the state's cam-
paign finance law. Hundreds of these reports for 1970 were
reviewed, mainly to establish the cost of statewide, coun-
cillor, and legislative campaigns. In addition, perhaps a
score of reports for the 1968 and 1972 elections were exam-
ined. One public document. Election Statistics , published
biennially after each state election, was useful for its
summary statement about campaign costs, and was repeatedly
referred to as a source of detailed information about all
elections, such as the names of candidates, their
16
partisanship, and the votes they received.^ A Manual for the
Use of the General Court, also published biennially, was
helpful in numerous ways, among them ascertaining the names
and titles of public officials in every branch of government
for 1970 and other years.
Throughout the study it was necessary to have an
essential grasp of the state's campaign finance law which was
effective during the 1970 election. This was particularly so
when tracing the three major amendments to the law which were
enacted in 1972, 1973, and 1974. To gain a familiarity with
the law before these changes, numerous references were made
to the General Laws Annotated ; to become conversant with
the amendments in 1972 and 1973, reference was made to the
state's Acts and Resolves ; and to acquire an understanding
of the change enacted in 1974 by initiative petition, refer-
ence was made to Official Information to Voters . ^-^ By them-
selves, these references proved helpful, but not fully sat-
isfactory. When supplemented by other sources such as
^Especially, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secre-
tary of State, Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43)
.
lOEspecially, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, A Manual
for the Use of the General Court for 1971-72 .
'-^Massachusetts, General Laws Annotated (1958),
c. 55, as amended by c. 444 of the Acts of 1962.
^^Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves (1972) , c. 810.
Also, Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 1173.




explanations offered in the press, information gained during
personal interviews, materials published for candidates by
the secretary of state, a report published by a special com-
mission established in 1966,^^ and especially one appraisal
of the law by the Massachusetts Junior Chamber of Commerce, ^5
the objective of gaining a working understanding of the
state's campaign finance law was achieved.
News accounts and editorials which appeared primarily
in the Boston press, especially in the Boston Globe , were of
considerable value in providing factual information, and more
importantly, in alerting the author to developments in cam-
paign finance in Massachusetts since the 1970 election.
Although their coverage was not as extensive as the Globe 's,
some items were also gleaned from the Boston Herald American
,
the Christian Science Monitor , the Real Paper , and other
Boston newspapers. No attempt was made, however, to system-
atically survey the coverage in any newspaper, because none
is indexed. A private collection of hundreds of news items,
dating from the mid-1960 's and mostly from the Boston press,
was made available to the author early in his research by
'•Massachusetts, House No. 3900, Report of the
Special Commission Established to Make an Investigation and
Study Relative to the Financing of Political Campaigns ,
July 21, 1966.
Greater Boston Junior Chamber of Commerce Survey
of Depository System," (Boston: [1963]). (Mimeographed.)
18
attorney Jerome Medal ie; it was a helpful introduction to
the press' coverage of campaign finance.
In every area of the inquiry-campaign costs, funding
of campaigns, rewards for contributions, and the legislative
response—interviews proved invaluable in providing informa-
tion and sharpening insights about campaign finance in the
Bay State. About fifty persons were interviewed, all but a
very few in person. They included elected officials, candi-
dates, campaign contributors, campaign aides, legislative
staffers, bureaucrats, party personnel, members of interest
groups. State House reporters, lobbyists, and private citi-
zens. Most interviews lasted less than an hour, some but a
few minutes, and a few perhaps two hours. No interview was
without some value. On several occasions, the person inter-
viewed provided written information, or suggested someone
else who had other information which had been overlooked.
In a few cases, the initial interview established a relation-
ship which thereafter led to several informal and usually
brief, but useful, conversations. This was the case with
Representative Francis C. Lapointe (Democrat-Chicopee) of the
legislature's joint Committee on Election Laws, Peter Keyes
of Common Cause/Massachusetts, and with personnel in the
Division of Public Records, the depository for campaign
finance reports.
^^Medalie is with the Boston law firm, Widett and
Widett.
19
In addition to the information obtained from public
records and reports, accounts about campaign finance in the
press, and interviews with knowledgeable persons, a miscellany
of sources, mostly unpublished and too numerous to mention
individually, were very helpful. Among the unpublished
materials provided by public officials, private citizens, and
groups were several press releases, fact sheets, handwritten
and typed lists, financial statements, and letters. Among
the most useful privately published materials which were
directly pertinent to the objectives of this study were the
Citizens' Research Foundation's Political Contributors of
$500 or More , and several publications by Common Cause,
including the Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics . ^"^
Most of these miscellaneous sources are cited in the bibli-
ography, and several are elaborated upon in the text or in
footnotes.
Although scores of persons willingly provided infor-
mation which greatly facilitated the completion of this
inquiry into campaign finance in Massachusetts, it should be
noted that it was impossible to acquire certain factual
information, psurticularly in the area of rewards for campaign
contributions. Many persons in a position to know
—
public
'^Herbert E. Alexander and Katharine C. Fisher,
eds., CRF Listing of; Political Contributors of $500 or More
in 1970 (Princeton, N.J.; Citizens' Research Foundation,
1972); The Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics (Wash-
ington , D.C . : Common Cause, 1972)
•
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officials, candidates, campaign aides, contributors, and
appointees, for example-willingly shared information, to a
point. On several occasions, however, such persons were too
"busy" to talk or answer correspondence, responded to ques-
tions with answers which were not believable, refused out-
right to tell what they knew, or cordially provided informa-
tion which, in retrospect, was less than they could have.
These people, of course, were under no obligation, legal or
otherwise, to provide any information, even that required in
campaign finance reports. Moreover, it obviously would have
been very foolish of them, indeed, to share information
potentially damaging to themselves or others.
It should also be noted that there is some question
about the reliability of the information contained in the
campaign finance reports submitted in 1970 to the secretary
of state by candidates and committees. During the author's
research, several persons expressed the opinion that these
reports did not accurately reflect all contributions received
or expenditures incurred. One candidate with ten years'
experience as a campaign manager, largely with legislative
campaigns in Massachusetts, claimed that the true cost of
campaigns was several times the reported cost. He readily
suggested a number of ways businesses made "contributions-
in-kind," A corporation, he pointed out, might allow a can-
didate's campaign workers to use its telephones for a "boiler
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room" operation just before the election (to get out the
vote), or print campaign stationery free-of
-charge . ^® To
the extent that candidates in 1970 accepted such assistance,
the equivalent of money, and thereafter did not report it,
the public record understated the cost of their campaigns.
There is, however, no way to establish conclusively how
extensive such practices were.
Another way, many said, that the campaign finance
reports for 1970 were unreliable was that they did not reflect
all cash transactions fully or truthfully. Some cash con-
tributions, it was claimed, were not reported at all, and in
other cases, contributions were not reported in the names of
the true givers. Neither practice was legal in the Bay State
in 1970. One reporter, predicting a "severe cut" in cash
contributions in the 1974 election in xMassachusetts because
of the publicity generated by Watergate (hundreds of thousands
of dollars in cash contributions went unreported in the 1972
presidential campaign)
,
wrote, "Insiders estimate that as much
as 30 per cent of the funds funneled to most state-wide can-
didates in Massachusetts in the past has been in cash."^^
The writer did not elaborate further, but the point is clear.
^^Interview with Ed Mettar, an unsuccessful candidate
in 1972 for the Republican nomination for county commissioner,
Middlesex County. Boston, 3 August 1972.
^^David Farrell, "Sargent Errs in Choice of Fund-
raising Watchdog," Boston Globe, 23 November 1974, p. 23.
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Cash transactions were coiranon in the 1970 election. A
difficult question is, how much cash went unreported?
Another is, how much of the cash reported was actually given
by persons other than the true givers? As with contributions-
in-kind, there is no way to establish conclusively how wide-
spread these practices were.
It is the author's judgment that some campaign
finance reports in 1970 were as true to the penny as was
humanly possible, but that many probably understated the cost
of campaigns by as much as 25-35 per cent because some cash
contributions and contributions-in-kind were not reported.
The reliability of the 1970 reports is also questionable to
the extent that some contributions were reported in the names
of persons other than the true givers. How extensive this
practice was is also a matter of opinion. It occurred, but
it probably was not widespread. Although the information in
the campaign finance reports examined was not totally reli-
able, these reports contained the only significant, publicly
available data about campaign contributions and expenditures.
They were, necessarily, relied on extensively throughout this
study, particularly in establishing the cost of campaigning
in the Bay State in 1970, a topic which now will be explored.
CHAPTER II
THE COST OP CAMPAIGNING IN
MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970
There is no question that the 1970 election in
Massachusetts was expensive and that its cost represented
a dramatic increase over the cost of campaigns in previous
years. In 1970 the cost of all campaigns waged in the Bay
State exceeded $10 million, whereas in 1960 the cost was
about $4 million. If the coat of campaigning for the six
statewide offices in Massachusetts government is compared
for the election years of 1964, 1966, and 1970, the trend
is still apparent, although less striking. In the 1964
election (two years after the state's campaign finance
statute was eunended to insure more complete reporting of
campaign contributions and expenditures) , the total cost
reported by all candidates for these six offices was
$3,345,000. In the 1966 election the total dropped slightly
to $3,305,502, but it rose sharply in 1970 to $4,677,711.^
One factor accounting for this rather dramatic rise in
^Election Statistics (Public Document 43); for 1960,
see pp. 3-4; for 1964, see pp. 3-5; for 1966, see pp. 3-6;
for 1970, see pp. 4-7. As of 1964, the information in PD43




spending was the substantial Increase In the cost of living.
Everything rose In price, and the expenses commonly asso-
ciated with campaigns-printing, postage, and advertising,
for example-were no exception. Campaign techniques have
changed, too, and this has been reflected In Increased cam-
paign expenditures. Television, an effective medium for
reaching the voters, but a very expensive one, has been used
more extensively by major candidates. There has been a
decline, also. In assistance to candidates from their polit-
ical parties. Candidates have been thrown back upon their
own resources to a greater extent as campaigns become
Increasingly more candidate-oriented. There has been a
consequent duplication of effort and waste of resources by
candidates within the same party as each goes his own way.
These reasons are but a partial explanation as to why there
has been a significant Increase In the cost of campaigning
In the Bay State In recent years.
The high, and mounting, cost of campaigning for
public office raises some Important questions related to the
democratic premises which. In theory, underlie the political
system In Massachusetts. First, are some excluded from
running for office? Can only some afford It? Is the elec-
toral process, for all practical purposes, open only to the
well-to-do who can finance their own campaigns, or who have
access to others with money? If this Is the case. Is not
the public the loser? Second, of those who do run, are some
25
candidates handicapped from the beginning? Do incumbents
enjoy an undue advantage? Are challengers able to raise
sufficient funds to offset the advantages of incumbency?
If not, the public does not reap the rewards of a competitive
campaign. Third, does the necessity to raise large sums of
money to finance campaigns, and the willingness of some to
make large contributions, create a situation which is poten-
tially unhealthy for candidates and contributors alike? Are
the candidates unduly obligated? Do those who make large
contributions exercise disproportionate influence, not only
in determining the victors at the polls, but in shaping
their behavior once they assume office? If so, is the public
good served? It seems not. Fourth, despite the high cost of
campaigns, are elections, in fact, adequately financed? Are
candidates—incumbents and challengers alike—with the
resources avail«a>le to them, able to communicate effectively
with the voters? Can the electorate leaurn enough about the
candidates and the issues to make intelligent choices, or
does the cost of campaigning prohibit this? If not, the
public interest is again not served. And, fifth, is there
some better way of finauicing campaigns which would allow
able men and women, who otherwise might not run for office,
to do so? Can the advantages of incumbency be offset fairly?
Can the potential for the corruption of both candidates and
contributors be curbed, and the integrity of the electoral
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process be more adequately insured? Can campaigns be more
adequately funded to permit the intelligent choices a demo-
cratic political order assumes? In this chapter, the cost
of campaigning for statewide office, the Governor's Council,
and the state legislature in Massachusetts in 1970 will be
examined as a first step toward answering the above ques-
tions. In these campaigns an effort will be made, not only
to establish the actual cost of campaigning, but to estimate
campaign costs if vigorous opposition existed in both the
primary and election. Before discussing the costs of par-
ticular campaigns, some remaurks are in order about the fac-
tors which affect the cost of any campaign.
Factors Affecting Campaign Costs
Any analysis of the cost of campaigning for public
office in Massachusetts in 1970, or any other year for that
matter, would have to take a number of factors into account.
Among the more important would be the following: the funds
available to the candidate; the size of the constituency;
the power and prestige of the office; the competition faced;
the candidate's status (incumbent or challenger); the parti-
san preference of the electorate; the ceunpaign strategy and
methods employed; the assistance received from political
parties and interest groups; the law regulating campaign
finance; and the general level of prices prevailing during
the campaign. Some brief comments about each of these
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factors will be useful before discussing the costs of
particular campaigns.
How much money a candidate and his organization are
able to raise to finance his campaign is dependent upon many
things, chief among them, perhaps, his prospects for winning
the election. IVhether a candidate's campaign is well funded
or underfinanced, however, it is likely that most of the
money that is raised will be spent. It is a rare candidate
who concludes his campaign reporting a substantial surplus
of funds. The essential point is that the cost of a candi-
date's campaign will be governed by how much money is avail-
able to himj he cannot spend what he does not have.
In general, one would expect that the greater the
size of the electorate in a particular constituency, the more
costly a campaign will be. The appeal to the voters in
Massachusetts of a statewide candidate should be more expen-
sive than the campaign of a candidate for the Governor's
Council (there are eight councillor districts in the state) ;
a campaign for the Council should be more costly than a race
for the state Senate (forty senators are elected); and a
campaign for the House of Representatives should be the least
expensive of all (240 are elected).
A factor affecting the cost of campaigns which is
related to the size of the electoral district is the power
and prestige of an office. This is based on a number of
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things, among them the authority of the office and the
willingness and ability of the occupant to exercise it.
contributors with a stake in public decisions care who win
the more powerful and prestigious offices. The winning
candidates will be in a position to advance or oppose the
interests of such people. Candidates for the more important
offices are apt to attract campaign contributions more
readily; their campaigns, in turn, will be more expensive.
Whether a candidate has competition will affect the
cost of a campaign. The typical candidate seeks his party's
nomination before running in the final election. In Massa-
chusetts in 1970, winning the nomination required running in
a primary election open to fellow partisans and independent
voters alike; and for statewide candidates, campaigning for
a party's endorsement at a pre-primary convention. ^ a can-
didate who faces no competition will obviously incur no
expense other than the minimal cost necessary to place his
name on the ballot. For a particular constituency, the cost
should be greatest, in general, for a candidate who has oppo-
sition for his party's nomination and is challenged, also, in
the November election. The quality of the opposition varies,
of course. A candidate can anticipate a more expensive
2In 1973 the law requiring the pre-primary conven-
tion, which for many years served the Republicans better than
the Democrats, was repealed.
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campaign when he faces serious, able, well-known, and
adequately financed opponents.
Being well-known often means being the incumbent,
vrtiich affords certain advantages that either help reduce the
cost of campaigning, or attract funds which make an effec-
tive campaign more likely."^ Often one of the first tasks of
a challenger, particularly one who has not been actively
engaged in public affairs previously, is to make himself
known to the electorate. An incumbent, especially one who
has been in office for more than one term, does not suffer
from this disadvantage. An incumbent is also in a position
to do something for his constituents, thereby winning sup-
port, whereas his opponent has no opportunity to "run
errands," and can only make promises until he gains power.
An incumbent can use his staff for such constituency ser-
vice, as well as for other campaign purposes. Because
incumbents, as a rule, are more likely to win than their
opponents, they attract funds more readily from contribu-
tors who, for whatever their reasons, want to side with the
probable winner. Incumbency is advantageous, too, because
it provides opportxanities for free exposure to the voters
-^Regardless of party, incumbents are likely to
attract twice as much in contributions as challengers,
according to the most recent and exhaustive study of the
advantage of incumbency. See Common Cause, 1972 Congres-
sional Campaign Finances; New England States (Washington,
D.C. : Common Cause, 1974), p. vii.
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while an officeholder goes about doing his job. There is
little free publicity for a challenger. And finally, the
electorate is unlikely to replace an incumbent with a rela-
tively unknown person unless the incumbent has erred badly;
the voters seem to prefer a familiar face and name in office.
One characteristic of a district which affects the
cost of a campaign is the partisan preference of the voters.
Despite the erosion of the partisan spirit in Massachusetts,
the electorate in Massachusetts still lias a strong preference
for Democratic candidates. ^ This preference is most impor-
tant in districts which are decidedly one-party in their
makeup. Many seats in the House of Representatives and some
in the Senate, for example, are so safe for Democrats that
Republicans often do not contest them at all. in such cases,
the only candidates who incur any expense are those who seek
the Democratic nomination, which under the circumstances may
be hotly contested since it is tantamount to election. There
is also little genuine competition for seats on the Govern-
nor's Council, and races for the lesser statewide offices are
often feebly contested by underfinanced Republican candidates.
The strategy adopted by a candidate and the methods
he employs to communicate with the voters can affect the cost
^In 1970 there were 2,628,581 registered voters in
Massachusetts. Only 547,393 of them were Republicans;
1,135,103 were Democrats; 946,085 were Independents, accord-
ing to a record maintained by the Secretary of State's Elec-
tions Division.
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of his campaign considerably. One incumbent, for example,
might elect to remain "on the job" and ignore his lesser
known opponent; another, taking nothing for granted, might
carry the fight vigorously to his challenger. One candidate
might rely heavily on highly paid political consultants and
a paid staff, whereas another might rely much less on profes-
sional assistance and emphasize volunteer efforts to a
greater extent. One candidate might employ radio and TV
lavishly and sample public opinion frequently, whereas his
opponent might travel around the district more, and emphasize
newspaper ads, billboards, and mailings to the electorate.
The possibilities are numerous, and the choices made by a
candidate obviously affect his campaign's cost.
There are many ways whereby members of a political
party or interest group can assist a candidate with his cam-
paign which are not reflected in his reported campaign
expenses, but which certainly are the equivalent of money.
A party or group, for example, can promote someone's candi-
dacy by openly endorsing him; it can conduct voter regis-
tration drives; it can publicize his name and voting record
in its communications with its members, provide volunteers
during the campaign to distribute his literature, and on
election day encourage voters to vote by telephoning them
and offering transportation to the polls. All of these
services would otherwise have to be paid for by the
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candidate, or be foregone, if a party or group provides
them, a candidate's campaign costs can be reduced consider-
ably.
The law regulating campaigns affects their cost.
The Massachusetts campaign finance statute in 1970 was
essentially a full disclosure law; that is, it required all
candidates and their committees to report to the secretary
of state the sources of their contributions and the purposes
for which they spent any money. Names, addresses, dates,
and amounts were required in these periodic reports. Apart
from the prohibition against any corporate contributions,
and another provision which limited an individual's support
of any candidate to $3,000 in a calendar year, the law con-
tained no provisions which seriously impeded the free flow
of funds from contributors to candidates. It also placed
no restriction on how much any candidate for any office
could spend to finance his campaign, nor did it forbid any
specific type of expenditure, except for alcoholic bever-
ages. At the same time, there was no provision in the cam-
paign finance law which served to ease the burden on candi-
dates of the need to meet the costs of their campaigns.
There was, for example, no partial subsidy by the state of
the cost of campaigning by any candidate for any public
office.
^General Laws Annotated (1958), c. 55, as amended
by c. 444 of the Acts of 1962.
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Most, if not all, of the costs associated with
campaigns are related to the level of prices prevailing at
the time. As prices in general rise, therefore, so will the
costs of campaigns. Any valid comparison of Uxe costs of
recent elections, particularly in the 1970 's, would have to
take the inflation of the past several years into account.
Now that most of the principal factors affecting the
cost of campaigning have been identified and commented upon,
the balance of the chapter will focus on the cost of running
for statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the legis-
lature in Massachusetts in 1970. No attempt will be made to
give attention to each of the aforementioned factors in dis-
cussing these campaigns. For example, the last factor men-
tioned, the price level, will be ignored because this inquiry
is not concerned with trends in the costs of campaigns.
Another factor, campaign strategy and methods, will only
receive infrequent comment because the number of elections
studied prohibits more than this. Four factors, however,
will be emphasized: (1) the size of the electoral district,
(2) the power and prestige of the office, (3) the competition
faced, and (4) the candidate's status, incumbent or chal-
lenger. The first campaign which will be examined is the
gubernatorial contest.
The Cost of Campaic^ninq for Gov^rnr^r-
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In 1964 the voters of Massachusetts amended their
Constitution to provide a four-year term for governor, m
1966 the incumbent governor. Republican John A. Volpe, was
elected for a four-year term, and Republican Francis W.
Sargent was elected lieutenant governor. Early in 1969
Volpe became President Nixon's secretary of transportation,
and Sargent became the Bay State's governor. In 1970, as a
result of a constitutional amendment enacted in 1966, the
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor ran for the
first time as a team, as the presidential and vice presiden-
tial candidates do. In that year Governor Sargent defeated
Kevin H. White in the most expensive election in Massachu-
setts history.
White, formerly secretary of state, was serving his
first term as mayor of Boston when he announced his inten-
tion to seek the Democratic nomination for governor. At his
party's pre-primary convention in the summer of 1970, White
met opposition from two serious contenders for his party's
nomination, Maurice A. Donahue and Francis X. Bellotti.
Donahue, a veteran legislator, was then serving as president
of the Massachusetts Senate. Bellotti had served in 1963-64
as lieutenant governor, and had been an unsuccessful candi-
date for governor in 1964 and attorney general in 1966.
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Maurice Donahue won the endorsement of his party at the
pre-primary convention, but as is common in Democratic
politics in Massachusetts, the nomination was contested in
the primary. Donahue was not only opposed by White and
Bellotti, but by Kenneth P. O'Donnell as well. O'Donnell,
who had never held an elected position in state or national
government, had been an adviser and intimate of President
John F. Kennedy. His strategy was to avoid the bloodbath at
the pre-primary convention and conserve his resources for
the September priraary.^ Kevin H. White, the runner-up to
Donahue at the party's convention, won the nomination, poll-
ing 231,605 votes to Donahue's 218,665 votes.
In the November election the Democratic nominee and
Governor Sargent, who had encountered no opposition in either
his party's pre-primary convention or in the primary, con-
ducted vigorous campaigns, including a debate on statewide
television. Although White once again proved to be an
effective fund raiser. Governor Sargent was even more so.
White raised $907,490 and spent $823,849, and Sargent raised
and spent in excess of $2 million to retain his seat as
Now that there is no longer a pre-primcory convention
at which the major parties endorse their statewide candi-
dates, all such candidates (including incumbents) must now
gather 10,000 signatures to get their names on the primary
ballot. The impact of the new law, enacted by a Democratic
legislature which overrode Republican Governor Sargent's
veto, upon the cost of winning a nomination is unknown.
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governor. 7 Although he apparently had no difficulty raising
funds. White was at a disadvantage financially; he had to
overcome opposition from his fellow Democrats, not only at
the party's pre-primary convention, but during the primary
as well. This required him to spend $251,191 of all the
money he raised before the election campaign began. Sargent,
who reported spending $755,556 during the primary, outspent
Mayor White in the general election by more than two to one.
Table 1 indicates the receipts and expenditures of Governor
Sargent and Mayor White in their primary and election cam-
paigns. Sargent won the election. He and his running mate,
Donald R. Dwight, received 1,058,623 votes (51.8 per cent of
the total vote cast) ; Mayor White and his running mate,
Michael S. Dukakis, received 799,269 votes (39.1 per cent).^
If the amounts spent by Maurice Donahue, Francis
Bellotti, and Kenneth O'Donnell are added to the amounts
spent by Governor Sargent and Mayor White, the total for the
1970 gubernatorial campaign exceeded $3,400,000. Senator
7por White's finances, see the report filed by
Kevin H. White for Governor Committee with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records. For Sargent's, see The
Sargent Committee's report; see, also. Election Statistics,
1970 (Public Document 43), pp. 5-6. This source provides
the combined receipts, expenditures, and liabilities reported
by all candidates for governor as of December 31, 1970.
^There were an unusually high number of blank ballots
(176,007) recorded in the 1970 election. The 1966 constitu-
tional amendment required the voter to cast a single ballot
for governor and lieutenant governor; many voters did not.
Their votes were recorded as blanks.
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TABLE 1
CAI^IPAIGN RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC NOMINEES FOR
GOVERNOR IN MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970













. . . 2,015,278 823,849
SOURCES: For White, the report filed by the
Kevin H. White for Governor Committee with the Secre-
tary of State's Division of Public Records. For Sar-
gent, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of
State, Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document
43), pp. 5-6.
Donahue's campaign for the nomination required approxi-
mately $250,000. Bellotti's effort required more than
$200,000, and O'Donnell's at least $150,000.^ Ignoring
the amounts spent by Dwight and Dukakis, the two nominees
for the lieutenant governor's office, each of Sargent's
primary votes cost $4.13 (White's cost $1.08); each of
Sargent's votes in the election cost $1.19 (White's cost
^Reports filed by Donahue, Bellotti, O'Donnell, and




The 1970 gubernatorial campaign was indeed a very
expensive one, so costly that legislation was enacted in
1972 which will limit expenditures in the 1974 election.
The limitation seems reasonable. White demonstrated that a
stiff primary fight could be won, and a respectable election
campaign waged, with a total expenditure of much less than
$1,000,000. It should be noted, however, that in 1970 White
was a powerful incumbent mayor and was well known throughout
Massachusetts, factors which probably served to keep his
campaign's cost down. Allowing for this, it seems reasonable
to conclude that a campaign for governor ought not cost much
more than $1,000,000.
The Cost of Statewide Elections
other than for Governor
In addition to electing a governor every four years,
the voters in the Bay State also choose a lieutenant gover-
nor, attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer and
receiver general, and auditor. Table 2 lists the expenditures
^^For each man, the reported expenditures in the pri-
mary were divided by the number of votes received to deter-
mine the cost per vote. The same was done for the election.
^^Acts and Resolves (1972), c. 810. Chapter 810,
enacted in 1972 but effective January 1, 1974, limits most
of a gubernatorial candidate's expenditures for "image adver-
tising" purposes to $500,000 in seeking the nomination. He
and the nominee for lieutenant governor may together spend
no more than $500,000 for those purposes during the general
election. Chapter 810 is discussed further in Chapter V.
TABLE 2
CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES REPORTED BY NOMINEES
FOR STATEWIDE OFFICE, OTHER THAN FOR




ROJDert H. Quinn (D) §014 o^^
Donald L. Conn (R) a ' ' ' Sl^TlS
Lieutenant Governor
Michael S. Dukakis (D) 210 771Donald R. Dwight (R)^ \ [ 134^668
Treasurer and Receiver General
Robert Q. Crane (D)
. .
. 37,508
Frederick D. Hannon (R) 11^975
Auditor
Thaddeus Buczko (D) 16,257
Frank P. Bucci (R) 1^841
Secretary of State
John F. X. Davoren (D) 48,417
Mary B. Newman (R) 74,544
SOURCES: For all candidates except Dukakis,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Secretary of State,
Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43), pp.
5-6. For Dukakis, reports filed by his two commit-
tees with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records.
^Conn was among the three candidates who
reported liabilities. His totaled $19,000;
Dukakis', $2,372; and Newman's $14,302. A liability
is a financial obligation such as an outstanding
loan, or an expense incurred which had not been paid.
^All winners were incumbents except Dwight (the
office had been vacant since early 1969)
.
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reported by the nominees for these offices in 1970. other
than the governor's office, the second most powerful elective
office in the executive branch in state government is that of
attorney general. In 1970 the incumbent. Democrat Robert H..
Quinn, was opposed by Donald L. Conn. Quinn, a former
speaker of the House of Representatives, had no primary oppo-
sition; neither did Conn. Conn, formerly an assistant attor-
ney general under Eliott L. Richardson (Quinn's Republican
predecessor)
,
was reasonably successful in raising campaign
funds in a year in which incumbent Governor Francis W. Sar-
gent virtually monopolized fund raising from Republican
sources. Conn waged a serious, but underfinanced campaign,
spending $91,715 and incurring liabilities of $19, 000.
Quinn encountered little difficulty in raising the money to
finance his campaign. By April 7, 1970, more than one-half
year before the general election, he had reported contribu-
tions of more than $88,000 to the secretary of state. He
later reported spending a total of $214,271. The election
in November was hardly close; Quinn v;on with a plurality of
477,502 votes. In this race Quinn enjoyed the advantages of
^^Report filed by the Committee to Elect Donald L.
Conn Attorney General with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records. The campaign receipts, expenditures, and
liabilities which are subsequently mentioned for other
statewide candidates are derived from the reports they and
their committees submitted, and from the summary statement
in Election Statistics, 1970 (Public Document 43), pp. 5-6.
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being an incumbent, and outspent his opponent by more than
two to one.^-^
The race for lieutenant governor in 1970 can be dis-
tinguished from previous contests for that office in that for
the first time in the history of the Bay State, the nominees
of each party for governor and lieutenant governor were
required to run as a team. There was some short-lived com-
petition from the Republican nomination. Martin A. Linsky
of Brookline, the assistant minority leader in the House of
Representatives, was Governor Francis W. Sargent's original
choice for the nomination. Linsky 's alleged involvement in
an "early morning" incident, which was reported extensively
in the Boston press shortly before the Republican pre-primary
convention, was politically embarrassing for Sargent, and
Linsky thereafter did not seek the nomination, Until then,
he was a serious contender; Linsky 's reports to the secretary
of state indicated that he had received almost $17,000 in
campaign contributions and had spent almost $15,000.
Donald R. Dwight, Sargent's second choice, was the convention-
endorsed choice of the Republican Party for the nomination,
and ran uncontested in the primary. There were five con-
tenders for the Democratic nomination for lieutenant governor.
1 3For additional information about the financing of
Quinn's 1970 campaign, particularly about contributions from
his assistant attorneys general, see Chapter IV.
"^^See, for example, David Nyhan, "Linsky Charges
'Smear'," Boston Globe, 6 June 1970, p. 1.
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but Michael S. Dukakis clearly outdistanced his fellow
Democrats. Dukakis, a former well-known state legislator,
reported spending $210,771 and incurring liabilities of
$2,372. Although endorsed by the Democratic pre-primary
convention, a substantial portion of Dukakis' money was
spent in winning the Democratic nomination. Dwight,
unopposed in the primary, reported spending $134,668, about
$75,000 less than Dukakis. Although Dukakis outspent
Dwight, the outcome of the election for lieutenant governor
was to a large extent influenced by who the gubernatorial
nominees were. The electorate could not, as in previous
elections, cast separate ballots for their choices for
governor and lieutenant governor. In the November election
Republicans Sargent and Dwight emerged the victors over
Kevin H. White, Sargent's opponent for governor, and
Dukakis; their plurality was 259,354 votes.
The elections in 1970 for attorney general and lieu-
tenant governor provide some basis for a judgment about the
cost of a statewide contest. Conn, who had no opposition
for the Republican nomination for attorney general, spent
less than $100,000 and lost to Quinn, the incumbent, by
almost one-half million votes. Quinn, also unopposed for
the nomination, spent about $215,000. In a vigorously con-
tested race for attorney general in which a candidate had
opposition for the nomination, a minimum expenditure of
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$300,000 to $400,000 would seem necessary; this would average
out to 15 to 2 0 cents per voter in a statewide election in
which about 2,000,000 ballots are cast.^S ^he recent consti-
tutional amendment which requires the nominees for governor
and lieutenant governor to run as a team makes a judgment
about the cost of a caiapaign for lieutenant governor somewhat
more difficult than for attorney general. Candidates for
each office must win the nominations on their own. After the
nominations have been decided, however, a candidate for attor-
ney general must continue to campaign independently whereas
the campaign efforts of a candidate for lieutenant governor
can be joined, to a significant extent, with his running
mate's. The expenditures required to capture the lieutenant
governor's office should be less, therefore, than those of a
candidate for attorney general. -^^ The expenditures by
Dukakis, the unsuccessful Democratic nominee in 1970, and by
Dwight, the Republican victor, are helpful in making a judg-
ment about how much money is required for a race for
^^Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 allows a candidate
for attorney general to spend no more than $250,000 for cer-
tain mass media purposes in seeking the nomination. It per-
mits $250,000 in additional expenditures for those purposes
during the general election period, a total of $500,000.
•'•^A candidate for lieutenant governor is limited by
Chapter 310 to $100,000 in expenditures for certain mass
media purposes in seeking the nomination. He and the candi-
date for governor together may spend $500,000 for those pur-
poses during the general election period.
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lieutenant governor. Dukakis had opposition in the primary
and spent more than $210,000; Dwight had none, and spent
about $135,000. In a vigorously contested election for lieu-
tenant governor in which a candidate had opposition for the
nomination, an expenditure of $200,000 to $300,000 would seem
reasonable.
Campaign Costs for Treasurer, Auditor, and Secretary
of State. For more than two decades Democratic candidates
have been successful in every election in capturing each of
three minor statewide executive offices (treasurer and
receiver general, secretary of state, and auditor) . The 1970
election was no exception.
In the race for treasurer and receiver general in
1970 the Democratic candidate was Robert Q. Crane and the
Republican candidate was Frederick D. Hannon. Crane, the
incumbent treasurer, easily defeated his Republican chal-
lenger by a plurality of 595,699 votes. Hannon, who had no
opposition for the Republican nomination, was politically
unknown to most voters and his campaign was clearly under-
financed. He reported spending only $11,975, whereas Crane's
reported expenditures were $37,508.^^ Crane, unopposed in
the Democratic primary, not only had the advantages of being
the incumbent, but outspent Hannon by more than three to one.
^^An incumbent treasurer has a "natural" campaign
finance constituency, the banking community. For a discus-
sion of this point, and for additional detail 2aDOUt Crane's
csunpaign financing for his reelection in 1970, see Chapter
IV.
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Incumbent state Auditor Thaddeus Buczko won by the
greatest plurality of any statewide candidate in the 1970
election; his margin over his Republican opponent, Frank P.
Bucci, was 648,605 votes. Bucci's campaign was even more
underfinanced than Hannon's. Bucci, who had no opposition
in the Republican primary, reported spending only $1,841.
Clearly a "sacrificial lamb," he was offered as a token oppo-
nent by the Republican Party to the well-entrenched incum-
bent, Buczko, who reported spending $16,257 in his campaign.
The lack of vigor in Bucci's campaign is demonstrated by the
fact that until October 1, 1970 he had reported but $35 in
campaign contributions to the secretary of state.
The elections of 1970 for treasurer and auditor pro-
vide little, if any, insight as to what it costs to run for
a statewide office in Massachusetts. They do emphasize the
fact, however, that underfinanced and unknown Republican
candidates cannot successfully wage campaigns against Demo-
cratic incumbents in a state which traditionally elects
Democrats to the lesser statewide offices. The race for
secretary of state, however, does afford an idea of the cost
of campaigning for one of the three lesser statewide offices.
In 1970 Mary B. Newman, a Republican legislator for more than
a decade and a person considered by many to be one of the
ablest members of the House of Representatives, ran as the
Republican candidate for secretary of state against the
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incumbent, John P. x. Davoren, a former speaker of the House
of Representatives. Mrs. Newman waged an effective campaign
but lost the November election. Davoren polled 1,001,528
votes; Newman polled 831,150 votes. No Republican candidate
other than Governor Francis W. Sargent (and his running mate.
Lieutenant Governor Donald R. Dwight) polled more votes than
Newman. Davoren's plurality was 170,378 votes, a substan-
tial margin.
Davoren, who was unopposed for the nomination,
reported spending $48,417, of which almost half ($23,646) was
spent in the general election campaign. Newman's campaign
cost $79,699, almost twice as much as her opponent's. In
a report to her contributors, she stated:
We needed a little more money, a little
earlier. If an additional $15,000 could have
been put into television beginning three weeks
before the election we are convinced that
enough votes could have been changed to insure
victory. In other words, we believe we could
have won with a budget of $100,000.19
18Letter from Mary B. Newman to her campaign con-
tributors, December 1, 1970. This amount, spent as of
November 10, 1970, differs somewhat from the amount offi-
cially reported in Public Document 43. According to that
source, as of December 31, 1970, Newman's campaign for
secretary of state had required expenditures of $74,554,
with liabilities outstanding amounting to $14,302. Despite
the discrepancy, the text which follows relies upon the
letter from Newman to her campaign contributors because it
provides subst^mtial detail.
19Ibid. After the November election, Newman sent
a report to each individual who had contributed to her cam-
paign^ explaining how her campaign had been financed and
detailing how the contributions she had received had been
47
Most of the money spent by Newman's committee was
used to communicate with the voters by radio, television,
and the printed word. Approximately $57,000 was used for
that purpose. More than $30,000 of that sum was spent on
a five-week radio effort which consisted of 1,963 one-minute
messages played on more than thirty different stations.
Slightly more than $8,000 was used to finance eighty-nine
half
-minute spots on television (using eight of the state's
nine commercial television stations) during the final six
days of the campaign. More than one-half million handout
items (bumper stickers, match books, hand cards, etc.) and
signs required an expenditure of approximately $18,000. A
staff of five people working out of one rented office, and
a headquarters office which had been furnished at no charge,
required an additional expenditure of slightly more than
$5,000. A detailed breakdown of Newman's expenditures is
found in Table 3.
Newman not only required "a little more money, a
little earlier," but failed to offset all of her campaign
expenses with contributions. She was able to raise $59,578
from 1,302 contributors. Although almost $35,000 was raised
spent. This report is valuable because it is the only known
report of a statewide candidate in recent years which has
been made available in a form that is readily understood.
It is of particular value because it provides reliable,
detailed evidence about the cost of a recent statewide race
in Massachusetts for a minor office.
TABLE 3









































SOURCE: Letter from Mary B. Newman to her
campaign contributors, December 1, 1970.
49
from contributions of $100 or more, including sixteen
contributions of $500 or more, more than 1,000 of her con-
tributions were less than $100. The average contribution
received was $46. Because Newman was unable to generate
sufficient cash contributions she was required to finance
her campaign partially with loans. As late as mid-November,
1970 she reported a deficit in excess of $20,000, of which
$12,000 was accounted for by personal or guaranteed loans
from seven individuals. Most of the money which she received
was contributed after her ncmiination in the Sept^ber primary,
in which she was unopposed. Apart from any loans, her cash
contributions prior to September 15 amounted to less than
$11,000. In the six-week period, September 16 through Octo-
ber 31, 1970, she received more than $42,000 in contributions.
In a letter to campaign contributors Newman stated
that she did not claim to know what a statewide campaign
should cost, but she noted the tremendous range in expendi-
tures that had been reported by candidates for governor as
well as for other statewide executive offices. She argued:
In theory it should cost no more to run for
Governor than for Auditor. In fact, from our
experience, there is an extra burden on a candi-
date for a lesser known office who must make the
public aware of the office — if not of its very
existence. 20
Newman's statement has some merit in that all candidates for
20 Ibid.
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statewide office have a constituency of the same size. The
governor, however, is the most powerful and prestigious
figure in state government. Candidates for governor are not
only more apt to attract campaign contributions but require
substantially more money for their campaigns. The public,
in general, and the candidates' parties, in particular,
expect candidates for the top office to wage more vigorous
and visible campaigns, to travel throughout the state more,
communicating with the electorate about a variety of issues
and concerns, many far more important than those to which a
lesser statewide candidate ordinarily addresses himself.
Based on Mary Newirian's campaign for secretary of state in
1970 it would seem reasonable to conclude that an able can-
didate, assisted by a skilled staff, could conduct an effec-
tive campaign for one of the lesser statewide offices (secre-
tary of state, treasurer, and auditor) with a budget of
approximately $100,000 to $125,000 if no vigorous opposition
for the nomination was encountered. The cost of winning a
statewide race would increase substantially, of course, if
there was primary opposition. In that case, an expenditure
of at least $200,000 would probably be required. In an
election in which 2,000,000 votes were cast this would average
^^Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 limits a candidate
for secretary of state, treasurer, and auditor to spending
no more than $100,000 for most media expenditures in seeking
the nomination; an additional $100,000 is allowed for the
election campaign.
out to a modest 10 cents per voter. If the candidate was
an incumbent, or well known throughout the state, the cost
could be appreciably less; Davoren's campaign in 1970 illus-
trates this.
It is not uncommon that voters do not know the names
of the occupants of the lesser statewide offices. This is
also true of the Governor's Council, perhaps the least
"visible" political institution in the Commonwealth. The
cost of campaigning for the Council is discussed next.
The Cost of Campaigning for
the Governor's Council
The Governor's Council, an institution which dates
back to Colonial times, consists of eight members who are
elected every two yeaors from councillor districts comprised
of five Senate districts. The principal function of the
Governor's Council today is to approve or disapprove of the
governor's judicial nominations. The Council usually meets
once a week, and the job pays $4,000 annually.
In 1970 the eight seats on the Governor's Council
were won by Democrats. Six incumbents retained their seats;
two councillors did not seek reelection. There was some
competition in the Democratic primary in five councillor
districts, but only one of the eight seats was contested by
a Republican candidate in the general election.
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In three districts (the Second, Fourth, and Fifth)
incumbent Democratic Councillors Herbert L. Connolly of
Newton, Patrick J. McDonough of Boston, and Thomas J. Lane
of Lawrence were unopposed in both the primary and general
election. Connolly reported spending nothing to retain his
seat; McDonough reported spending only $443, and Lane but
22$1,049. It is interesting to note that Patrick J.
McDonough, a former state legislator from 1941-46 and a
member of the Governor's Council from 1947 to the present,
was the beneficiary of one of the largest testimonial din-
ners held recently for a Massachusetts politician. On Sep-
tember 25, 1972 at Anthony's Pier 4 in Boston, McDonough
was honored by a $100-per-person dinner aboard the S.S. Peter
Stuyvesant, an affair attended by virtually every politician
of importance in Boston.
The races in the five councillor districts (the
First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth) in which there was
some competition for the Democratic nomination afford some
idea, although an inadequate one, as to the amount of money
required to run for a seat on the Council today. In the
^^Reports filed by Connolly, McDonough, and Lane with
the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. The
subsequent discussion of expenditures by candidates, in addi-
tion to these three, relies upon the reports they filed.
23
'•'David Nyhan, "McDonough a Beacon for His Big
Night," Boston Globe
, 26 September 1972, p. 3. Other testi-
monials are discussed at length in Chapter III.
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First District, Nicholas W. Mitchell of Fall River, the
incumbent, spent $4,848 in defeating two primary opponents;
in the Third District, incumbent George F. Cronin, Jr. of
Boston, spent $4,442 in defeating two opponents in the Demo-
cratic primary; in the Sixth District, incumbent G. Edward
Bradley of Somerville spent $811 to defeat one opponent for
the nomination; in the Seventh District, William J. McManus
of Worcester spent $6,832 in defeating four fellow Demo-
crats; and in the Eighth District, Edward M. O'Brien of East-
hampton defeated four Democratic rivals in the primary and
spent $10,310. McManus and O'Brien, the Democratic nominees
in the Seventh and Eighth Districts, waged the most expen-
sive campaigns; they v/ere not incumbents. Each was success-
ful in the general election. The costs incurred by the eight
Democrats who won seats on the Council in 1970 are presented
in Table 4.
A better indication of what it costs to run success-
fully for a seat on the Governor's Council is provided by
the race in the Eighth District, won by Edward M. O'Brien.
O'Brien met opposition not only in the Democratic primary,
but was the only candidate for the Governor's Council in 1970
to have a Republican opponent in the November election.
H. George Wilde, of Lee, the Republican nominee, reported
spending a total of $12,032 in the primary and election.
Wilde, although having an opponent in the primary, spent most
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O'Brien's four opponents in the Democratic primary,
Anthony W. Ravosa of Springfield made the most serious bid
for the nomination. Ravosa reported spending $15,447 during
the primary whereas O'Brien spent less, $10,310. In the
November election O'Brien reported spending $6,478. Although
he was outspent by his Republican opponent, Wilde, he won the
election handily; O'Brien received 131,770 votes, and Wilde,
73,756. The expenditures reported by these three candidates
were as follows:
Primary Election Total
O'Brien (D) $10,310 $ 6,478 $16,788
Ravosa (D) 15,447 — 15,447
Wilde (R) 1,164 10,868 12,032
It seems plausible that candidates for the Governor's
Council might have some difficulty raising sufficient funds
because the Council is not known to many voters, its power
is essentially limited to the confirmation of judicial
appointees, and its prestige still suffers from evidence of
corruption unearthed by the Massachusetts Crime Commission
in the mid-1960 's. A councillor district is quite large,
nonetheless, containing approximately 250,000 voters, and a
candidate with substantial opposition in both the primary
and election would undoubtedly need more than the $16,788
reported spent by O'Brien in 1970. An expenditure of $40,000
to $50,000 (15 to 20 cents per voter) in a hard fought campaign
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is a distinct possibility. 24 how readily a candidate could
attract this much money in campaign contributions is another
matter.
Our attention now turns to the cost of campaigning
for the Senate, a far more "visible" institution than the
Council, whose members are chosen for a two-year term by
constituencies only one-fifth as large as councillor dis-
tricts.
The Cost of Campaigning for
the Massachusetts Senate
In 1970, 101 candidates, thirty-five of whom were
incumbents, contested forty seats in the legislature's upper
house. In some cases, candidates met no opposition in either
the primary or election. In other cases, they met opposition
in only the primary or election. And in a few cases, they
met opposition in both. Because campaign finance reports
filed with the secretary of state were available for only
ninety-three of the 101 candidates, what follows pertains only
to them. The primary objective in this section is to provide
evidence as to how much it cost to run for a Senate seat in
1970, and to suggest what it might cost to run in a competitive
campaign in the future. Of the ninety-three candidates whose
24Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 limits a candidate
for Governor's Council to spending no more than $25,000 for




reports were examined, only fourteen spent more than $10,000
during their campaigns; more than three-quarters of the
candidates spent less than $10,000, and more than one-half
spent less than $5,000. Eight candidates reported no expense
whatsoever, whereas the most expensive race required an
expenditure of $36,867. See Table 5. The expenditures
reported by the ninety-three candidates totaled $489,637, an
average of $5,265 per candidate. This figure is roughly
comparable to a finding by Mileur and Sulzner; they estab-
lished that the average expense of Senate nominees in the 1968
general election was about $4,600.25 as might be expected,
those campaigns which cost the least (if anything at all)
were the thirteen in which the candidate was neither opposed
in the primary or election. On the other hand, the most
expensive included, but were not necessarily limited to, those
in which a candidate met opposition in both the primary and
election (eleven cases)
. Sometimes a candidate had a "free
ride" in either the primary or election, but encountered
vigorous opposition in the other phase of the electoral
process. For example, in five races, candidates who had no
primary opposition reported spending more than $10,000 in
the election; and in four contests, candidates who had no
^^Mileur and Sulzner, Campaigning for the Massachu-
setts Senate
, p. 79. The authors did not include expendi-
tures incurred during the primary; had they, the average
cost would have exceeded $4,600.
opponents in the election were actively opposed in the
primary, and reported spending more than $10,000.
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TABLE 5
CAMPAIGN COSTS^ REPORTED BY NINETY-THREE
CANDIDATES FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS
SENATE IN 1970



















SOURCE: Reports filed by candidates
and their committees with the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.
Costs are for both the primary and
election and include liabilities (obli-
gations incurred but not paid).
Table 5 affords some insight into the cost of a
Senate race in 1970, but a comparison of the costs incurred
by incumbent senators who ran for reelection with the costs
reported by non-incumbents is more instructive. Of the
forty incumbent senators, five chose not to run for re-
election. Of the thirty-five who ran, thirty-two retained
their seats; two were defeated in the primary, and one in
the election. One striking fact about the reelection cam-
paigns of the thirty-five incumbents, which cannot be
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ignored, is that thirteen of them were unopposed in both the
primary and election campaigns. Moreover, twenty-six of them
had no primary opponents, and seventeen of them were unopposed
in the election. Only three of them met opposition in both
the primary and election. Table 6 lists the thirty-five
incumbents and their reported expenses. It also identifies
whether these candidates were opposed in the primary and
election, and if they retained their seats. When the cam-
paign costs reported by the thirty-five incumbents are com-
pared to the costs incurred by the fifty-eight candidates who
were not incumbents, it is apparent that the incumbents, on
the average, spent less. Of the $489,637 spent by all ninety-
three candidates, the thirty-five incumbents spent $153,954,
an average of $4,399 each. The fifty-eight non-incumbents
reported spending $335,683, or $5,788 each; their campaigns
were $1,389 more expensive, on the average, than the campaigns
of the incumbents. A comparison of the costs of the campaigns
of incumbents and non-incumbents is as follows:
Reported Cost Incumbents Non-inciambents$04 4
1- 999 7 15
1,000-4,999 11 14
5,000-9,999 10 14
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An inquiry into several of the more expensive
contests for seats in the upper house in 1970 provides
further insight into the cost of campaigns. Table 7 iden-
tifies the fifteen candidates, of whom only five were incum-
bents, who reported spending the most for their campaigns.
In all cases but one, the reported expense exceeded $10,000.
Nine of these fifteen candidates, including all the incum-
bents, were elected. In ten of these races there was oppo-
sition for the nomination, and of the twelve candidates who
were nominated, eleven faced opponents in the general elec-
tion.
A brief examination of six of the fifteen most expen-
sive campaigns, four of them involving incumbents, is very
helpful in making a judgment about the cost of a contested
Senate election. The first was the most expensive campaign
for a Senate seat in 1970 in terms of the araount spent by
one candidate, as well as by all candidates vying for that
seat. In the race for a vacant seat in the Eighth Middlesex
District nine contenders sought the Democratic nomination;
the winner was Irving Fishman (Democrat-Ne\^^ton)
. The Repub-
lican challenger was Monte G. Basbas, a former mayor of the
city. Basbas, unopposed for his party's nomination, reported
spending $36,867, more than any other candidate for the
Senate in 1970. Fisliman spent $20,929. If the amounts of































































i 73 H (U
Id ffi H >i 0>
<D C • -H •H




•d M 5 •H U
c (0 >
Id 0 ^ 0) (M Id <M
















(1) Xi J3 (1)
13 ta H +J fH
0 x; -a
o no
(d 0) 0) -H •H -H





































































































































































































C ^ G c ^ U-t "«—
G CI iH C Q •H
(U <U
s 5
Id ^ 0 T3
« H 3 H
Qi ^ 0 xi 2 <u
CO •H
.a ^§ • U-l• 0 Cm W
Hi 0) CO CO 04 -p •P
0) G cd +J
m § G G)
•H w U S (d S
G M r—
1
(I) M-t 0) «H H m C M-l




















































for the Democratic nomination are assumed to be sufficient
evidence, Fishman faced serious and adequately financed oppo-
sition from only three of his rivals for the nomination. Of
them, Terry P. Segal of Newton spent the most, $11,758. If
the amounts spent by the nine Democratic candidates (approxi-
mately $50,000) are added to Basbas' reported expense, the
ten candidates who sought the seat in the Eighth Middlesex
District spent in excess of $86,000 in 1970. That race, in
which Fishman defeated Basbas by approximately 6,000 votes,
was very expensive indeed.
Although the amount reported spent was not nearly as
much, the contest in the Cape and Plymouth District bears a
resemblance to the previous election in that the seat was
vacant. Unlike the previous race, however, the Cape and
Plymouth District is a safe Republican district, and although
contested by the Democrats in the November election, was won
handily by the Republican nominee, John F. Aylmer of Barn-
stable. The prospect of a Republican victory provoked com-
petition among Aylmer and two other Republican aspirants for
the nomination. Together, they reported spending approxi-
mately $28,000 in their primary campaigns. Aylmer, who won
a narrow victory in the primary, beating his closest opponent
by less than 500 votes, reported spending $15,938. He had no
trouble in the election, winning by a margin of approximately
25,000 votes.
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The second most expensive race for a Senate seat in
1970 involved an incumbent, George D. Hammond (Republican-
Westfield)
,
who successfully retained his seat in the Hampden
and Berkshire District. Hammond, unopposed for the Repub-
lican nomination, reported spending a total of $28,680 in his
reelection campaign. His Democratic opponent, Robert Ryan of
Springfield, handily defeated an opponent for his party's
nomination, but then lost to Hammond in the November election
by approximately 5,000 votes. Ryan spent $6,958, approxi-
mately one-fourth of what Hammond spent.
The election in the Second Middlesex District is
interesting because of the large expenditures by an unsuc-
cessful candidate for the Democratic nomination, David A.
Wylie. This seat was retained by incumbent Senator Francis X.
McCann (Democrat-Cambridge)
, who reported spending only
$3,107. Wylie, however, reported spending $24,339 in the
primary alone. Although outspent by roughly eight to one,
McCann edged Wylie in the primary by about 2,000 votes. He
had no Republican opponent in the November election.
In the Norfolk and Suffolk District, an incumbent
senator failed to retain his seat. As in the above case,
there was a vigorously contested and expensive race for the
Democratic nomination, and there was no Republican opponent
in the November election. Senator Beryl W. Cohen (Democrat-
Brookline) was defeated in a four-way race for the Democratic
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nomination in which Jack H. Bactaan of Brookline reported
spending §16,960, whereas Cohen reported spending but 55,749.
Baokman's margin of victory in the primary was less than 300
votes.
The final case involves a second incumbent who failed
to retain his seat. In a relatively expensive race in the
First Middlesex District, a newcomer to the Senate, B. Joseph
Tully of Dracut, defeated incumbent Democrat John E. Harring-
ton, Jr. of Lowell in a close five-way contest for the nomi-
nation. Tully reported spending $12,885, and the expenses
reported by his four opponents for the nomination totaled
$21,079. Harrington, the losing incumbent, reported spending
$8,443. Tully received roughly one-third of the votes cast
in the Democratic primary, topping his nearest rival by
approximately 1,400 votes, and went on to win handily against
a Republican opponent in the November election.
In conclusion, it can be expensive to unseat an incum-
bent senator. Backman did it in the Norfolk and Suffolk Dis-
trict, and Tully was successful in the First Middlesex Dis-
trict. Wylie came close, but failed, in the Second Middlesex
District. It can be expensive, too, for an incumbent to
retain his seat. The best example of this is Hammond's race
in the Hampden and Berkshire District. It is apparent, also,
that it is expensive to mount a successful campaign for a
vacant seat, even when the district is not very competitive.
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Aylmer'a election in the Cape and Plymouth Dietrict is
evidence of this, it is even more expensive when the dis-
trict is competitive, as Basbas' and Pishman's campaigns
demonstrate. How much should a competitive campaign reason-
ably cost today? Certainly not $70,000, the reported cost
of the most expensive campaign waged by a winning candidate
26in 1972. In the typical Senate district in 1970 approxi-
mately 50,000 ballots were cast. Even if a candidate spent
$1 to appeal to each voter his expense would total only
$50,000. None of the candidates who ran the most expensive
campaigns in 1970 came close to this. A total of approxi-
mately $25,000 for all purposes would seem adequate, although
the legislature, in a recent amendment to the campaign
finance law, allowed a candidate to spend a maximum of
$30,000 to offset many, but not all, of the major costs of a
caunpaign.^^
When the voters elect their senators they also elect
240 members to a two-year term in the Massachusetts House of
^^Representative Chester G. Atkins (Democrat-Acton)
elected to the House for the first time in 1970, made a suc-
cessful bid for the Senate two years later. Atkins reported
spending in excess of $22,000 for the nomination, and more
than $47,000 during the general election period. He also
declared liabilities of $31,000 in his report to the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.
27chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 sets a ceiling upon
the auaount of money which a candidate for the Senate may spend
during the primary and election for television, radio, news-
paper, magazine, billboard, and postage expense. A candidate
may spend up to $15,000 for these purposes to win the nomina-
tion, and an additional $15,000 during the election.
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Representatives, the second largest lower house in the fifty
state legislatures. The cost of campaigning for the House
of Representatives is discussed next.
The Cost of Campai^ninc^ for the Massarhn^^i-^-,
House ot Representatives ~
—
In 1970, 581 persons (421 Democrats and 160 Republi-
cans) who wanted to be state representatives on Beacon Hill
sought the nominations of the two major parties. The Demo-
crats nominated 218 candidates and the Republicans, 129.
There were 364 candidates in the November election, including
seventeen independent candidates. The Democrats prevailed in
November, winning about three-fourths of the 240 seats, not
surprising since the Republicans provided opposition in little
more than one-half of the races. Because so many candidates
made bids for House seats, only the campaign finance reports
of winning candidates were examined in an effort to establish
what it cost in 1970 to win an election for the House of
Representatives. A review of the records of 225 successful
candidates, 173 of whom were Incumbents, does provide some
idea of what it cost (the campaign finance reports of fifteen
winning candidates were not avail«a>le) Eleven of the 225
candidates reported no expense whatsoever. More than one-
half of them (120 candidates) spent less than $2,000. A cam-
paign costing more than $5,000 was uncommon; only 13.8 per
28Reports filed by candidates and their committees
with the Secreteury of State's Division of Public Records.
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cent (thirty-one candidates) reported campaigns that costly.
Only four of the 225 candidates spent in excess of $10,000,
the most expensive campaign costing $15,921. See Table 8
for the campaign costs reported by the 225 successful candi-
dates.
TABLE 8
C7VMPAIGN COSTS* REPORTED BY 225 SUCCESSFUL
CANDIDATES FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES IN 1970












10,000 or more 4
225
SOURCE: Reports filed by candidates
and their committees with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records.
^Costs are for both primary and elec-
tion and include liabilities (obligations
incurred but not paid)
.
The above figures, however, provide only the roughest
guide to the cost of a House campaign in 1970. A look at the
twenty-five most expensive campaigns in that year affords an
idea of how much it cost to be elected when a candidate had
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opposition. Of the twenty-five candidates who spent the
most—nineteen of whom were Democrats, and six Republicans-
only ten were incumbents. Twenty of the candidates had pri-
mary opponents, and all but three had opponents in the Novem-
ber election. Seventeen of the twenty-five were opposed in
both the primary and election. The districts in which these
campaigns were waged were largely urban and suburban in
character, and were located in some of the larger cities and
towns in seven of the Commonwealth's counties. Fourteen of
these districts were multi-member districts. The expendi-
tures reported by these twenty-five House candidates, pre-
sented in Table 9, ranged from $5,384 to $15,921. They
totaled $200,873, an average of $8,035 per candidate.
A more detailed study of the costs incurred by six
candidates for the House of Representatives in 1970 gener-
ally affirms the findings about the twenty-five most expen-
sive House campaigns. In 1972, members of the staff of House
Minority Leader Francis W. Hatch of Beverly examined the
campaign costs incurred by six successful Republicans in
their first campaigns for the House of Representatives.^^
^^Representative Hatch directed SAVE (Sustain a
Veto) , the effort to elect Republican candidates to the House
of Representatives in 1972. Three members of his staff,
Peter Berg, William Harwood, and Field Reichardt, analyzed
the campaign costs of six successful first-time candidates
in 1970 in order to provide a basis for advising Republican
candidates in 1972. See "Budgets Used by Successful House
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These candidates ran for seats in a variety of districts
throughout the state. One was a rural district in Franklin
county, in western Massachusetts; one was a suburban district
near the city of Brockton; one was a district in the metro-
politan Boston area; and three were urban districts in Law-
rence, Worcester, and Gloucester. AH but the metropolitan
Boston district were single-member districts. Three of the
six candidates encountered no opposition in their primary
races, but all had opponents in the election. The expendi-
tures reported by the three candidates with opposition only
in the November election averaged $5,337. The expenses
reported by the three candidates who were opposed in both
the primary and election averaged $6,913. The expenses
reported by the six candidates were as follows: ^0
District Primary Election Total
Worcester $4,580 $5,370 $9,950Suburban 0 6,890 6,890
Rural 890 4,930 5,720
Metro. Boston 0 5,080 5,080Gloucester 1,940 3,130 5,070
Lawrence 0 4,040 4,040
The most expensive campaign in 1970 for the House of
Representatives was waged by Chester G. Atkins of Acton, a
twenty-one year old Democratic candidate who captured a seat
30Ibid. Three of these candidates were Representa-
tives Ames, Simons and Lionett, each of whom is included in
Table 9 which lists the twenty-five most expensive campaigns.
There are some discrepancies between the figures in Berg's
study and those in the table, but they are minor.
in the Thirty-third Middlesex District. Atkins- campaign
cost $15,921. Most of this money was raised and spent in
the primary, although a substantial amount was spent during
the election. Although numerous small contributions were
received by Atkins' committee, the cost of his primary and
election campaigns was borne largely by him, with some
assistance from his parents. Atkins personally contributed
$6,900 toward his campaign, and loaned his committee an
additional $1,900. His parents contributed $2,000, and also
loaned $500 to his campaign. Together, he and his parents
accounted for $11,300 of the funds spent in this unusually
expensive race for a House seat.^^ Atkins defeated the
Republican nominee in the November election after having won
a stiff primary fight against an opponent who had spent only
$2,715. Atkins polled 1,969 votes in the primary, edging
his opponent by 457 votes. Each of Atkins' votes in the
primary cost approximately $5. One would have to agree with
Martin A. Linsky that Atkins' campaign was one of "the most
lavish and heavily personally financed in Massachusetts' his-
tory . ""^^
^^Reports filed by Atkins and his committee with the
Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
-''•Linsky, former assistant minority leader of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives, expressed the same
opinion about Atkins' extremely expensive ccunpaign for the
state Senate in 1972. Atkins soon after co-authored a book.
Getting Elected; A Guide to Winning State And Local Office .
In his book Atkins ironically offers prospective candidates
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The Atkins campaign, then, was hardly a typical House
campaign in 1970. Its cost was excessive. A much more
realistic figure for the cost of a campaign for a seat in the
House of Representatives—if a candidate had an opponent in
the primary and election—is provided by the author's inquiry
into the twenty-five most expensive campaigns, and the study
by Representative Hatch's staff. For a campaign in a single-
member district $5,000 to $8,000 would seem quite adequate. 33
Siammary and Conclusions
In siimmary, a total of about $5,500,000 was reported
spent in Massachusetts in 1970 on behalf of all candidates
for statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the state
legislature. 34 The cost of the election for governor far
the advice of using as much volunteer assistance as possible,
and makes no mention in the chapter devoted to campaign
finance about the large expenditures he incurred in his two
campaigns. See Linsky's scathing book review, "A Radiclib
Guide to Winning Elections: Money," Real Paper (Boston), 16
May 1973, p. 4.
—
^3chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 sets a limitation
upon a House candidate's television, radio, newspaper, maga-
zine, billboard, and postage expense during the primary and
election. A House candidate may spend no more than $5,000
during the primary, and an additional $5,000 during the
election.
All districts will be single-member districts,
beginning with the 1974 election, as a result of an amend-
ment to the Massachusetts Constitution approved by the voters
in 1972.
^^An estimate is necessary because Public Document 43
does not present campaign expenditures in a way which allows
the reader to ascertain the cost of all campaigns for the
House, Senate, or Council. Moreover, although the total
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exceeded any other, accounting for more than $3,400,000, with
the incumbent reporting more than one-half of the total.
Only three candidates for other statewide offices, the incum-
bent attorney general and the two nominees for lieutenant
governor, reported spending in excess of $100,000 to finance
their campaigns. The cost of the elections for the eight
seats on the Governor's Council was surprisingly low, only
two candidates reporting expenditures greater than $15,000.
Of the ninety-three candidates for the Senate, who together
reported expenditures totaling almost $500,000, only fourteen
spent more than $10,000. And of the 225 successful candidates
for the House of Representatives, whose total campaign costs
also approximated $500,000, only thirty-one reported expen-
ditures exceeding $5,000.
Of the several factors which affect the cost of ccun-
paigns, four are especially worthy of comment. The first is
the size of the electoral district. As anticipated, state-
wide elections were, in general, the most expensive. Cam-
paigns for the Senate and House of Representatives, in that
order, were less expensive. In elections for the House,
fourteen of the twenty-five most expensive campaigns involved
multi-member districts. Because there was only one contest
expenditures by all candidates for each statewide office are
given, it is not possible to determine from PD 43 what par-
ticular candidates spent during their campaigns. There are
deficiencies, in addition to these, which could easily be
remedied and would make the summary statement more readable
and useful.
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for the Governor's Council in which there was competition in
both the primary and election, there is scant basis for a
judgment, although it should be noted that the costs reported
by two candidates in that race exceeded the costs reported by
all but six candidates for the Senate.
The second factor affecting the cost of campaigns
which warrants comment is the power and prestige of the
office. Of all the offices considered, the governor's is
clearly the most powerful and prestigious, and most observers
rank the office of attorney general second. The other state-
wide offices are definitely of lesser importance. Quarrels
might arise about the status of a governor's councillor, but
a senator would be ranked above a representative. As noted
in the above remarks about the size of the electoral district.-
campaign costs in 1970 generally followed this ordering of
the relative importance of these offices, with the expense
reported by the candidates for governor and attorney general
providing the best evidence that the more important the
office, the more expensive the campaign will be.
Competition is the third factor affecting the cost
of campaigns which deserves further mention. As expected,
when there was serious competition for an office, campaign
expenditures were greater than when competition was minimal
or absent. The election for governor in 1970, which required
expenditures totaling $3.4 million, is the best exmmple of a
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Vigorously contested statewide race. The election for
auditor, in which the Republican, Bucci, reported spending
only §1,841, best illustrates a statewide contest wherein
competition was essentially absent, m several elections
for the Governor's Council, the Senate, and House of Repre-
sentatives there were no opponents for candidates in the
primary or election, or both, and the campaign expenditures
reported were correspondingly low—if any expense at all was
reported, when competition was present, however, the story
was much different. In the only vigorously contested elec-
tion for the Governor's Council, for example, three candi-
dates reported spending a total of more than §44,000, more
than twice the total reported spent by the winners of the
other seven seats on the Council. And, of the fifteen can-
didates who reported spending the most in campaigns for the
Senate (all but one spent more than §10,000), ten faced oppo-
nents in the primary, and eleven had opposition in the elec-
tion. Finally, of the twenty-five candidates who waged the
most expensive campaigns for the House of Representatives,
twenty were opposed in the primary, and twenty-two in the
election. In brief, competition increased the cost of
campaigns.
The fourth factor affecting the cost of campaigns
which merits attention is whether a candidate was an incum-
bent or not. Incumbents, with few exceptions, were
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successful in retaining office in 1970. No statewide
incumbent, for example, was defeated; nor was any of the
six incumbents who ran for the Governor's Council unseated.
Only three of the thirty-five incumbents who sought re-
election to the Senate failed to win, and in the 225 cam-
paigns for the House of Representatives studied, only twenty-
one of 194 incumbents v/ho ran for reelection lost their
seats. Of those candidates who seriously challenged incum-
bents, several failed to raise sufficient funds to finance
successful campaigns. One good example of a statewide can-
didate is Mary Newman, the Republican nominee for secretary
of state, who maintained her campaign required "a little more
money, a little earlier." The most interesting and conclu-
sive evidence, however, pertains to campaigns for the Senate,
in which challengers generally fared badly. Of the ninety-
three candidates whose expenditures were examined, the
thirty-five incumbents spent an average of $4,399; the
fifty-eight challengers reported spending an average of
$5,788. Although the challengers spent considerably more,
only three of them unseated incumbents. The benefits of
incumbency are clear. Challengers, as a rule, must spend
more than inciambents, if they expect to win. Even when they
do, it will not guarantee victory.
In conclusion, there were a number of relatively
quite expensive campaigns in 1970, cunong them Governor
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Sargent's successful bid to retain his office, Atkins'
winning campaign for the House of Representatives, and
Basbas- losing effort to capture a Senate seat. Some have
criticized these, and other, campaigns as too expensive, but
it can be argued that it was necessary to incur such high
expenditures to meet the competition and to communicate with
the electorate, thereby assisting the voters to make their
choices. Although this argument has some force, the author
is inclined to side with the critics of such heavy spending.
After all, the cost of each of Sargent's votes averaged $1.62;
Atkins', $1,89; and Basbas', $1.39.^^ On the other hand,
there were a number of candidates for statewide office, the
Governor's Council, and the state legislature whose campaigns
were inadequately funded. The point can be illustrated using
the cost of mailing campaign literature. Assuming a competi-
tive House of Representatives district with 10,000 voters
(comprised of 2,500 registered Democrats, 2,500 Republicans,
and 5,000 Independents), the cost of a single mailing by a
Democratic candidate in the primary to all registered Demo-
crats, and a follow-up mailing in the election to all Demo-
crats and Independents, would be about $1,000. To do the
same in a Senate district with a similar distribution of
voters, the cost would be about $5,000; in a Governor's
•^^The cost per vote was figured by dividing the total
campaign cost by the number of votes received in the primary
and election.
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Council district, $25,000; and statewide, $200,000. A
campaign involves far more, of course, than a mailing to
all voters. The examples are cited because when these costs
are compared to what many candidates actually spent in 1970
on their campaigns, one can argue that not enough—rather
than too much—was spent to enable the voters to learn
enough to make up their minds.
CHAPTER III
FUNDING ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS
Now that it has been established what it cost to run
in Massachusetts in 1970 for statewide office, the Governor's
Council, and the state legislature, it is appropriate to turn
to the question of how the money to finance these campaigns
was raised. Funding campaigns adequately is obviously vital
to their success, and is one of the most difficult—and to
some candidates, distasteful—tasks which confront all can-
didates. In this chapter the roles played in 1970 by the
candidates and their committees, the political parties, and
interest groups will be explored with three objectives in
mind. The first, and principal, objective is to establish
the relative importance of the fund-raising efforts by the
candidates and their committees, the political parties, and
interest groups. The second objective is to note the great
variety of techniques which are employed in financing cam-
paigns, and to give particular attention to one of the most
common and lucrative methods used, the testimonial dinner.
The third objective is to establish how important large
C2unpaign contributions were to the funding of campaigns in
1970. The fund-raising efforts by candidates and their
committees will be discussed first. In examining their
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activities, which were far more important than those of
either the political parties or interest groups, the methods
used to raise money and the importance of large contribu-
tions will be covered. Then the fund-raising efforts by the
parties and groups, in that order, will be treated.
Funding Campaigns: Candidates
and Their Committees
One of the first tasks confronting any candidate who
anticipates any opposition in his campaign, no matter what
the size of his constituency, is to raise sufficient funds
as quickly as possible to begin his campaign. A candidate
can, and in many cases does, initially approach his close
friends, relatives, and political allies for funds. If they
are numerous, and the constituency is small—a state House
of Representatives district, for example—contributions from
them may be sufficient to finance his campaign, or at least
to begin it effectively. He can also, to the extent he is




. Although the Massa-
chusetts campaign finance statute which was effective during
the 1970 election permitted any candidate to make unlimited
contributions and loans to his campaign, there was very
little evidence of any substantial self -financing of cam-
paigns by most candidates. The typical candidate did not
reach into his own pocket. Some proponents of the public
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subsidy of campaigns argue that one of its benefits would be
that it would prevent well-to-do candidates from "buying"
elections. Neither from the author's review of the campaign
finance reports filed in 1970 by scores of candidates for
statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the state
legislature, nor from conversations with persons knowledge-
able about the financing of campaigns, was there any reason
to conclude that this happened. This is not to say that
several candidates and their relatives did not make contri-
butions or loans. They did. In most cases, however, the
contributions and loans were not large in proportion to the
total cost of these campaigns.^ A brief examination of the
extent of the self-financing of campaigns by candidates for
the House, Senate, Governor's Council, and statewide office
will clarify the above points.
Only thirty of the several hundred candidates for
the state House of Representatives spent $500 or more of
their own funds, or made loans of that size, to help finance
their 1970 campaigns. Together they spent $39,581 and loaned
$3,376—which totals $42,957—an average of $1,432 per can-
didate. Most of them spent less than $1,000 of their
similar finding, limited to candidates in the
1968 election for the state Senate, is reported in Mileur
and Sulzner, p. 98.
personal funds. 2 one notable exception was Chester G.
Atkins (Democrat-Acton)
, who was elected to the House in
1970 in his first bid for elective office. Atkins' cam-
paign, discussed in the previous chapter, was heavily
financed with money contributed or loaned by him and his
parents. Atkins contributed $6,900 and loaned $1,900 of
his own money. Most of the thirty House candidates, like
Atkins, were not incumbents. The ten who were incumbents
spent a total of only $11,700, whereas the twenty non-
incumbents gave, or loaned, $31,257.
Only twelve of the 101 candidates for the state
Senate helped finance their campaigns in a substantial way
with their personal funds. They contributed $20,919 and
loaned an additional $9,804, a total of $30,723."^ This
averages to $2,560 per candidate, a somewhat distorted
figure because one candidate, Edward DerKazarian, contrib-
uted $8,500 to his campaign, and another. Republican incum-
bent George D. Hammond, loaned $7,000 to his campaign com-
mittee. Only five of the twelve candidates, including
^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . This valuable
source provides an alphabetical listing of the names of
contributors of $500 or more to all candidates and com-
mittees which were required to file campaign finance reports
with public officials throughout the United States. The
data include the address of each contributor, the amount
given, and the date of the contribution. A smaller CRF pub-
lication, excerpted from this source, contains data pertain-




Hanunond, were incumbents; together, they gave or loaned a
total of only $11,804 to help finance their campaigns. As
was true in the House campaigns, the non-incumbents running
for the Senate relied more heavily upon their personal funds
than did the incumbents. The seven non-incumbents gave
$18,919.
In the election for the Governor's Council, there
was significant self-financing by only one candidate. Incum-
bent Councillor George P. Cronin, Jr. made contributions to
his campaign totaling $1,314.^
Statewide campaigns were no different from legisla-
tive or councillor races. With the exception of the cam-
paigns of Mary B. Newman and Donald L. Conn, the Republican
nominees for secretary of state and attorney general respec-
tively, there was no evidence of any substantial self-
financing of campaigns by statewide candidates. In Newman's
case, her campaign committee reported liabilities totaling
$14,302 as of January 14, 1971; among them were two out-
standing loans from Newman to her committee which totaled
$5,339.^ Conn finished his campaign with liabilities total-
ing $19,000. His committee owed him $10,000, and an
*Ibid.
^Report filed by the Newman Committee with the
Secretary of State's Division of Public Records.
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additional $9,000 to Lloyd E. Conn, no doubt a relative.
«
Neither Newman nor Conn was an incumbent, and neither was
elected to the office he sought.
Although the foregoing discussion of self-financing
of campaigns in 1970 is based only upon contributions or
loans of $500 or more, it is reasonable to conclude that,
whatever the office sought—statewide. Governor's Council,
House, or Senate—candidates in 1970 generally relied upon
funds other than their own to finance their campaigns.
If a candidate expects substantial opposition, or
the office he seeks has a large constituency—a statewide
office, for example—it is most likely that the contribu-
tions and loans from his friends, relatives, and political
allies (and whatever personal funds he provides) will have
to be supplemented. Additional potential contributors will
have to be identified and solicited. Most incumbents who
have had to raise money for past elections undoubtedly
maintain lists of contributors to those campaigns. An
individual who has never run for public office does not have
that advantage, but all candidates have available to them a
valuable source which can provide the names and addresses
of potential contributors. For many years the state's cam-
paign finance statute has required candidates for statewide
^Report filed by the Committee to Elect Donald L.
Conn Attorney General with the Secretary of State's Divi-
sion of Public Records.
90
office, the Governor's Council, and the state legislature to
file reports with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records. These reports, which essentially identify a candi-
date's receipts and expenditures, are kept by that office for
four years, and are available for inspection by any citizen.
7
In an election year, anyone who visited this office for but
a few hours during a typical day would likely observe a
number of candidates and campaign workers, reviewing these
records and diligently copying the names, addresses, and the
amounts contributed by persons who will soon be approached in
some fashion by a candidate or his committee.
Election-Year Committees
. Many candidates who needed
a substantial amount of money or faced serious competition
in 1970, despite the size of their constituencies, authorized
election-year committees to assist them in financing their
campaigns. This pattern was especially discernible among
candidates for statewide office. Some candidates employed
as many as three committees, the maximum number allowed by
law, although most candidates who authorized committees used
•7
'A revision to the campaign finance statute. Chapter
1173 of the Acts of 1973, placed the responsibility for the
receipt and review of these records with an independent
office, the Office of the Director of Campaign and Political
Finance. It was deliberately placed outside the jurisdiction
of the secretary of state in order to facilitate enforcement
of the campaign finance statute. In the summer of 1974 the
new agency rented office space nearby the State House, meet-
ing its need for Icurger qu£u:ters, and at the same time,
helping to establish its separate identity.
only one. Under the law, whenever a committee was
established it was required to notify the secretary of
state no later than thirty days prior to the primary or
election for which the committee had been organized. In
that notice the committee was required to designate a
chairman and a treasurer, and to name at least three other
members of the committee. It had to state the purpose for
which the committee had been organized and to submit the
candidate's written consent to the committee's formation.
The notice to the secretary of state also had to include
the name of the candidate in the committee's title (most
committees had titles similar to that used in 1970 by the
state's Auditor, The Committee to Re-elect Thaddeus Buczko
State Auditor)
.
The person named as treasurer thereafter
had to file his written acceptance with the secretary of
state; until he did this, the committee could not lawfully
function. Once a committee had satisfied all of the above
conditions, it was duly authorized to receive and disburse
funds on behalf of a candidate. It was thereafter obliged
to make periodic reports of its receipts and expenditures
to the secretary of state.®
One final point essential to this discussion con-
cerns committees which were established on behalf of
^General Laws , c. 55, as amended by c. 444 of the
Acts of 1962.
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-depository candidates. A major revision to the campaign
finance statute in 1962 designated certain candidates as
depository candidates.
^ All candidates for statewide office
were so designated; candidates for the Governor's Council
and the state legislature were not. Any committees estab-
lished by depository candidates are referred to as deposi-
tory committees. Depository candidates and committees were
required to designate a bank in which all campaign contri-
butions received had to be deposited, and from which all
campaign expenditures had to be made. The bank was required
to submit periodic reports of these transactions, on behalf
of a depository candidate or committee, to the secretary of
state. Non-depository candidates were not required to
designate a bank to handle their transactions, but, as indi-
cated above, were required to make periodic reports to the
secretary of state.
In 1970 most of the money raised on behalf of all
candidates who ran for statewide office, the Governor's
Council, and the state legislature, was raised by committees
operating on their behalf ."'^ Virtually all of the money
raised to finance the campaigns of depository candidates,
as presented in Table 10, was raised by their committees.
pp. 4-7.
^Ibid.
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Committees were important, but to a lesser extent, to
non-depository candidates. Slightly more than one-half of
the money raised for the campaigns of non-depository candi-
dates was raised by their committees. Whether a candidate
employed a committee or not, if he received or disbursed
funds for his campaign, the campaign finance statute obliged
him to make periodic reports to the secretary of state.
Even if he received or disbursed nothing, he was required to
file reports.
Once a candidate's committee has been duly authorized
to receive funds it can go about its work. Its first task is
to identify potential contributors. The next, equally obi-
ous, is to contact them and ask for money. The methods
employed by those responsible for fund raising are limited
only by their imagination and the resources at their command.
These methods for reaching potential contributors include
the use of newspaper advertisements, radio and television
appeals, door-to-door canvassing, and telephone and direct-
mail campaigns. The use of the mails to distribute campaign
literature and letters from candidates requesting contribu-
tions is quite common. Another frequently used technique is
to gather potential supporters, expose them to the candidate,
and provide them with food, drink, or entertainment. These
gatherings can be large or small, and are usually quite
informal. The possibilities are endless. A candidate and
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his supporters can sponsor picnics, barbeques, and clambakes;
coffee, cocktail, or wine-tasting parties; dances, concerts,
or movies. Whatever the event, the objective is to provide
a good time, expose contributors to the candidate, and
relieve them of their money.
Testimonial Dinners
. Although it is apparent that
there are numerous ways by which candidates, veteran cam-
paigners and political novices alike, can finance their cam-
paigns, one method—the testimonial dinner (luncheon, or
cocktail party)—is particularly worthy of attention. The
testimonial dinner, also referred to as the friendship or
appreciation dinner, merits attention because it is one of
the most lucrative ways candidates for public office in
Massachusetts have funded their campaigns. It deserves
consideration, too, because it has been abused by some poli-
ticians, and until the campaign finance statute was amended
in 1973, it also afforded anonymity to campaign contribu-
tors, a situation most acceptable to many politicians and
contributors alike. The testimonial dinner has been used
for many years in the Bay State, but in the past few years
it has become increasingly popular as caunpaign costs mount.
During that time, it has been used by the incumbent governor
and other candidates for that office, persons running for
other statewide offices, a number of leading senators and
representatives on Beacon Hill, and one prominent member of
the Governor's Council.
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The testimonial, used most effectively by well-known
personalities and especially by incumbents who have polit-
ical clout, helped to finance the 1970 campaigns of Robert Q.
Crane, Robert H, Quinn, and Kevin H. White. At an affair in
1966 celebrating the fortieth birthday of incumbent Treas-
urer Crane, approximately $70,000 was raised. This testi-
monial not only helped to finance his 1966 reelection cam-
paign, but provided substantial funds as well for his 1970
campaign. 11 m April, 1970 incumbent Attorney General Quinn
was honored at a $50-per-person affair at Anthony's Pier 4,
one of the favorite fund-raising spots in Boston; in October,
a similar affair was held at the Harvard Club. 12 During the
summer of 1970, Mayor Kevin H. White of Boston, a candidate
for the Democratic Party's nomination for governor, offset
a substantial portion of his campaign expense with a testi-
monial which raised $144,000.1^ According to one State
House reporter, "White has held so many testimonials asso-
ciated with birthdays, that former Democratic State Committee
llunited Press International, "State Bankers Happy
to Help Treasurer Crane's Campaign," Boston Herald American,
10 July 1973, p. 3.
12Interview with Aaron M. I. Shinberg, Executive
Assistant to Attorney General Quinn, Boston, 10 August 1973.
The Chateau de Ville in Framingham and the Pleasant Valley
Country Club in Sutton are the two other most popular places
in the state for holding large testimonials.
l^Christopher Lydon, "$100-a-Plate Tund-Raising
Party for White Lures 700," Boston Globe , 28 October 1971,
p. 63.
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Chairman Charles McGlue once said at a State House hearing
that White 'has got to be the most rapidly aging man in
Massachusetts*. There were undoubtedly several other
testimonials associated with the 1970 campaign, but infor-
mation about them is not readily available (the Boston press
is not indexed)
.
Subsequent to 1970, as pressures mounted
to enact legislation to remedy abuses of this fund-raising
technique, there was increased attention to testimonials by
the Boston press, particularly by the Boston Globe .
Testimonials are lucrative, but precisely how lucra-
tive those held in recent years have been, and who actually
purchased tickets, have been impossible to determine. Com-
menting about this, A. A. Michelson stated:
The estimate as to the hauls from these affairs
are difficult to make. The big buyers of tickets
usually are not there. They are lobbyists with
extensive expense accounts and others with vested
interests. They send in their checks and let the
public officials being "honored" paper the house
with free tickets for friends or colleagues.
This means, often there are many more attending,
particularly if it's a $100-a-plate affair than
there were ticket buyers. 15
The reason that newsmen such as Michelson were required to
make estimates as to the amount of money raised by testi-
monial dinners prior to 1974 is that the information
l^Steven A. Cohen, "Testimonials Grow in Massachu-
setts," Herald Traveler and Boston Record American , 31
August 1972, p. 6.
l^A. A. Michelson, "The Testimonial Gimmick,"
Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield) , 19 February 1972, p. 11.
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available from the public record was very inadequate. The
1962 campaign finance law did not require persons who were
honored at testimonial dinners, unless they were announced
candidates, to disclose whether they had a testimonial, who
bought tickets, and how much was raised at their affair.
The 1962 statute only required an individual, once he became
a candidate, to report that portion of the money raised that
was actually spent for campaign purposes. There was no
obligation to report the total amount raised, or who pur-
chased tickets. Newsmen, who attend the major testimonials,
could only roughly estimate the amount of money raised
because a common practice is, as Michelson stated, to "paper
the house." Lobbyists are among those who have purchased
tickets, according to knowledgeable observers on Beacon Hill.
In reporting on a flurry of testimonials in late 1973 before
new legislation curbing the use of testimonials became effec-
tive, one State House newsman wrote:
It is well-known on Beacon Hill that well-fixed
lobbyists at the State House buy tables for
such events, the bigger the political figure,
the bigger the purchase. 16
This insight into who purchases tickets to these affairs was
affirmed by another reporter, who wrote:
^Robert F. Hannan, "Politicians Push for Testi-
monials Before Funds Control Becomes Law," Sunday Herald
Advertiser (Boston), 28 October 1973, p. 25.
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Those who generally come up with the moneyfor the high-priced tickets are lobbyists
whose demonstration of what they euphemis-
tically term "friendship" is part of the
lobbying procedure at the State House. 17
The criticism levelled at testimonials is not con-
fined to lobbyists, however, because in some cases officials
in positions of power have taken advantage of their public
offices to enrich themselves. Perhaps the best recent
example of this is the testLtionial held on September 25, 1972
for Governor's Councillor Patrick J. "Sonny" McDonough. As
the leading member of the Governor's Council, McDonough
exerts considerable influence in approving gubernatorial
nominations of judges. This $100-a-plate affair, hosted by
McDonough aboard the S.S. Peter Stuyvesant at Anthony's Pier
4 in Boston, was attended by an estimated 800 to 1,000
people, including many prominent political figures.!^
McDonough, a member of the Council since 1947, was unopposed
for reelection in 1972. Despite criticism from the press,
McDonough proceeded with his testimonial, claiming he was
broke. According to one newsman, "Anyone who is familiar
with the Councillor and his success with insurance and other
business ventures knows that Sonny is not broke. "-'-^ The
campaign finance statute in 1972 did not prohibit McDonough
^^Cohen, "Testimonials Grow," p. 6.
^®Nyhan, "McDonough a Beacon," p. 3.
^^David Farrell, "McDonough" s High-Gear Drive for
Funds," Boston Globe, 21 September 1972, p. 35.
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from using the proceeds from his testimonial for personal
purposes. He is only obliged to report any earnings
received as a result of investing this money to the state
and federal income tax authorities; and tax records are not
available for public scrutiny.
Testimonials have also been criticized as political
armtwisting, but for purposes other than personal enrich-
ment. A recent example, which was highly publicized in the
Boston press, was the cocktail reception on November 19,
1973 at the 57 Restaurant in Boston for Senator James A.
Kelly, Jr. (Democrat-Oxford)
, As Senate Ways and Means
Chairman, Kelly is a key figure in establishing the state
budget. At this $100-a-person affair. Senator Kelly raised
more than $30,000.20 At one point during the testimonial,
Kelly stated, "You could raise a couple of hundred grand at
one of these if you worked at it." This provoked the ques-
tion, "They really want to see you that much?" "No," he
glinted. "None of them wants to be left out."^-^ Kelly had
previously held a very lucrative testimonial in 1971 at the
Pleasant Valley Country Club in Sutton, Massachusetts. He
acknowledged that as a result of that fund raiser he had
$116,000 at his disposal which he wanted to increase "to
^^Michael Kenney, "Kelly's Senate-President Cam-
paign Chest Enriched by $30,000 Fund-Raiser," Boston Globe ,
20 November 1973, p. 3.
^'^Michael Kenney, "The High Cost of Campaigning,"
Boston Globe, 27 November 1973, p. 19.
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about $150,000 for the Senate fight."22 ^^^^^ apparently
has no statewide political ambition, but he does aspire to
be president of the Massachusetts Senate when Senate Presi-
dent Kevin B. Harrington (Democrat-Salem) steps down. Kelly
contributed more than $10,000 to House and Senate candidates
in the 1972 election, and admittedly is ready to make sub-
stantial contributions to senators in exchange for their
votes, if and when Harrington steps down.^"^
Some public officials have been criticized because
they commenced funding their campaigns by testimonials well
in advance of any announcement of their candidacites. The
1971 testimonial held to honor George L. Sacco, Jr.
(Democrat-Medford)
,
then Vice Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, is one example. At a $100-per-plate affair
at the Chateau de Ville in Framingham, Massachusetts, 1,500
people contributed well over $100,000 to Sacco. ^4 ^t the
time, it was rumored that Sacco had statewide ambitions,
speculation which was substantiated in mid-1974 when Sacco
announced his candidacy for the office of attorney general,
2 2Ibid.
2 3Ibid. The funds raised at the 1971 testimonial
were not necessary for Kelly's 1972 reelection campaign for
which he reported contributions amounting to $1,440, and
expenditures of $923. United Press International, "Kelly
Having Fund-Raiser; He Won't Divulge Proceeds," Boston
Globe
, 19 November 1973, p. 4.
24David Nyhan, draft of a 1972 article, "Fund-
Raising" (in Nyhan's State House files).
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and thereafter resigned from the legislature. Something
which distinguishes Sacco's testimonial from virtually all
others held recently is that he raised approximately $38,000
by selling space in what is known as an "ad book," in which
a full page advertisement cost $1,000. In 1970 using an ad
book enabled politicians and corporations to circumvent
Massachusetts law which prohibited corporations from making
contributions to candidates or their committees, in 1964
Edward W. Brooke, then Attorney General, ruled that ad books
were permissible.^^
The best example of an unannounced candidate raising
substantial funds "off season" by testimonials is afforded
by the activities of The Sargent Committee, established for
the 1970 campaign of Governor Francis W. Sargent, the most
effective political fund raiser in the history of Massachu-
setts politics. Sargent's fund-raising activities did not
cease once he was elected in November, 1970, despite
repeated demands that he cease his "off season" fund raising
25Brooke in his ruling stated, "Value in advertising
should be received for the amount of money paid. In addi-
tion, the advertising should bear a direct relation to the
business being advertised and should be reasonable in amount
considering the size and nature of business, and its ordi-
nary advertising practices and requirements." Sacco's ad
book, however, was not available at the time of the testi-
monial but was distributed thereafter to ticket holders.
He said, "that he didn't want to spread the book around
indiscreetly." See Cohen, "Testimonials Grow," p. 6.
103
or, at the least, make known the names of his contributors. 2
6
Sargent, in response, voluntarily made public the names of
his contributors. In a radio-TV address on April 19, 1972,
Sargent announced that he was making available the following
day to the Secretary of State a complete list of contribu-
tions and expenditures since March 31, 1971 (the date of the
Sargent Committee's last required report concerning the 1970
election)
.
Moreover, he announced that it would be his
practice, as well as Lieutenant Governor Donald R. Dwight's,
to make public at six-month intervals audited reports of all
contributions and expenditures. 27 Although Sargent there-
after made public the names of his contributors, his fund
raisers continued. One of the largest and most successful
was a dinner on May 21, 1972 planned by Albert T. Manzi, a
Sargent appointee to the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
It netted $140,000 for the Sargent coffers. since the
May 21 dinner. The Sargent Committee conducted a number of
affairs, including four $100-per-person dinners in November,
1973. The first of these, in Hyannis on November 9,
26The fund raisers are coordinated by Victor F.
Zuchero, the full-time Executive Director of The Sargent
Committee, from an office nearby the State House.
27
'The complete text of the radio-TV address is found
in a press kit, containing five other documents, released by
Sargent on April 19, 1972. It will hereafter be cited as
"Sargent Press Kit."
2^Peter Lucas, "Sargent Says Dinner Raised $140,000,'
Boston Globe, 21 July 1972, p. 1.
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attracted 300 Sargent
.upporters and rai.ed an e.timated
$25,000 to $30,000, the aecond, on November 12 in Agawam,
250 for $25,000, the third, on November 13 in Andover, 260
for $25,000, and the fourth, on November 20 in Pramingham,
350 for $35,000.29 ^^eae affair., which the Governor con-
•idered cancelling because of criticism he received, gener-
ated an estimated $100,000. Sargent justified them-as he
had previous fund raisers-as necessary to offset political
expenses he incurs such as commissioning public opinion
polls, attending Ckjvernors' conventions once or twice
yearly, and attending his party's National Convention. ^0
His candidacy for reelection in 1974 affords a more complete
explanation.
Despite the attacks by its critics, the testimonial
is not without its defenders. At an affair on April 10,
1972 honoring Senator B. Joseph Tully (Democrat-Lowell),
Senate President Harrington maintained that politicians
were required to resort to testimonials because of the
29por reports about the four dinners see the follow-
ing articles in the Boston Globe t Peter Lucas, "Sargent
Dinner Brings $25,000," 10 November 1973, p. 1, Jean Cald-
well, "Sargent Goes to Agawam for 2nd of 4 Fund-Raisers,
"
13 November 1973, p. 37, "3rd Sargent Fund-Raiser Draws 260
in Andover," 14 November 1973, p. 4, and Peter Lucas, "Sar-
gent Dinner Raises Another $35,000," 21 November 1973, p. 4.
^^Robert Healy, "Stop Passing the Political Hat?",
Boston Globe , 19 November 1973, p. 19.
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"unbelievable expenses in running for public office. "31
According to Tully, the proceeds from the testimonial,
attended by about 650 persons who paid $50 each for a
chicken dinner, were earmarked to finance his 1972 reelec-
tion campaign. County officials throughout Massachusetts
were invited to Tully's testimonial, which was "neatly timed
with County budget hearings, " according to a Boston Globe
reporter. 32 Tully, who spent $12,885 in his first try for
a Senate seat in 1970 when he unseated an incumbent (see
Chapter II), expected that $28 of each $50, a surprisingly
high figure, would be necessary to offset the expenses con-
nected with his affair. 33 m 1972 he retained his seat,
reporting expenditures of $22,914. Under the law, whatever
remains of the proceeds—there probably was little, if any—
is his to use as he sees fit.
In conclusion, testimonials have been used in Massa-
chusetts for many years, helped to finance several 1970
election campaigns, and have been used with increasing fre-
quency since then. They have most often been used by incum-
bent politicians with considerable political clout, and have
been a very lucrative source of funds for their ceunpaigns.
Although defended as a legitimate and necessary method for
3ljoseph Rosenbloom, "Harrington Defends Pols'





financing campaigns, testimonials have been sharply
criticized because they have been abused by some politi-
cians who have used the proceeds for their personal enrichr-
raent, or to further their long-term political ambitions when
they had no immediate need for campaign funds. The legiti-
macy of the testimonial was also repeatedly questioned
because the law insured anonymity for contributors if the
person "honored" was not an announced candidate when an
affair was held. This departure from the idea of a full
disclosure law was corrected in 1973. The law now requires
any individual who is the recipient of funds raised at a
testimonial—whether he is an announced candidate or not—to
report the names, addresses, and amounts given by his con-
tributors to the Office of the Director of Campaign and
Political Finance. 34
Whatever methods are used for raising funds, and
whoever raises them, large contributions are usually most
welcome. Whether raised by a testimonial dinner sponsored
by a candidate's campaign committee, a motion picture
premiere planned by a party's legislative leaders, or a
candidate's personal solicitation of a potential contribu-
tor, they are gratefully received. Just how important
large contributions were to candidates in the 1970 election
is worthy of attention and will be discussed next.
^^Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, effective
Janueury 1, 1974.
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Campaign Contributions of $500 or Mor^ . a small
minority of citizens In the Bay State helped finance pollt-
leal campaigns In 1970. Of those who did, only a few thou-
sand may be classified as "large" contributors, a term
defined for purposes of this discussion, as any contributor
who gave $500 or more. The vast majority of large contribu-
tors In 1970 In Massachusetts were Individuals. The cam-
paign finance statute effective during the 1970 election
allowed any Individual to contribute up to $3,000 to any
candidate or his committees during the year. No campaign
In the Bay State In 1970 relied solely upon large contribu-
tions, although some depended upon them more than others.
Large contributions are attractive to many candidates and
their campaign finance managers because It Is obviously
easier to offset the cost of a campaign by raising a few
large contributions than many smaller ones.
Campaign contributions of $500 or more, arrayed In
Tables 11 and 12, were an Important source of funds for
several candidates In Massachusetts ceunpalgns In 1970,
particularly gubernatorial candidates. Governor Francis W.
Sargent, who received the most, reported 737 campaign con-
tributions of $500 or more in his successful 1970 campaign;
they totaled $570,918.^^ His Democratic opponent. Mayor
^^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . All data for
this discussion, with two exceptions, came from It. The
contributions listed In the CRF publication did not Include
those made to legislative candidates In 1970 by The Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House and The Committee to Elect a
Republican State Senate.
TABLE 11
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF $500 OR MORE TO CANDIDATESFOR STATEWIDE OFFICE, THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL, ANDTHE STATE LEGISLATURE IN MASSACHUSETTS IN 1970
Candidates Number ofContributions Amount
STATEWIDE OFFICES
Governor
Francis W. Sargent (R) . .
Kevin H. White (D)
. . . .
Maurice A. Donahue (D) . .
Francis X. Bellotti (D)
Kenneth P. O'Donnell (D)
.
Lieutenant Governor
Donald R. Dwight (R) . . .
Michael S. Dukakis (D) . .
Attorney General
Robert H. Quinn (D) ...
Donald L. Conn (R) . . . .
Secretary of State
Mary B. Newman (R) . . . .
John F. X. Davoren (D) . .
Treasurer and Receiver General
Frederick D. Hannon (R)
Robert Q. Crane (D)
Auditor
Thaddeus Buczko (D)
























SOURCE: Herbert E. Alexander and Katharine C.
Fisher, eds., CRF Listing of: Political Contributors
of $500 or More in 1970 (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens'
Reseeurch Foundation, 1972) .
*These figures include contributions made to leg-
islative candidates by The Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic House and The Committee to Elect a Republi-
can State Senate in 1970. The Democratic committee
made 71 contributions which totaled $41,350; the Re-
publican committee, 15, which totaled $17,250. These
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Kevin H. White of Boston, reported 565 contributions of $500
or more, which totaled $575,686. Although White received
fewer large contributions than Sargent, he raised more money
from them. The average large contribution to White exceeded
$1,000. Moreover, White depended to a much greater extent
upon large contributions to finance his campaign than Sar-
gent did. Almost 70 per cent of the cost of White's cam-
paign was financed by these large contributions, whereas
Sargent depended upon them to finance approximately 25 per
cent of the cost of his campaign. White's three opponents
for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination also received
many large contributions; together, they received 171,
amounting to $147,997. Maurice A. Donahue reported 97,
amounting to $76,600; Francis X. Bellotti, 40, amounting to
$37,747; and Kenneth P. O'Donnell, 34, amounting to $33,650.
White's efforts during the primary were more successful,
however, than his three opponents* combined. Although he
reported receiving fewer large contributions (159), his
contributors were more generous. Their contributions aver-
aged $1,153, and totaled $183,400.
Apart from the gubernatorial candidates, only a few
other candidates for statewide office reported a substan-
tial number of contributions of $500 or more. Donald R.
Dwight, the Republican nominee who was elected lieutenant
governor, reported sixty-one, amounting to $70,500. His
Ill
Democratic opponent, Michael S. Dukakis, who relied less
heavily upon large contributions, reported twenty-six,
amounting to $15,529. Robert H. Quinn, the Democratic can-
didate for attorney general, raised $46,300 from sixty-
eight contributions of $500 or more. Quinn was reelected,
defeating Donald L. Conn, who reported twenty-nine such
contributions, totaling $24,600. The statewide candidates
of both parties for the offices of secretary of state,
treasurer and receiver general, and auditor reported far
fewer large contributions than any of the abovementioned
candidates.
Large campaign contributions were generally of minor
importance in the eight races for the Governor's Council in
1970, in which most seats were uncontested in either the
primary or election. Only twelve campaign contributions of
$500 or more, totaling $10,400, were reported by all of the
candidates who ran for seats on the Council. Eight of these
contributions, totaling $7,900, were reported by two candi-
dates who opposed each other in the prJLmary for the most
closely contested seat. The large contributions they
received aunounted to about one-third of their combined
primary expenses.
In campaigns for the state legislature large contri-
butions were not reported by most of the 701 candidates who
sought seats in either the House or Senate, but they were
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quite helpful to several, in all, 270 contributions of $500
or more, totaling $210,336 were reported. House candidates
reported 190, amounting to $134,554; Senate candidates
reported fewer (80), amounting to less ($75, 782). 36 of
those candidates reporting large contributions, the typical
Senate candidate received two or three, and the typical
House candidate, one or two. Although helpful, in neither
case would they do more than offset a fraction of the cost
of a campaign if there were any substantial competition. No
Senate candidate received more than six large contributions,
and no House candidate received more than seven.
In conclusion, campaign contributions of $500 or
more were an important source of funds for several candi-
dates in Massachusetts campaigns in 1970. They were partic-
ularly important to all of the candidates who ran for the
office of governor, especially the two nominees. They were
important, but to a lesser extent, to a number of other
statewide candidates. They were of minor importance in
races for the Governor's Council, but were quite helpful in
the campaigns of numerous candidates for the Senate and
House of Representatives on Beacon Hill.
^^Ibid. These figures are the sums of the contri-
butions to legislative candidates listed in the CRF publi-
cation and the contributions (not listed) which were given
in 1970 by The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House and
The Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate, according
to reports filed by these committees with the Secretary of
State's Division of Public Records.
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The vast majority of campaign contributions of $500
or more were raised by candidates and their committees.
Although each political party reported some large contribu-
tions, their activities, by comparison, were much less
important in that respect. More importantly, the total
funds they raised and disbursed in 1970 to help candidates
were of minor consequence when compared to the funding of
campaigns by candidates and their committees. Our attention
now turns to the activities of the two major parties.
Funding Campaigns: Political Parties
The funds raised by the Democratic and Republican
parties in 1970 were raised by committees established by
their legislative leaders and by the elected state and local
party organizations. 37 in the state House of Representa-
tives substantial funds were raised to assist Democratic
legislative candidates, whereas the Republicans did vir-
tually nothing. In the Senate there was no organized effort
by the Democratic leadership, whereas Republican candidates
benefitted from contributions raised by their leadership.
Neither the Republican nor Democratic State Committee was
of much consequence in the 1970 campaign, although the
^^Each party has elected state and local committees
chosen by pzurtisans every four years in the April presiden-
tial primary. The eighty-member state committees are com-
prised of forty men and forty women, one man and one woman
from each of the state's forty senate districts. The town
and ward committees range in size from three to thirty-five
members.
effort by the Republicans was more substantial. i„ the
cities and towns, the elected town and ward connnittees
evidenced some activity, with the Republican comittees
raising and spending n,ore money. The fund-raising activi-
ties of the legislative co,™,xttees will be treated first,
then the activities of the state and local party organi^l-
tions will be discussed.
The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic Hon.. ir.
1970. A significant source of funds in 1970 for Democratic
candidates running for seats in the House of Representatives
was The committee to Re-elect a Democratic House. Under the
leadership of Speaker David M. Bartley (Democrat-Holyoke)
,
more than $100,000 was raised on October 30, 1569 at a
premiere performance of the motion picture. Paint Your
Wa^on, at the Circle Theater in Brookline. Although approx-
imately 1,100 people attended the movie, the public record
indicates that 468 persons supported the affair financially.
Their contributions totaled $85,660. Fifty-one contributors
gave $500 or more which accounted for $39,450. Although the
contributions made ranged up to the legal limit of $3,000,
there were, as shown in Table 13, 118 contributions under
$100. The most cora^non contribution was $100, and the aver-
age contribution was $183.^^
38
-•"Report filed by The Committee to Re-elect a Demo-
cratic House in 1970 with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
TABLE 13



















SOURCE: Report filed by The Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970
with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records.
*When the receipts for advertisements
in the program book ($14,386) are included,
a total of $100,046 was contributed.
The $85,660 given by the 468 contributors consti-
tuted most, but not all, of the money available to Bart-
ley's committee. 39 There were two additional sources of
income. First, as is not uncommon at some large fund-
raising affairs, a program book ("ad book") was published














•^^Ibid. The subsequent discussion of the commit-
tee's other income relies upon this source.
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and distributed to all advertisers and persons attending the
motion picture. Receipts from the "ad book" generated an
additional $14,386.40 second, 1970 was not the first elec-
tion year in which the Conunittee to Re-elect a Democratic
House was active. A substantial sum, $13,036, was trans-
ferred from the unexpended funds of the 1968 coiruaittee. The
interest earned by these funds, on deposit in five banks,
accounted for an additional $2,467. The motion picture pro-
ceeds, the receipts from the program book, the unexpended
funds of the 1968 committee, and the interest earned by
those funds, placed approximately $115,000 at the disposal
of the Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970.
A total of $76,150, as presented in Table 14, was
disbursed by Hartley's committee to 205 House candidates in
1970.41 The committee's contributions ranged from $100 to
$1,000, the average contribution being $371. Seventy-one
candidates received $500 or more. Of the 205 candidates
supported by the committee, 127 were incumbents. They
received contributions which averaged $428, and sixty-seven
of them received $500 or more. The seventy-eight non-
40rphe fourteen-page program book contained fifty-
eight advertisements ranging in size from one-eighth of onepage to a full page. They ranged in cost from $50 to$2,500. The average advertisement cost approximately $250.Corporations which placed ads were listed in the report of
Bartley's committee.
41The subsequent discussion of campaign contribu-
tions by the committee is based upon the report filed by
The Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970.
TABLE 14
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES FORMASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REpSseStaT^VESBY THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT A































































SOURCE: Report filed by The Commit-
tee to Re-elect a Democratic House in
1970 with the Secretary of State's Divi-
sion of Public Records.
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incumbents were less generously supported. Their average
contribution from the committee was only $279, and only four
of them received $500 or more. According to a salaried
consultant employed by the cormnittee, the amount contributed
to a candidate depended upon whether he faced opposition in
the primary or general election, or both, as well as his
prospects for winning. 42 The incumbents fared well in two
ways: (1) only seven of the 127 incumbents supported by the
committee lost their seats in the House, and (2) they
received greater assistance from the committee than did the
non-incumbents. Nonetheless, forty-one of the seventy-eight
non-incumbents supported by the committee were elected.
Only seventeen of the 178 Democrats who were elected to the
1971-72 House, including Speaker Bartley himself, received
no campaign contribution from the committee. Although the
average contribution ($371) was insufficient to finance a
competitive campaign, contributions undoubtedly were wel-
comed by those candidates who received them. More than one-
half of the House campaigns in 1970 cost less than $2,000
(see Table 8 in Chapter II), and a contribution of that size
was obviously helpful.
Although the committee had about $115,000 at its
disposal to disburse to candidates it incurred considerable
42interview with Edward T. Downey, Jr., then Counsel
to the House Majority Whip, Boston, 3 July 1973.
U9
expense, thereby greatly reducing the amount available for
campaign contributions. Among Its larger expenditures were









The committee Incurred other expenses, but not as large as
the above disbursements. Bartley's committee was certainly
not frugal, and It clearly did not finance the campaigns of
Democratic House candidates as much as It might have, its
contributions to candidates ($76,150) and the above large
disbursements totaled less than $100,000. The committee's
total disbursements, as set forth In Its thirty-five page
typewritten report, amounted to $109,505, which Indicates
there were numerous lesser expenses.
In terms of the amount of money raised, and to the
extent there Is a connection between Its campaign contribu-
tions and Democratic victories at the polls, the Committee
to Re-elect a Democratic House In 1970 was successful. The
voters elected 178 Democrats and sixty-two Republicans to
43Report filed by The Committee to Re-elect a Demo-
cratic House In 1970 with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
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the 1971-72 legislature. Increasing the Democrats' margin by
five seats. Because the Democratic State Committee has pro-
vided little financial support to legislative candidates in
recent years-it provided none in 1970, a fact which will be
discussed later in this chapter-Democratic candidates for
the House of Representatives look to Bartley's committee as
one of their sources for campaign contributions. Hartley
established a similar committee, for the same purpose, in
1972.44 Tjj^ Speaker is a powerful person for a number of
reasons. He is the one who makes the decisions about the
disbursement of committee funds to candidates; 45 this affords
him one additional means to exercise scane control over his
fellow Democrats.
44 Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House in1972 copied the successful performance of the 1970 commit-tee. It staged a premiere of the motion picture, Nicholas
and Alexandra
> at the Circle Theater in Brookline onMarch 7, 1972. The Committee raised a total of $107,098
and disbursed $104,915. As in 1970, a program book waspublished. It was even more successful; 109 advertisements,
ranging in cost from $100 to $1,000, were purchased for a
total of approximately $25,000. As in 1970, a large portion
of the Committee's income came from substantial contribu-
tions. Sixteen thousand dollars was reported given by six-
teen individuals. Most of the money raised was disbursed
during the primary campaign. In his committee's report
dated August 6, 1972, Hartley reported expenditures of$14,142. In the October 28, 1972 report an additional
$88,455 was reported spent; and in the third and final
report dated November 15, 1972, he reported expenditures of




"'Interview with Downey, 3 July 1973.
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The success of Speaker Hartley 's effort to fund the
campaigns of Democratic state legislators in 1970 stands in
marked contrast to the virtual absence of any such activity
by the Republican House leadership, a situation which can
be explained partially by the substantial financial support
which the Republican State Committee provided in previous
elections. 4^ There was a committee established in 1970 by
Representative Sidney Q. Curtiss (Republican-Sheffield),
then the Republican floor leader, to assist in the financing
of Republican campaigns for House seats, but the Committee
to Elect Republican Representatives reported contributions
of only $1,770, and expenditures of $1,700, in 1970.^^
Obviously, it was of little consequence. When Representa-
tive Francis W. Hatch, Jr. of Beverly, now the Republican
floor leader, defeated Curtiss for the minority party's
top post in 1971, he exercised the leadership Curtiss had
not. He organized a committee, SAVE (Sustain a Veto) , to
help recruit, finance, and otherwise aid Republican candi-
dates running for House seats. It was very successful; in
1972 SAVE raised $86,095. It disbursed $85,936, $52,510
^^In both 1966 and 1968 the State Committee con-
tributed more than $100,000 to various Republican candi-
dates, but in 1970 its total contributions amounted to
only $11,557. These points are elaborated upon later in
this chapter.
^
^Report filed by Committee to Elect Republican
Representatives with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1970.
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of that sum in campaign contributions to seventy-three
Republican House candidates. Advertisements on behalf of
candidates accounted for most of the balance.
The Committee to Elect a Republican State Senate in
1970. Although there was no Republican activity of any
consequence in the House in 1970, this was not the case in
the Senate. In that year, Senator John F. Parker
(Republican-Taunton) established the Committee to Elect a
Republican State Senate. Parker, the Senate's Republican
floor leader, had previously been successful as a fund
raiser during his part-time stint as Chairman of the Repub-
lican State Committee in 1966, a year in which the Republi-
can State Committee made substantial contributions to
Republican legislative candidates. In 1970 the committee's
financial difficulties did not allow this. It was not
Parker's intention that the committee he established in 1970
would fully finance the campaigns of Republican candidates
for the Senate, but it was his expectation that the funds
raised would offset some of the costs incurred by incumbent
Republicans as well as by other Republican candidates.
In fact, the Committee to Elect a Republican State
Senate in 1970 was a connmittee of one—namely, Parker. For
^^Report filed by SAVE with the Secretary of State's
Division of Public Records, 1972.
^^Interview with Senator John F. Parker, Boston,
12 July 1972.
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a one-man effort, the "committee" was quite successful, m
September and October of 1970, after the primary races had
been decided. Senator Parker personally raised $25,119 with
a low-budget telephone and mail campaign. 50 The committee
received 205 contributions, of which eighty-three were $100
or more. They accounted for most of the money raised by
the committee ($21,814). Ten of these contributions were
$500 or more, the largest being the $5,914 contribution by
the Republican Club of Massachusetts. 51
Sixteen Senate candidates received a total of
$17,500 from the committee's funds. 52 por some unknown
reason about one-fourth of the money raised was not dis-
tributed to candidates, a surprising fact because several
candidates could have used it. 53 Parker, who made the deci-
sions, disbursed the money carefully, usually in amounts of
$300 or $400 at a time. No candidate received more than
$2,200, and the candidate least generously supported received
$250. The average candidate received approximately $1,000.
Most of the money disbursed by Parker went to ten incumbent
Republican Senators. Only two of the candidates who were
50Report filed by the Committee to Elect a Repub-
lican State Senate in 1970 with the Secretary of State's
Division of Public Records.
51lbid. 52i]j,ijj^
53ibid. Parker's expenses in raising the money
cunounted to a bit less than $1,000, and the committee's
treasury had an unexpended balance of $6,646 after all
contributions to candidates had been made.
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not incumbents received large contributions, in a few
cases, the contributions made by Parker's committee exceeded
the actual costs of the campaigns of some candidates. In
some others, they defrayed a substantial part of the cost of
campaigning. Several candidates, however, had to rely
essentially upon themselves for raising the necessary funds.
Although the amount of money disbursed by the Committee to
Elect a Republican State Senate in 1970 constituted but a
fraction of the total cost of the campaigns waged by most
Republican candidates for the Senate in that year, the money
given these candidates by Senator Parker was helpful to
them, and undoubtedly was gladly received. Table 15 lists
the sixteen candidates who received contributions and indi-
cates their success in the November election. Nine of the
ten incumbents were reelected, but only one of the six non-
incumbents was successful. Four of the non-incumbents
received less than $1,000 from Parker, and one cannot help
but speculate why they were not supported more generously.
The financial difficulties which prevented the
Republican State Committee from supporting legislative can-
didates in 1970 continued after the 1970 election. Senator
Parker established a similar committee in 1972 to help
finance the campaigns of Republican candidates for the
Senate. On the whole, it was eibout as successful as the
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expenditures of $19,044 during the 1972 campaign.54
Electorally, the Republicans fared more poorly in the 1972
election than in 1970, as only seven Republican senators
were elected, a loss of three seats.
Parker's effort in 1970 was not matched by the
Democrats. The Democratic leadership did not establish a
committee in the Senate in 1970 to raise and disburse money
to finance the campaigns of Democratic candidates.
Maurice A. Donahue of Holyoke, the Senate President, was
immersed in a campaign to win the Democratic nomination for
governor. Donahue had, however, previously organized such
a committee. In 1968, his Committee to Retain a Democratic
Senate supported twenty-six candidates with $44,250 in cam-
paign contributions, an average of $1,702 per candidate. ^5
Four years later, in 1972, Donahue's successor. Senate
Report filed by the Committee to Elect a Repub-lican State Senate in 1972 with the Secretary of State'sDivision of Public Records. Again, most of the money raisedDy Parker s ccxnmittee came from large contributors, some ofthem the same as in 1970. Almost 50 per cent of the total
received, $9,700, came from twelve contributors. Among
those contributions were some party money, some money givendirectly by lobbyists, and other special interest money.
The Republican Club of Massachusetts and The Sargent Com-
mittee each contributed; lobbyists Bruce D. Kinlin,
Robert G. Hennemuth, Robert A. Chadbourne, and William F.
Malloy made contributions; the GE Committee, Massachusetts
REPEC, the Massachusetts Public Employees Council, and the
Massachusetts Nursing and Rest Homes Political Action Com-
mittee were also among the larger contributors.
5
^Report filed by The Committee to Retain a Demo-
cratic Senate with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1968.
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President Kevin B. Harrington of Salem, reactivated the
committee and was equally successful. The Committee to
Retain a Democratic Senate in 1972 disbursed $43,300 to
twenty.five candidates, an average of $1,732 per candi-
date. ^6 This kind of effort, had it occurred in 1970, would
have offset almost 15 per cent of the campaign expenses of
the Democratic candidates who ran for the Senate in that
year.
In addition to the fund-raising efforts by legis-
lative leaders, the state and local committees of each party
helped finance the campaigns of some candidates in 1970.
We now focus upon their activities.
State and Local Party Committees
. Indeed, 1970 was
a bleak year for the Republican State Committee. The com-
mittee budgeted $90,000 for the support of all Republican
candidates and $10,000 for the general promotion of the
Republican Party and its candidates in Massachusetts, but
it failed to raise the necessary funds. Rather than spend-
ing $100,000 as planned, it contributed only $11,557 to its
candidates, and promoted their cause with an additional
expenditure of $2,702, a total of $14,259.^7 Richard F.
Treadway was the interim chairman of the Republican State
56Report filed by The Committee to Retain a Demo-
cratic Senate with the Secretary of State's Division of
Public Records, 1972.
57
-"Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Monthly Operating Statement," December 31, 1970.
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Coimaittee at this time. His strategy was to support a small
number of candidates running for House and Senate seats on
Beacon Hill (those thought to have good prospects for
winning) with the limited money available to the committee.
Ironically, 1970 was the year in which the party's guberna-
torial candidate, Sargent, successfully won his election,
spending in excess of $2 million. The major, and obvious,
conclusion which can be drawn about the Republican State
Committee is that it was of little consequence financially
in the 1970 election.
Although of little importance in 1970, the Repub-
lican State Committee had given substantial financial sup-
port to Republican candidates, especially legislative
candidates, as recently as 1966 and 1968. For example, in
1966, the first year in which statewide candidates ran for
four-year terms. Senator John F. Parker, serving as an
interim chairman, disbursed $144,766 of the committee's
funds. Of the $100,249 given directly to candidates, all
but $8,000 went to candidates for statewide office, the
state legislature, and the Governor's Council (some candi-
dates for the U.S. Congress received contributions)
. State
legislative candidates received $59,925; candidates for
statewide office received $23,500; and candidates for the
Governor's Council received $8,824. In addition, $44,517
129
was spent on opinion research by Parker's committee. 58
In 1968, Josiah A. Spaulding, elected chairman of
the Republican State Committee early in 1967, led a vig-
orous but unsuccessful effort to improve the statewide
performance of the Republican Party. The budget for the
1968 campaign was $565,000, of which $500,000 was earmarked
for direct contributions to candidates. Spaulding 's com-
mittee failed to reach its ambitious goals, disbursing a
total of only $180,899, of which $117,149 was given directly
to candidates. The committee spent an additional $55,750
to promote the Republican Party and its candidates, and
$8,000 on opinion research. 59 Most of the money given
directly to candidates went, as in 1966, to state legisla-
tive candidates. 60 A comparison of the disbursements of the
Republican State Committee in 1966, 1968, and 1970 is pre-
sented in Table 16. Under Spaulding 's leadership, the com-
mittee incurred a deficit in 1968 of approximately $83,000,
whereas after the 1966 election a surplus of more than
$90,000 remained in its treasury. Spaulding resigned in
December, 1969 to oppose incumbent Democratic U.S. Senator
5 8Interview with Parker, 12 July 1972.
59Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Monthly Operating Statement," November 30, 1968.
^^Interview with Margaret Kelly, long-time secretary
to chairmen of the Republican State Committee, Boston, 30



























































































































Edward M. Kennedy in the 1970 election.
A partial explanation of the Republican State Com-
mittee's inability to help finance the campaigns of Repub-
lican candidates in 1970 is that it had other demands upon
its limited resources, among them the cost of maintaining
a year-round headquarters nearby the State House. It also
had to retire the substantial debt incurred in the 1968
campaign. Its financial difficulties can be more fully
explained by other factors, however, among them the pref-
erence of contributors for supporting individual candidates
as opposed to a party. This candidate-orientation of con-
tributors is best illustrated by the above comparison of
campaign funds available in 1970 to the party's leader.
Governor Sargent, and the Republican State Committee.
Nonetheless, the committee was able to sustain its full-
time operation with funds raised on its behalf by town and
ward committees, and from large contributions by members
of its Key Committee. Local fund-raising efforts, the
Republican State Committee's largest single source of
income, accounted for $99,421 of its receipts in 1970.
Membership in the Key Committee, which affords an oppor-
tunity to meet prominent figures in the party, is limited
to contributors of $500 or more. In 1970 $40,500 was given
^^Republican State Committee of Massachusetts,
"Statement of Income, Expenses, and Deficit," December 31,
1970.
132
by slxty-eight members. ^3 The financial difficulties of the
committee can be traced, too, to a rift between Governor
Sargent and his party about patronage and other matters.
This, in turn, has resulted in a succession of Republican
State committee chairmen since Josiah A. Spaulding's tenure
ended in December, 1969. As of September, 1974 there have
been five chairmen since Spaulding. One of them, Robert C.
Hahn of Stoughton, a former state representative and Sar-
gent's choice for chairman, mounted a campaign in 1972 to
provide $200,000 in campaign support for Republican candi-
dates. ^4 Shortly thereafter, Kahn stepped dovm as chairman
when his name was linked with an insurance scandal which
caused embarrassment to the Republican Party and to Governor
Sargent, who had urged Hahn's election by the Republican
State Committee. 65 The major consequence of the inability
of the Republican State Committee in 1970 to finance the
campaigns of candidates it had traditionally supported was
the formation of fund-raising committees by Republican
legislative leaders, such as Senator John F. Parker's Com-
mittee to Elect a Republican State Senate and Representative
^^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing .
^^Republican State Committee of Massachusetts, "A
Program for 1972 or Can You Spare a Quarter for Better
Government?", undated.
^^arnes Ayer, "Hahn Out as GOP Head," Boston Globe,
26 May 1972, p. 3.
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Francis W. Hatch's committee, SAVE.^^
If the financial health of the Republican State
committee was poor, the condition of the Democratic State
committee was even worse. Table 17 compares the receipts
and expenditures of each committee during 1970, and it is
apparent that the Republican State Committee was the more
active of the two. Its expenditures totaled $157,502,
whereas the Democrats spent only $19,091 during all of 1970,
about one-half of that sum going to defray expenses con-
nected with the party's pre-primary convention held in June
at the state university in Amherst. 67 Although the Repub-
licans managed to disburse a very modest $11,557 to candi-
dates during the year, the Democratic State Committee made
no campaign contributions whatsoever . ^8 The committee's
chairman at the time was state Representative David E.
Harrison of Gloucester, who was defeated for reelection to
the House in November. It is interesting to note that in
the following year, in 1971, the Democratic State Committee
conducted a fund-raising drive which was far more successful
°^In raid-1974, the Republican State Comraittee had
virtually eliminated a deficit of almost $100,000 and had$20,000 available for the support of legislative candidates
in the 1974 election, according to "Sargent/Dwight G.O.P.
Newsletter," July, 1974, p. 2.
^"^Report filed by the Democratic State Committee




































































































than their efforts during the election year. In July alone,
they reported receipts totaling almost $40,000. Among the
committee's disbursements of about $30,000 in that month
were a $10,000 "legal fee" to Harrison, a salary payment of
$3,390 to the committee's secretary, and a $5,000 payment
for a telephone bill. 69 m short, although the committee
rendered no direct support to candidates in 1970, it did
finance the party's state convention, and one year later,
mounted a successful fund-raising drive which left about
$10,000 on hand to meet its operating expenses. No doubt,
the lopsided Democratic majorities in both houses of the
legislature and the success of Speaker Hartley's committee,
which assisted House candidates in 1970, are factors which
help explain the inactivity of the Democratic State Com-
mittee during an election year.
Whereas there are only two state committees there
are hundreds of Democratic and Republican committees in the
Commonwealth's 351 cities and towns. Many of these elected
town and ward committees seldom meet, except during the
months immediately preceding an election. When questioned
recently about the "health" of the local Republican commit-
tees. Senator John F. Peurker replied that it could best be
6
^Report filed by the Democratic State Committee
with the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records,
1971.
136
described as a near "terminal illness, "70 a condition that
apparently afflicts the Democrats as well, m Boston, for
example, the committees in eight of the city's twenty-two
wards reported no financial activity whatsoever in 1970
during the primary and election; in six other wards, the
incomplete reports filed by their committees indicated the
same; the remaining eight ward committees filed no reports. ^1
A similar pattern prevailed for many other local committees
of both parties. The lack of vigor in the local committees
of both parties is apparent in the comparison of their
financial activity in 1970, which is presented in Table 17.
During the primary, for example, all local committees
reported spending only $17,525. During the election, how-
ever, they spent considerably more, $74,310. In both the
primary and the election the Republican committees were more
active than the Democrats, outspending them $57,854 to
$33,981. Not all of this money, however, went directly to
candidates. For example, one of the more active Republican
committees, the town committee in Arlington, divided its
resources between a csunpaign headquaurters and campaign con-
tributions. Of the $1,090 it disbursed in 1970, a total of
70p2u:ker made this remark during a meeting of the
Bridgewater Republican Town Committee in mid-1974.
7lReports filed by Boston's Democratic ward commit-
tees with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.




$500 was given to one statewide and three local candidates,
most of the balance was used to offset expenses connected
with its headquarters. 73 m Wellesley, of §755 spent by the
town's Republican committee, none went directly to candi-
dates. The committee spent virtually all of its funds for
printing and mailing a "slate card," thus supporting several
candidates. 74 m sum, many local committees were inactive
In 1970. Of those which raised and spent money, some aided
candidates directly, whereas others chose to promote the
party and its candidates more generally. Finally, it should
be recalled that there are hundreds of local committees
whose combined disbursements in 1970, totaling only $91,835,
indicate that their financial impact upon the 1970 election
was, on the whole, of minor consequence.
The fund-raising efforts by the parties in the
legislature, and by state and local party committees, none-
theless, were more important than the efforts by interest
groups to finance campaigns in 1970. Their activities are
examined next.
73Report filed by the Arlington Republican Town
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
74Report filed by the Wellesley Republican Town
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records
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With one major exception, there was no evidence in
the public record that associations representing the state's
bankers, manufacturers, teachers, road contractors, doctors,
realtors, race track owners, police, veterans, or any of the
scores of organized interests which lobby public officials
on Beacon Hill made campaign contributions to candidates in
1970. Such groups have an obvious concern about the deci-
sions public officials make, and this concern properly
extends to the election of these officials. Why, then, was
there no evidence of campaign contributions in the names of
these groups? The answer does not lie in any prohibition
against such giving by the campaign finance statute in
effect in 1970. It allowed campaign contributions by asso-
ciations and simply required that any candidate (or candi-
date committee) receiving a contribution report the name of
the association, the names and addresses of its principal
officers, and the amount and date of the contribution to
the secretary of state. There was also no limitation upon
how much money an association could give in a calendar year
to any candidate or committee organized on his behalf to
receive contributions (individuals were subject to a $3,000
75limitation) .'^ The most plausible explanation is that
^
^
General Laws , c. 55, as amended by c. 444 of the
Acts of 1962.
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groups did not fund campaigns in their na.es because persons
connected with them in some way-their members, group offi-
cials, and lobbyists-did so. They were the ones who made
contrli>utions to candidates, with or without the advice of
the organization, whom they believed would best represent
the interests of the group. The public record does provide
some evidence that substantiates this explanation. For
example, several of the state's bankers did, in fact, help
finance the reelection of state Treasurer Robert Q. Crane
in 1970, although no banking association was reported as a
campaign contributor. Lobbyist William P. Malloy did, in
fact, make numerous contributions in 1970 to legislators
whose committee assignments gave them an influential voice
in legislative decisions of concern to the groups he repre-
sented. Each of these cases is elaborated upon in the next
chapter. There was, then, no apparent necessity in 1970
for most groups to solicit their membership for campaign
funds, thereafter to be given—in the name of the group-
to candidates deemed worthy of support. There were some
indications, however, that certain groups were beginning to
do this in 1972. Political action committees representing
some of the state's teachers, realtors, insurance brokers,
physicians, and certain employees of the General Electric
Company in Massachusetts were among those organized to
raise and disburse campaign funds in the 1972 election.
Soee of them reported their activities, and others did
not.
The Committee on Politic. i Education (rnr>.^
^he
C«nmittee on Political Education (COPE, of the Massachusetts
State Labor Council (APL-CIO) was the major exception to the
pattern of a lack of participation by interest groups in the
financing of electoral campaigns in the Bay state in 1970.^7
For many years, COPE has been the vehicle whereby the Massa-
Chusetts State Labor Council has educated its membership
politically, and consistent with the advice offered by
Samuel Gompers, rewarded its friends and punished its
enemies by making campaign contributions to candidates with
good labor records. Although the Massachusetts campaign
finance statute specifically prohibits corporate contribu-
tions, it imposes no such obstacle to organized labor. The
law specifically allbws political committees, and COPE is
one, to raise and disburse funds for electoral purposes.
Occasionally, petitions have been introduced in the state
legislature which, if enacted into law, would deprive organ-
ized labor of the right it presently enjoys.
^fS^V?''?
White, "State Piling Law Ignored by MostGroups:
-Political Committees' Aided Candidates," BostonGlobe
, 28 December 1972, p. 16. ^
J^A similar finding, limited to 1968 Senate cam-paigns, is found in Mileur and Sulzner, pp. 100-101.
In 1970 COPE raised $62,628 from three sources:
$48,018 came from payroll deductions from the wages of each
participating APL-CIO member in Massachusetts; the national
office of APL-CIO in Washington, D.C. contributed $11,000;
and a banquet honoring Samuel Gompers and Philip Murray,
sponsored biennially by the Massachusetts State Labor Coun-
cil, netted $3,610.78 ^11 of the funds raised by COPE in
1970 were spent.79 presented in Table 18, candidates for
statewide office received campaign contributions totaling
$12,375, and state legislative candidates received a total
of $13,132. No contributions were made to candidates for
the Governor's Council. In addition, more than $19,000 was
disbursed to finance a direct-mail campaign to encourage
members of organized labor in Massachusetts to register to
vote, and to cast their ballots for candidates endorsed by
the state AFL-CIO. The balance of their funds were used
for campaign contributions to candidates for the U.S. Con-
gress, and for other purposes with which this discussion is
not concerned. In brief, most of the funds disbursed in
1970, according to the Director of COPE, were intended to
elect candidates running for Massachusetts offices who were
^^Report filed by the Committee on Political Educa-
tion (COPE) of the Massachusetts State Labor Council (AFL-
CIO) with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
79
'Ibid. All subsequent references to expenditures
by COPE are based upon this source.
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perceived as friendly to organized labor by officials of the
Massachusetts State Labor Council (AFL-CIO) .^^
TABLE 18
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON POLITICALEDUCATION (COPE) OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE LABORCOUNCIL (AFL-CIO) TO CANDIDATES FOR STATEWIDE




Donahue For Governor Committee $ 5,000Maurice A. Donahue Campaign Committee
.
. l!ooOKevin H. White Committee 5,000
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception
Committee 1^000Secretary of State John F. X. Davoren
. . 125
Auditor Thaddeus Buczko 250To^l $12,375
State Legislature
21 Senate Candidates 3,675
75 House of Representatives Candidates . . 9,4 57
Total $13,132
Total $25,507
SOURCE: Report filed by COPE with the Secretary
of State's Division of Public Records.
Of the $12,375 contributed directly to five state-
wide candidates, virtually all of it went to the two major
contenders for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.
State Senate President Maurice A. Donahue of Holyoke was an
''"Interview with John A. Callahan, Boston, 18 July
1972. The decisions adaout campaign contributions, according
to Callahan, are usually made by the four officers of the
Massachusetts State Labor Council, but in some instances
the thirty-five members of the Council participate.
early choice of the Massachusetts State Labor Council and
received $6,000 from COPE for his campaign prior to the
September primary. Although Donahue won his party's
endorsement at the pre-primary convention, Mayor Kevin H.
White of Boston narrowly defeated Donahue in the primary.
COPE then supported White as the Democrats' nominee with a
$5,000 contribution. Lesser contributions were made to
three statewide incumbents: Attorney General Quinn, Secre-
tary of state Davoren, and Auditor Buczko, all Democrats.
Of the $13,132 contributed by COPE to ninety-six
state legislative candidates, seventy-five candidates for
the House of Representatives received a total of $9,457,
and $3,675 was divided among twenty-one candidates for the
Senate. The average campaign contribution to a candidate
for the lower house was $130, whereas the average contribu-
tion to a candidate for the Senate was a bit more, $175.
No legislative candidate received more than $300. COPE's
contributions to legislative candidates are shown in Table
19. No effort was made to determine the partisanship of
the legislative candidates supported by AFL-CIO in 1970,
but it is a quite safe assumption that the overwhelming
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In addition to the $25,507 disbursed directly to
statewide and legislative candidates as campaign contribu-
tions, COPE spent at least $19,411 for printing and postage
on a direct-mail campaign. Collaborating with them in this
effort, in part, was the nonpartisan League of Women Voters
Of Massachusetts. The women wrote some of the literature
urging the workers to register and vote, and the AFL-CIO
defrayed the cost of printing and mailing it to their mem-
bership, in its direct-mail effort, COPE also encouraged
support at the polls for AFL-CIO-endorsed candidates. It
Is not known exactly what candidates were promoted in COPE's
mailings, nor to what extent, but because approximately 80
per cent of COPE's campaign contributions in 1970 went to
candidates running for statewide offices or the state legis-
lature, about $15,000 of the cost of the mailing can reason-
ably be allocated to their campaign support. The total
assistance rendered them, therefore, was approximately
$40,000, roughly two-thirds of COPE's total disbursements
in 1970.
Summairy and Conclusions
From the preceding discussion of the fund-raising
activities of candidates and their committees, political
parties, and interest groups, it is apparent Uiat most of
^^Ibid.
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the funds raised to finance the campaigns of candidates for
statewide office, the Governor's Council, and the state
legislature in 1970 were raised by committees established on
behalf of candidates. A substantial sum was raised, how-
ever, by candidates without the benefit of committees. There
was very little evidence that candidates financed their cam-
paigns with contributions and loans from their personal
funds. The fund-raising efforts of the political parties
were decidedly less important, and with one exception, there
was virtually no fund raising by organized interest groups.
The fact that almost all of the money raised in 1970 was the
result of the efforts of candidates and their committees
reflects a marked tendency on the part of contributors to
give directly to candidates whom they favored, as opposed to
contributing to any centralized party or group fund-raising
effort. Although the burden for raising funds fell princi-
pally upon the candidates, each political party did make
some effort in 1970 to assist their candidates, most of this
assistance going to legislative candidates. In the House of
Representatives, Speaker David M. Hartley established the
Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House, and in the Senate,
Minority Leader John F. Parker established the Committee to
Elect a Republican State Senate. Although the Republicans
established a committee in the House similar to Hartley's,
it raised virtually nothing. In the Senate, no committee
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similar to Parker's was established by the Democrats. The
fund-raising activities by the parties' elected state com-
mittees were less important than those of the committees
established by the legislative leadership. The Republican
State committee made more of an effort, although it hardly
was successful, than the Democratic State Committee. On the
local level, the elected town and ward committees of both
the Democratic and Republican parties were of some conse-
quence. Here, too, the Republican effort was greater. The
only significant fund-raising activity by any interest group
in 1970 was the effort by the Committee on Political Educa-
tion (COPE) of the Massachusetts State Labor Council (AFL-
CIO)
.
In sum, the typical candidate had to rely upon him-
self. He received little direct financial assistance from
either his political party or interest groups in his cam-
paign.
It is reasonable to assume that a candidate, at the
least, will have a tendency to favor those who assisted him
in any substantial way with his campaign. For a candidate
not to feel some sense of obligation toward his campaign
workers and financial benefactors seems quite unlikely. If
a candidate, however, received no more than token support
from his political party, it can be argued that there is
little basis for such a feeling of obligation. Moreover,
it might be asked, what influence can that party expect to
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exert upon his behavior once he assumes office? In similar
fashion, if organized groups contributed little, or nothing,
to his campaign's success, would not they, too, have less
leverage with the candidate, once in office? Could not the
candidate conduct himself with greater independence toward
them, while not neglecting their interests that he per-
ceived as legitimate? To whom, it then follows, is the
candidate "indebted"? Obviously, those who helped him get
elected, including his campaign contributors. If he can do
something for them, he will, with this in mind, we now turn
to the subject of rewards for campaign contributions.
CHAPTER IV
REWARDS FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
Only a small minority of the electorate make
campaign contributions.! a fascinating question, but one
Which is difficult to answer, is why do they give? Most
people are not parted from their money easily for any
reason, and when they are, they expect something for it.
This motivation seems to be present, also, in politics.
The conventional wisdom holds that a campaign contribution
for many people is a self-serving action, one for which a
reward for oneself, or a friend, relative, or acquaintance
is expected. A campaign contribution is looked upon by
many as an "investment," and a return on that investment is
hoped for, if not expected, it is not inferred, incident-
ally, that what most contributors want is necessarily
illegal or improper in any way, although one of the lessons
of Watergate is that, for some, this is so.
Public officials in the Bay State are in a position
to dispense a variety of rewards, and one obvious way to
-
!^68, for example, 8,700,000 persons (8 per centof the adult population of the United States) said they made
contributions to campaigns at some level of government. At
no time during the past twenty years did more than 12 per
? «




come to their attention and possibly win their favor, is to
support their candidacies with money. At some future date
financial contributors may be recognized and rewarded. Some
officials can reward contributors with jobs in the executive,
legislative, or judicial branches of state government.
These jobs might be permanent or temporary, full-time or
part-time, well paying or parsimonious, important or prosaic.
Some officials can reward contributors with contracts, in
Massachusetts, the state government purchases all kinds of
goods and services, many of them connected with the design,
construction, and maintenance of roads, schools, office
buildings, hospitals, and recreational facilities, it awards
numerous architectural, engineering, construction, and main-
tenance contracts in the process. There are literally thou-
sands of vendors with whom the state enters into contracts
for equipment, supplies, and services. In addition to making
decisions about jobs and contracts, some officials can reward
contributors with other administrative actions. The possi-
bilities here are numerous. Two examples will suffice. A
favorable ruling by a rate-setting agency such as the Depart-
ment of Public Utilities within the Office of Consumer
Affairs can have a tremendous impact upon the economic health
of an enterprise such as an electric utility. The vigor with
which the Office of Environmental Affairs administers state
statutes dealing with air and water pollution can have a
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similar effect upon the profitability of various enterprises.
Officials can also reward contributors with legislative
decisions. Efforts by elected officials to enact legisla-
tion which will protect or advance the interests of cam-
paign contributors, or to defeat or modify proposed legis-
lation which will adversely affect their interests, can be
the guid gro guo for contributions. Finally, lawmakers and
administrators can grant access to their campaign contribu-
tors.
Public officials can punish as well as reward. A
person with a stake in public decisions does not want his
interests ignored, or responded to with less than dispatch.
Although he may have no particular job, contract, or legis-
lation in mind, he may give because he fears being left out,
or punished, if a contribution is not made.
Certainly, it should be made clear that other less
self-serving reasons exist for supporting candidates finan-
cially. Many, such as programmatic agreement, integrity of
the candidate, party loyalty, and family ties are often
cited when persons explain their motivations for contribu-
ting. This study, however, focuses upon some of the more
tangible benefits previously mentioned. They are inher-
ently more interesting to examine, and, especially in Massa-
chusetts, have become part of the mythology about how state
government is conducted.
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Difficulties arise, however, when any attempt is
made to link campaign contributions with rewards. To know
that a particular person made a campaign contribution to a
candidate is one thing; to determine why the contribution
was, made, or what reward-if any-was received by the con-
tributor is quite another matter. The contributor is the
person who knows best of all why he gave, and the public
official who made an appointment, awarded a contract, or
granted access to a contributor best knows the reasons for
his decision. Neither is particularly willing to explain
his actions fully. To get to the bottom of the matter of
"giving and getting" is extremely difficult, it would be
an error in many cases to conclude that a particular
appointment was made, or a specific contract awarded, in
exchange for a campaign contribution. In one case, an
appointment may have been made solely because a contribu-
tion was given to the appointing official. In a second
situation, the principal consideration in the decision may
have been the public official's previous friendship or
working relationship with the appointee. In a third
instance, a number of factors might have weighed equally in
the decision—the campaign contribution, friendship, pres-
sure from the party organization, and the impressive quali-
fications of the contributor for the position. The diffi-
culty in conclusively linking campaign contributions with
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rewards is apparent. At best, such relationships can only
be inferred. No claim is being presented that associations
will be established conclusively in this thesis.
Originally it was intended to explore the relation
between campaign contributions and jobs, legislation, con-
tracts, other administrative action, and access. Next to
jobs, the area of contracts was thought particularly excit-
ing and promising. The author recalled the embarrassment
of the Volpe administration caused by revelations that many
architects who had made contributions to Volpe* s 1962 cam-
paign were thereafter awarded state contracts; for five
weeks in 1966 the state Senate held hearings, investigating
the selection of architects for the state university's new
medical school. 2 One architect who testified stated:
I found that the system called for anyone who
wanted anything like a contract to contribute
to the campaign. This is the systan.3
After some preliminary efforts to develop a method and deter-
mine sources of information, which met with little success,
''Governor Volpe was upset by revelations by Repre-
sentative Michael S. Dukakis (Democrat-Brookline) that "11
architects who contributed to the unsuccessful gubernatorial
campaign of 1962 were awarded 15 architectural contracts
before the Governor left office at the end of that year,
"
according to an editorial, "Quality Is the Issue," Boston
Globe, 4 May 1966. Regarding the Senate investigation, see
John C. Thomas and Jeremiah V. Murphy, "Governor's Brother
Denied Getting Campaign Cash," Boston Globe , 21 May 1966,
p. 1.
~~
^David Shields, quoted in "Other Architects Ready to
Talk, but Kelly Opposes Calling Them," Boston Globe, 25 May
1966, p. 1.
154
the author wrote Michael S. Dukakis, hopeful that he might
suggest a method or sources of information which had been
overlooked. Dukakis, critical of the Volpe administration
in the 1960's, and later of Governor Sargenfs, replied:
Jhf? ^^^""^ ^'^y about the fact
^? with the State aretraditionally solicited for contributions by Gov-ernors and State Officials of both parties. Wemanaged to stop that racket in connection withthe award of architectural contracts back in 1966by setting up a designers selection board whichhas fairly effectively taken architectural con-tracts out of the political grab bag. My only
suggestion with respect to the particular problemyou raise in your letter is to do the ratherlaborious and painful job of checking out thebackgrounds of a candidate's contributors indetermining whether or not they have an interestin State contracts. I know of no easily access-ible source for such information
. .
.4
The author had already done some "laborious and pain-
ful," and very time-consuming, investigating of campaign con-
tributions, largely in connection with appointments as a
reward to contributors, and concluded that it was simply not
feasible to explore the area of contracts, given the time and
resources available to him. Although the problems were dif-
ferent, the same conclusion was reached about two other
rewards, legislation and other administrative action. It was
decided, therefore, to limit the inquiry about rewards to two
areas, jobs and access.
Letter from Michael S. Dukakis, September 6, 1973
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Rewards for Contrlbutlona i Jobs
Jobs will be the first reward discussed, beginning
with the judicial appointments of Governor Francis W. Sar-
gent, some of Sargent's other appointments, and the patron-
age available to other elected statewide executives, especi-
ally to the attorney general, will be treated next.
Judicial Appointments by Governor s^Tc^^r.*- m an
article dealing with no-bid contracts for the city of Boston,
Peter Lucas wrote:
White is not the originator of the practice ofrewarding political friends. People give presi-dents money and become ambassadors; people givegovernors money and become judges; people give
mayors money and get jobs or contracts. The prac-tice is as old as government ... in politics onehand washes the other. Political writers know it.White knows it. The public has the right to knowit.
And in an article written a few months before that, another
State House reporter, Stephen A. Cohen, maintained that Gov-
ernor Sargent followed his campaign contributions book rather
closely in making appointments to the Massachusetts judi-
ciary.^ To some extent Lucas and Cohen are correct in their
assertions about judicial patronage, but the evidence is not
overwhelming
.
^Peter Lucas, "Mayor Clouds No-Bid Issue, " Boston
Globe
, 9 October 1972, p. 45.
^Stephen A. Cohen, "Sargent Follows Book on Appoint-
ments," Boston Globe , 4 April 1972, p. 14.
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Since Francis W. Sargent became governor on
January 22, 1969 he has had an enormous impact on the
judicial branch of state government. As of August, 1974
he had made more than 175 appointments to the judiciary,
an unprecedented number of appointments in the history of
Massachusetts politics.
^ The discussion which follows,
however, treats Sargent's first 150 appointments, which
were confirmed by mid.1973. By that time. Governor Sargent
had named six justices to the Supreme Judicial Court, the
state's highest court. Sargent also had named all six jus-
tices to the Appeals Court, established by the legislature
in 1972 to relieve the Supreme Judicial Court of much of
its appellate work. He had appointed twenty-five justices-
more than one-half of the bench-to the Superior Court, the
state's trial court, and named ninety-three justices to the
District Courts, the state's lowest level courts where most
cases are decided. In addition, Sargent had appointed four-
teen Probate Court justices, three Juvenile Court justices,
two Land Court justices, and one justice of the Boston Hous-
ing Court. More than one-third of his judicial appointments
were made in 1973, most of these related to an amendment to
the Massachusetts Constitution approved by the voters in
^Joseph Rosenbloom, "With Little Fanfare, Sargent
Has Filled the State Bench," Boston Globe , 29 July 1973, p.
20. See also, Rachelle Patterson, "Sargent Names Friend of
White to the Bench," Boston Globe , 24 August 1974, p. 1.
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November, 1972 which provides for the mandatory retirement
of all justices upon their reaching the age of seventy.
Thirty-eight of Sargent's fifty^seven appointments in 1973
were made to comply with that amendment. The Governor had
not only named more than one-half of the entire state bench,
but he had also appointed the Chief Justices of the Supreme
Judicial court, the Appeals Court, the Superior Court, the
District Courts, and the Probate Courts.
The Massachusetts Constitution provides that all
judges "shall be nominated and appointed by the governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the council. "8 During
his tenure, however, Sargent has dominated the process of
appointing judges. His nominations have been approved by
the eight-member Governor's Council with only three excep-
tions. These were his nominations of Walter Skinner to the
Superior Court and William Garbose to the Gardner District
Court in 1969, and Paula Gold to the Dorchester District
Court in 1973. The Democratic
-dominated Council's voice,
during Sargent's administration, has been heard essentially
during the confirmation hearings, according to one of Sar-
gent's advisers.^ They can, and have, suggested nominees
^Massachusetts, Constitution
, c. II, sec. I, art.
IX
.
^Telephone interview with William G. Young, Chief
Counsel to the Governor, 3 September 1974. Young had then
served in that capacity for about two years and did not
claim to speak for his predecessor.
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to the governor, but they have not been consulted in advance
of the naming of his nominees, m fact, councillors now
only learn of them twenty-four hours in advance of their
names being revealed to the public. This is a far different
situation than what prevailed but a few years ago when the
council was known for its "wheeling and dealing." a partial
explanation is that the Governor's Council now enjoys less
political clout and prestige. About a decade ago, most of
its statutory powers were taken from it by an initiative
petition approved by the voters. Its prestige suffered from
revelations of corruption, involving some councillors,
unearthed by the Massachusetts Crime Comir.ission in the mid-
1960' s. In addition, the quality of Sargent's nominees has
been advanced as an explanation. The Council has been hard
put to find fault with thera.^^
Although the Governor and the Council possess the
formal authority for appointment, there are a number of
participants who influence these appointments. According to
William G. Young, Chief Counsel to the Governor since 1972,
all nominations by the Governor to the Council are first
discussed by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, his Chief
Secretary, Chief Counsel, and other members of his staff
before the Governor's decisions are referred to the Joint
Bar Committee on Judicial Appointments of the Massachusetts
lOlbid.
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and Boston Bar Associations.il m the case of the thirty-
eight appointments made by the Governor to fin the vacan-
cies created by the constitutional amendment mandating
retirement at age seventy, he employed the services of a
committee to assist him. m August, 1972 the Governor
appointed an ad hoc Advisory Coimnittee on Judicial Appoint-
ments, a twelve-member committee comprised equally of law-
yers and lay members, and charged it with seeking out and
recommending potential appointees to him. The Governor's
Chief Counsel served as secretary of this committee, and
the activities of the committee were given considerable
publicity. Individuals who aspired to the Massachusetts
bench, and others who were in a position to recommend poten-
tial jurists, were invited to submit their names to the
committee. Over a period of several weeks the committee
traveled to various parts of the state and held public
hearings at which citizens were invited to express their
views concerning the qualities they believed were most
important in persons who might be appointed to the bench.
The committee used an elaborate questionnaire which was
distributed to approximately 1,100 potential candidates.
About 600 questionnaires were returned, and 550 of those
individuals who returned questionnaires were interviewed
^Interview with William G. Young, Boston, 30 July
1973. The description of the selection process that follows
is based upon this interview.
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by the committee. The Governor's Chief Counsel coordinated
this effort and made recommendations to the Governor inde-
pendent of the recomiuendations of the committee. Governor
Sargent reviewed the credentials of the recommended candi-
dates with members of his staff, after whicn he invited the
recommendations of the Joint Bar Coimnittee on Judicial
Appointments of the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associa-
tions. It was only then, on January 4, 1973, that he com-
menced submitting the names of his nominees to the Gover-
nor's Council for confirmation. By March 7, approximately
eight weeks later, he had filled the thirty-eight vacancies
created by the constitutional amendment.
Cohen maintains that campaign contributions to the
Governor played an important part in his decisions:
Governor Sargent's track record on judicial
appointments since the beginning of his current
term show he's stuck pretty close to the book —
a blue binder in the Secretary of State's office
which contains more than 500 pages of contribu-
tions to his 1970 campaign. 12
The evidence indicates, however, that while campaign contri-
butions were probably a factor of consequence in some of
Sargent's first 150 appointments, most of them have to be
explained in some other way. First, most appointees did not
make campaign contributions. Only thirty-five appointees
and/or their wives made contributions of $100 or more (most
appointees who made contributions gave the money in their
l^cohen, "Sargent Follows Book," p. 14.
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names, although in six cases, contributions were made by the
wives of appointees, a not uncommon practice involving
appointees other than prospective judges) .^^ thirty-five
contributions ranged in size from $100 to $2,625 and were
distributed as follows: "'^







Second, a number of appointees made nominal contributions.
The author agrees with Sargent's oft-repeated response to
his critics that:
If someone buys a couple of tickets to a
political dinner, that shouldn't preclude
him from receiving an appointment any more
than it should entitle him to receiving
such an appointment. 15
Christopher J. Armstrong's appointment as an associate jus-
tice of the new Appeals Court provides an example of a person
l^Report filed by The Sargent Committee with the Sec-
retary of State's Division of Public Records. There probably
were more than thirty-five contributors who later becamejudges, as well as an unknown number of contributions fromjudicial hopefuls who were not appointed. Apart from infor-
mation in articles in the Boston press, the method employed
to determine contributors, tedious and likely to invite
error, was to scan the 500 page report of The Sargent Com-
mittee, searching for the names of the 150 appointees.
^4ibid.
-^^"Sarge to Critics: Nothing to Hide," Record
American (Boston) , 6 April 1972, p. 1.
Who was Clearly rewarded for prior service to the governor.
Prior to his appointaaent, Armstrong served as Governor Sar-
gent's legal counsel. His §200 contribution was obviously
uniiaportant. One of Sargenfs most recent appointees,
Rudolph A. Sacco, named a special justice of the Hampshire
county Probate Court, helped manage Sargent's campaign in
1970 in Berkshire County. Sacco contributed only $100 to
Sargent's campaign, but he was instrumental in raising an
additional $10,000 to $15,000. In this case, his campaign
assistance, particularly his fund-raising efforts, was
probably quite important.
Although some appointees gave only nominally, like
Armstrong and Sacco, several made substantial contributions.
Twenty-two contributors gave $500 or more, eleven of them
giving $1,000 or more. Cohen's charge that appointments
were influenced by campaign contributions has more validity
in these cases. The twenty-two appointments in which con-
tributions of $500 or more were involved are presented in
Table 20.
Prominent among the large contributors were persons
^%oseph Rosenbloom, "Sargent Names R. A. Sacco a
Judge," Boston Globe , 19 July 1973, p. 13.
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later appointed special justices in the District Courts."
Fifty of Sargent's first X50 appointees to the bench ware
named special justices. Fifteen of them made contributions
to his campaign, eleven of them giving $500 or more. The
frequency of giving by these special Justices, and the size
of their contributions, stands in marked contrast to the
pattern of giving by Sargent's other judicial appointees.
Of his other 100 appointees, only twenty made contributions,
eleven of them giving $500 or more. As a rule, individuals
Who were appointed to the higher courts did not make contri-
butions, a situation for which there is no simple explana-
18tion. None of Governor Sargent's six appointees to the
Supreme Judicial Court made a campaign contribution; only
justices are generally assigned to eachof the district courts throughout the state. They workpart-time as the workloads of these particular courts
are compensated on a per diem basis, and are per-mitted to maintain private law practices while they serveasjudges. They often are later nominated to be the pre-siding 3ustices of the courts they served as special jus-tices. Governor Sargent has supported legislation which
would create a number of positions for full-time specialjustices to reduce the need for part-time special justices.Justices appointed would serve a number of district courts
as their workloads dictate. According to Sargent's ChiefCounsel, the legislature's Committee on the Judiciary
approved the legislation twice, but on both occasions it diedin the House Ways and Means Committee. Telephone interview
with William G. Young, 3 September 1974.
^^Ibid. One explanation offered by the Chief Counsel
to Governor Sargent, which is less than satisfying to the
author, is that it is generally understood by members of the
Massachusetts bar that these important and prestigious posi-
tions are not sought; rather, "the job seeks the man." Why,
then, did the Supreme Judicial Court, on January 1, 1973,
166
one of his six appointees to the recently created Appeals
court, and but two of his twenty-five appointees to the
superior Court, made contributions. Contributions were
uncommon, too, by appointees to the Probate Courts; only
three of fourteen appointees gave. Campaign contributions
were more frequent, however, by appointees to the state's
lower courts. Twenty-nine of Sargent's thirty-five campaign
contributions from judicial appointees came from appointees
to the District, Municipal, and Juvenile Courts. Among the
twenty-nine were the fifteen contributions by special jus-
tice appointees.
The evidence also demonstrates that campaign contri-
butions by prospective judges were far less frequent when
Governor Sargent's ad hoc committee assisted him in recruit-
ing and screening candidates for the bench, something which
invites speculation, but about which only Sargent and his
confidants know the complete story. 19 In 1973 Sargent made
announce a prohibition against campaign contributions by
sitting judges? The vast majority of Sargent's appointees
to the higher courts, moreover, were not sitting judges.
It would seem that if it were thought necessary to restrain
sitting judges that there would be at least as great a need
to impose the same restraint upon all members of the bar.
No similar standard applies.
l^Sargent's use of the ad hoc committee certainly
expanded the opportunity for participation in the judicial
selection process, and in the author's judgment, tended to
make it less political. At the same time it did not deprive
Sargent of the opportunity to reward qualified lawyers who
had supported him politically.
The Boston press has been increasingly active in
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fifty-seven appointments, including the thirty-eight
appointments which filled the vacancies created by the
constitutional amendment mandating the retirement of all
judges when they reached the age of seventy, of the fifty-
seven justices appointed in 1973, only six of them-less
than one in nine-are known to have made campaign contri-
butions. During the previous four years of Sargent's
administration (1969-72), however, when ninety-three appoint-
ments to the bench were made, twenty-nine of them-about one
in three-were reported as campaign contributors. Contri-
butions were about three times more frequent during those
years than when the ad hoc committee functioned (after Sar-
gent filled the thirty-eight vacancies in March, 1973 he
dispensed with the services of the committee)
.
In conclusion, it is obviously false to generalize
that Governor Sargent's appointees to the bench became
judges because they made contributions to his 1970 campaign.
Only thirty-five of his first 150 appointees-
-less than 25
per cent—did so, and several of them gave nominally. It
is likely, however, that large contributions were a factor
of some importance in some appointments. Observers can only
speculate. Only Sargent and his advisers really know, and
reporting about campaign contributions, and Sargent's oppor-
tunities to make numerous appointments attracted great
attention. It is possible that this publicity reduced the
number of appointments of contributors as much as any other
factor.
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they deny the charge. Despite the denial, they are
politicians, ana as Lucas stated, "in politics, cne hand
washes the other." The charge has some truth, but has been
overstated. Finally, one cannot help but wonder how many
aspirants to the Massachusetts judiciary made campaign con-
tributions to Governor Sargent in 1970 but were not appointed
judges.
Other Appointments by Governor Saraent . a governor
in Massaohusetts has vast appointive authority, m addition
to his appointment of judges, he has the authority to make
other appointments to the judicial branch; for example, he
appoints the clerks of the District Courts. He also appoints
all of the state's medical examiners, notaries public, public
administrators, justices of the peace, and masters in chan-
cery. Within the executive branch, there are a great many
appointments at his command. On his authority alone, the
governor names his cabinet secretaries, and presumably has
a voice in the appointments of their staffs. Moreover, there
are a number of middle-management positions which are non-
civil service jobs; some of these political appointments are
made by the governor. There are also numerous boards and
commissions, such as the Alcoholic Beverages Commission, to
which he makes appointments. He names the trustees of all
institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth, and
he appoints the trustees of other state institutions such
as state hospitals. In addition, he appoints the members of
various public authorities such as the Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority and the Massachusetts Port Authority, m
sum, there are literally hundreds of appointments of all
types at his command. According to Evans and Novak, Gover-
nor Francis W. Sargent had made 4,200 appointments by mid-
1974 (he assumed office in January, 1969) . Two thousand of
these went to Republicans, the remaining 2,200 to Democrats
and Independents. 2^
Helping to fill many of these positions today is
Robert C. Dumont, a personnel vice president on a two-year
leave of absence from the New England Mutual Life Insurance
Company. Prior to Dumonfs assuming direction of the Gover-
nor's State Service Office in March, 1973, Sargent's patron-
age chief for more than three years was Harold J. Greene,
who later became head of the Excise Bureau in the Department
of Corporations and Taxation. Greene had been Sargent's
administrative assistant when Sargent was a commissioner in
the Department of Natural Resources, and was recruited by
Sargent soon after he became governor. Dumont explained
that his responsibility includes helping to fill the periodic
vacancies on the many boards and commissions which advise
Governor Sargent, some top echelon jobs, and some 30- and
90-day appointments. He emphasized that his office does not
20Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "GOP Split
Endangers Gov. Sargent," Boston Globe , 21 June 1974, p. 19.
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handle all non-civil service jobs, something which Greene
attempted to do.^l Greene said he had tried to centralize
patronage, but was unsuccessful in persuading all state
agencies to advise his office of all non-civil service
openings, as well as civil service openings for which there
was no eligible list. Many agencies did not cooperate,
some advising legislators about job openings instead, thereby
giving them a share in the patronage. 22 Most of Greene's
time was spent with advisory board appointments, although
like Dumont, he helped recruit some persons for several
full-time paying positions.
One of Greene's assistants for two years was
Patricia R. Wales, later appointed an assistant commissioner
in the Department of Commerce and Development, who entered
politics as a Sargent staffer during his 1966 campaign for
lieutenant governor. Wales strongly objected to the term
patronage, claiming that the Governor's State Service Office
stressed qualifications, a point emphasized also by both
Greene and Dumont. 23 Greene maintained that Sargent had
told him, "I don't care if they're Republicans or Democrats
21interview with Robert C. Dumont, Boston, 28 August
1973.
2 2Interview with Harold J. Greene, Boston, 4 October
1973.
23interview with Patricia R. Wales, Boston, 4 October
1973. The balance of the discussion about the Governor's
State Service Office is based upon the interviews with Wales,
Greene, and Dumont.
as long as they're qualified." Dumont stated that Sargent
had frequently told him that "good appointments is good
politics." Political considerations, however, did enter
into many decisions about appointments. Wales checked the
suitability of candidates with local Sargent campaign coor-
dinators. Greene, without explaining further, said he kept
a "score card" on legislators and rewarded them accordingly.
The Governor's chief secretary often sat in on patronage
decisions, according to Greene, and some applicants were
referred to Greene's office by Victor F. Zuchero, Sargent's
full-time fund raiser. Dumont indicated he was often aware
of the partisanship of many prospective appointees because
this was essential in complying with the laws regulating
many advisory board appointments. He admitted that polit-
ical considerations were involved in filling some 30- and
90-day appointments. Dumont made a conscious effort to deal
with the Republican State Committee, whereas Greene had
ignored it, a decision which eventually created great diffi-
culty for Sargent with his own party in the 1974 election.
Although Greene, Dumont, and Wales all knew of the
author's interest in linking campaign contributions with
appointments, there was no acknowledgment by them that any
such relationship existed. Dumont admitted knowing of cam-
paign contributions in some instances, and Greene recalled
several complaints by persons who had made contributions and
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argued that they deserved jobs. Each stressed, however, that
the principal standard applied in selecting appointees was
their qualifications for the job. it should be noted that
it is possible that qualified persons can also be campaign
contributors.
In 1970 Governor Sargent received 737 campaign con-
tributions of $500 or more, and thereafter made hundreds of
appointments. This inquiry is confined, however, to the
fifty individuals who gave the most money to Sargent's cam-
paign. There were two reasons for this. First, it was
assumed that those individuals who made the larger contribu-
tions were more likely to want something from him, and were
more likely to get it. Second, the inquiry was confined to
the fifty top contributors to insure it would be manageable.
Some brief additional comments about the method of analysis are
in order. Governor Sargent's campaign finance report for 1970
was not directly consulted because a privately published
report of all contributors of $500 or more in 1970 was made
available to the author by Common Cause/Massachusetts. It
greatly facilitated the task of identifying the top fifty
contributors to Governor Sargent. 24 ^ alphabetized card
file of Governor Sargent's appointments, maintained by the
2^The campaign finance report filed by The Sargent
Committee for 1970 contains more than 500 typed pages of
the names and addresses of contributors of $25 or more.
The amounts and dates of their contributions are also
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Secretary of state's Commissions Division, was then
consulted to determine which of the fifty contributors
received appointments.
At least twelve of the top fifty contributors to
Sargenfs campaign in 1970 received appointments. These
twelve individuals made contributions ranging from $1,650
to $3,000. Eleven of them gave $2,000 or more, two of them
giving $3,000, the maximum allowable contribution under the
law by an individual to a candidate or his committees during
a calendar year, six of these persons were rewarded by
Governor Sargent with full-time appointments. Three became
judges. The other three full-time appointments went to Aldo
Eramo, who was named an assistant clerk of the state's
Appellate Tax Board; to Norman Brisson, who was appointed a
clerk of the Central District Court of Northern Essex; and
to Albert G. Diehl, who was named an inspector in the Gover-
nor's Highway Safety Bureau. Sargent appointed the other
six large contributors to positions which are part-time, and
for which there is little or no compensation. Francis D.
Adoraaitis was appointed a member of the Massachusetts Aero-
nautics Commission; William Foley was appointed to the Board
of Registration of Chiropractors; Leonard Florence was
included. The nauaes, however, are in no particular order.
Fortunately, the names of the 737 contributors of $500 or
more to Governor Sargent in 1970 are listed—alphabetically—
in Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing . This source was pre-
pared by CRF by consulting Sargent's 1970 report.
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reappointed as a trustee of the Soldiers' Home in
Massachusetts; Selwyn Cain was appointed as a member of
the Massachusetts Educational Communications Commission;
George Karelitz was reappointed as a public administrator
in Essex County; and Wallace Yaffee was reappointed as a
member of the Advisory Council on the Licensing of Hospi-
tals, Hospital Surveys, and Construction Planning. Table 21
lists the twelve appointees, the positions to which they
were appointed, the dates of their appointments, and the
amount which they contributed to Sargent's 1970 campaign.
The fact that twelve of Sargent's largest contribu-
tors later received appointments is insufficient informa-
tion, by itself, to permit any valid conclusion about these
appointments. To learn more, a few of the donors were
interviewed directly, or by telephone; persons who knew
about these contributors, including members of the press,
were also interviewed; and street lists, city directories.
Who's Who in the East , and similar publications were con-
sulted. 25 Some of the findings will now be briefly related.
25campaign finance reports in Massachusetts state
only the name and address of a contributor, the size of the
contribution, and the date it was made. No occupational
information about the contributor is reported. A sixty-one
page booklet. The Common Cause Manual on Money and Politics
(Washington, O.C. t Common Cause, 1972} suggests some methods
for analyzing campaign finance reports, and discusses several









































































































































































































































































































The inquiry into Leonard Florence's contribution
demonstrates how involved a particular case can be, and
illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
acquiring information directly from a contributor. Flor-
ence, a successful businessman and former resident of
Chelsea, Massachusetts, has been a trustee of the Soldiers'
Home in Massachusetts (in Chelsea) since his appointment by
Governor Volpe in 1967. His reappointment by Governor Sar-
gent occurred almost four years after he gave $2,500 to
Sargent's 1970 campaign. Florence is friendly with the
Commandant of the Soldiers' Home, who is the son of a former
mayor of Chelsea. Leonard silver International, Inc., which
Florence owns, employs about 300 people, and Florence leases
a building located at Logan Airport, in East Boston, from
the Massachusetts Port Authority. This is convenient since
the company's business involves importing silver. On
June 11, 1974, Florence, long friendly with U.S. Represen-
tative Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, served as the chairman of a
fund raiser for Democratic House candidates in Potomac,
Maryland. The affair raised $52,550, of which $1,000 was
given by Florence. Among the people from Boston who attended
were Edward J. King, the Executive Director of the Massachu-
setts Port Authority. 2^ Why Florence gave Sargent such a
2^See David Nyhan, "O'Neill Names Donors to Fund for
DOTiocrats," Boston Globe , 14 June 1974, p. 20. See also,
David Farrell, "Republicans Zero in on O'Neill Fundraiser,"
Boston Globe , 18 June 1974, p. 23.
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large contribution in 1970, why he wanted to be reappointed,
and just What Florence's relationship with the Massachusettl
Port Authority is, are unknown. Florence, when contacted by
telephone, gave the author the "brush off," claiming he was
too busy to discuss his contributions and appointment. 27
What is clearer, after this investigation, is that Flor-
ence • 8 interests are affected by both the federal and state
governments, and that his bipartisan campaign contributions
are very likely one way he attempts to protect and advance
those interests. Even so, the information known is still
insufficient to make a conclusive judgment, insofar as his
appointment is concerned, about the significance of his
$2,500 contribution to Sargent in 1970.
Not all contributors who were approached were as
uncooperative as Florence. Aldo Eramo, for example,
explained that not all of the $2,825 contributed in his
name ($825 in February and $2,000 in September, 1970) was
his money; some had been raised by him from others, although
he had received credit for the entire contribution. He did
not say how much he had personally given. Eramo, appointed
27
Telephone interview with Leonard Florence, 19 June
1974.
^^Interview with Aldo Eramo, Boston, Summer, 1973.
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an Assistant Clerk of the Appellate Tax Board29 in March,
1970, has been involved in Republican gubernatorial politics
since the early 1960»s. Albert G. Diehl's case affords
another example. Diehl, a long-service state employee, has
worked for most of his career in a non-civil service posi-
tion for the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. Almost two
years lapsed after his $2,500 contribution was made before
his appointment as an inspector in the Governor's Highway
Safety Bureau. His new position is also a non-civil service
job. The Bureau is a new agency, about five years old,
which is entirely financed with federal funds. When asked
why he made such a large contribution, Diehl replied that
some of Sargent's people told him the Governor needed money
for his campaign. 30 With no further infomation available,
Diehl and Eramo's cases suggest the plausible explanation
that these men thought their campaign contributions would
come to the attention of persons with the authority to
decide whether they would receive appointments.
In some cases there was no direct contact with con-
tributors, and the connection between their contributions
and appointments is even more speculative. It is unlikely
29The governor appoints the chairman and the five
commissioners of the Appellate Tax Board. He also appoints
a chief clerk and five assistant clerks. The function of
the Board is to hear appeals of property owners throughout
Massachusetts who believe their property has been unfairly
assessed by local officials.
^^Interview with Albert G. Diehl, Boston, 11 June
1974.
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that William Foley, a Boston schoolteacher, contributed
$3,000 to Sargent's campaign to be appointed a member of
the Board of Registration of Chiropractors, a position he
soon thereafter resigned to accept a similar appointiaent
with another board of registration. 31 Neither position is
very important. Efforts to contact Foley for an explana-
tion, however, were unsuccessful. It is also unlikely that
George Karelitz, first appointed Public Administrator for
Essex County by Governor Volpe in 1966, gave $2,000 in 1970
to insure his reappointment one year later by Governor Sar-
gent. This position is also of little importance, one about
which few citizens, including some lawyers, know ar.ything.32
A bit more was learned about Karelitz, however, than Foley.
In 1970 Karelitz was a law partner of Norman Brisson, who
also gave Sargent $2,000. Brisson was thereafter appointed
Clerk of the Central District Court of Northern Essex, a
position attractive to many attorneys. Moreover, each had
been active in Republican politics, Karelitz as a member of
the Republican State Committee, and Brisson as chairman of
31within Massachusetts state government, there «ire
twenty-seven such boards of registration whose essential
functions are to examine, license, and oversee the practice
of people engaged in a variety of occupations in which the
public has an interest. The typical position is part-time
and pays nominally.
•^^The 30b of a public administrator is to oversee
the execution of the estate of a person who dies without a
will and has no known relatives. For doing this, the Pro-
bate Court for the county, which assigns such cases, awards
him a percentage of the estate.
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the city conunittee in Haverhill.33 ^ possibility is that
Karelitz's contribution was related to Brisson's appointment
(rather than his own), but this is admittedly speculative.
When the great variety of motivations for making
campaign contributions are recalled, the fact that about one
in four of Sargent's top fifty contributors to his 1970 cam-
paign thereafter received appointments is put in better per-
spective. Some information about the thirty-eight large
givers who did not receive appointments is helpful, too, in
providing this perspective. Some of the thirty-eight non-
appointees were out-of-state residents, most were Massachu-
setts businessmen, some were attorneys, and a few were per-
sons long active in Republican party affairs. Among the
seven persons who were residents of other states was Laurance
(and Mary) Rockefeller of New York City.^^ sargent and
Rockefeller have been friendly for years and share a deep
interest in the environment. Others were toy manufacturer
Louis Marx, Jr., of New York City, and Cummins Engine Com-
pany chief executive officer J. Irwin Miller of Columbus,
Indiana; each gave substantially, not only to Sargent, but
to several candidates in other states. Particularly inter-
esting because their company "secretly funneled $100,000
33interview with Kelly, 30 July 1973.
^^The same approach was used in gathering informa-
tion about the thirty-eight non-appointees as was used for
the twelve large contributors who received appointments.
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through dummy committees into the 1972 presidential campaign
of Representative Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark.)"35
^^^^^^
Meyerson and W. K. Gayden of Dallas, executives employed by
a computer company, Electronic Data Systems, within Massa-
chusetts, among the prominent businessmen who gave gener-
ously to Sargent was Stephen P. Mugar of Belmont, a Star
Market (supermarket chain) executive. Mugar had given
earlier to Maurice A. Donahue, who unsuccessfully sought the
Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Banker William W. Wol-
bach of Brookline, President of the Boston Safe Deposit and
Trust Company also gave. Other Bay State businessmen who
contributed substantially were chain retailer Saul Liebow
of Sharon, and Charles N. Atwood of Winchester, whose wife
made an equally large contribution. Atwood 's firm, the
Atwood and McManus Box Company, has done some business with
the state in recent years. Two other generous givers were
Andrew J. Abdo of Beverly, a well-to-do owner of real estate
in several North Shore communities,-^^ and Morris Sibulkin,
Jr. of Framingham, a nursing home administrator who was
active in the leadership of the Massachusetts Federation of
•^^Brooks Jackson, "Firm Secretly Gave $100,000 to
Mills Presidential Campaign," Boston Globe , 2 August 1974,
p. 1.
^^From vendor records made available by the state's
Comptroller, Arthur S. MacKinnon, August 15, 1973.
^^Real estate valuation list for Beverly, Massachu-
setts, circa 1973.
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Nursing Homes in the mid-1960's, and who probably has a
financial interest in one or more nursing homes. 38 sibulkin
gave substantially not only to Sargent, but to Donald Dwight
(Sargent's running mate), the House Republican campaign com-
mittee, and Speaker Hartley's Committee to Re-elect a Demo-
cratic House. 39 Among the lawyers who gave was David B.
Kaplan of Boston, who had difficulty recalling his $2,000
contribution to Sargent, but maintained that he neither
wanted, nor got, anything in return. 40 Finally, Sargent's
large contributors included men active in Republican party
affairs for several years, such as wealthy Harcourt Wood of
Dedham and P. Loring Reed of Westwood, who together ran a
very successful fund raiser in 1966 honoring Leverett Salton-
stall upon his retirem.ent from the U.S. Senate. 41 a variety
of motivations for the giving by the persons just discussed
suggest themselves.
In conclusion, it seems reasonable that the campaign
contributions made by Sargent's appointees were important.
^^Telephone interview with Ora DeJesus, part-owner,
Meadowville Nursing Home, Lakeville, Massachusetts, 17
August 1973.
39Report8 filed by the Committee to Elect Republi-
can Representatives in 197 1 and the Committee to Re-elect a
Democratic House in 1970 with the Secretary of State's Divi-
sion of Public Records.
^^Interview with David B. Kaplan, Kaplan, Latti, and
Flannery, Boston, 1 August 1974.
41lnterview with Kelly, 30 July 1973.
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It is not suggested that these appointments were "bought."
How important the contributions were, and in what cases, is
really only known by those who participated in the appoint-
ment decisions. Most likely, as with the judicial appoint-
ments discussed earlier, factors other than campaign con-
tributions—but more than just the qualifications of the
appointees—affected those decisions. Prior service to
Sargent in his campaign is one factor which was cited
repeatedly by one writer who dealt with Sargent's patronage
in a recent article. 42 The author returns to his original
assumptions, mentioned earlier in the chapter, in buttressing
his conclusion: people give because they want something, and
politicians are more likely to be responsive to large con-
tributors. The fact is, that twelve of Sargent's top fifty
contributors got appointments. Much, admittedly, is not
known, and many questions remain for others to explore.
Among them is, what rewards—if any—did the hundreds of
other contributors of $500 or more in 1970 receive?
Patronage Available to Elected State Officials other
than the Governor . Although the authority to make appoint-
ments in Massachusetts state government resides largely with
the governor, some legislators and other elected officials
within the executive branch have some patronage at their
command. All of them must periodically finance their
^^Steven Kinzer, "Political Patronage," Metro:
Boston, October, 1971.
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campaigns, and some of the contributions they receive are
made by persons who hope for, or anticipate, appointments
in return for their campaign contributions, others, already
on the state payroll, give to help insure that they retain
their jobs, the legality and propriety of which has been
repeatedly questioned.43 Although they do not possess the
formal authority to make appointments, key legislators-the
House speaker. Senate president, and committee chairmen,
especially of important committees such as the House Ways
and Means Committee-are in a strong position to bargain
with the governor about patronage. According to Governor
Sargent's former patronage chief, "if the legislature passes
a bill calling for twenty jobs, you can expect that the
legislative leadership will ask for ten of them. "44
secretary of state, treasurer and receiver general, and the
auditor have some jobs at their disposal, too. Some brief
commentary about their capacity to reward their campaign
contributors is in order before discussing the financing of
^^The legal question was resolved, although unsatis-
factorily to some, with a ruling in 1964 by Attorney General
Edward W. Brooke. He maintained that it was permissible for
a public employee to make a campaign contribution to a c€m-
didate's committee, but that it was illegal to give money
directly, or through an intermediary, to the candidate him-
self. See Kenneth D. Campbell, "Contribution Conundrums,"
Boston Globe , 14 February 1974, p. 15.




Attorney General Robert H. Quinn's campaign in 1970, and its
connection with the patronage at his disposal.
The secretary of state administers a department
which today employs approximately 150 persons who perform
a variety of duties probably unknown to most of the Common-
wealth's citizens. Some of this work is vital, such as that
done by the Elections Division, whereas other tasks, such as
arranging State House tours, are relatively less important. 45
According to Representative Paul H. Guzzi, about fifty of
the department's employees are patronage appointees who owe
their jobs to the incumbent Secretary of State, John P. X.
Davoren, whom Guzzi challenged and defeated in the 1974
Democratic primary. Since Davoren 's unexpected loss, some
of these persons have approached Guzzi because of their con-
cern about losing their jobs after Davoren steps down in
January, 197 5. One of Davoren *s key appointees. Deputy
Secretary of State, Archie D. Dickerson, as evasive as Guzzi
was direct, maintained there was far less patronage than
Guzzi claimed. Dickerson explained that Davoren 's principal
appointees were his five deputies and a few directors of
^^A twelve-page pamphlet, "The Office of the Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth: Directory of Services, " published
by Davoren 's office in 1974, provides a readable and up-to-
date statement of the responsibilities of his office.
46interview with Paul H. Guzzi, Boston, 27 September
1974.
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divisions within Davoren's department. 47 whatever the case,
it was not established how many of Davoren's patronage
appointees made contributions to his 1970 reelection cam-
paign, but it was determined, as indicated in Table 11,
that he reported receiving only three contributions of $500
or more. It is possible, of course, that his appointees
made smaller contributions, but this is not known.
The Treasurer and Receiver General of Massachusetts,
whose campaign finance is discussed at length later in this
chapter, administered a department in 1970 which was author-
ized to employ ninety-three persons. 48 Although it is not
known how many of these persons were patronage appointees,
the evidence available about the financing of Treasurer
Crane's 1970 campaign suggests that it is quite unlikely
that more than a few of his ^nployees were large contribu-
tors to his reelection effort. Crane reported receiving
only ten contributions of $500 or more in 1970, as shown in
Table 11, and seven of them came from members of the banking
47interview with Archie D. Dickerson, Boston, 27
September 1974.
^^Elwyn E. Mariner, This Is Your Massachusetts
Government
, 6th ed. (Arlington Heights, Mass.: Mariner
Books, 1970), p. 147. This source includes a valuable but
dated description, not only of the treasurer's department,
but of a multitude of other state agencies. See also. The
League of Women Voters of Massachusetts, Massachusetts




con»unlty." Jobs were by no means the principal reward at
crane's disposal in 1970, something which will be made much
Clearer shortly. ^0
The Commonwealth's auditor is required by statute to
conduct an annual audit of every agency in state government,
including all public authorities such as the Massachusetts
Port Authority, as well as the numerous local housing author-
ities scattered throughout Massachusetts, in 1970 the audi-
tor was authorized to employ ninety-seven persons to accom-
plish this. 51 How many of them were patronage appointees is
not known. Today his department employs more than twice that
number. Of the approximately 220 persons under his super-
vision, ninety are "temporary" personnel, most of them
engaged in audits in the field. Although when employed they
met professional selection criteria established by the
department, these persons are patronage appointees. The
^^United Press International, "State Bankers Happy,"
p • 3
.
^^Since 1971, however, the treasurer has served as
chairman of the commission which administers the state lot-
tery. Some of the scores of lottery employees are patronage
appointees, according to Marc Furcolo, Crane's opponent in
the 1974 Democratic primary. See "Democrats in Mass. Treas-
urer Race Differ on Banking Practices," Boston Sunday Globe
,
1 September 1974, Sec. A, p. 5. Contributions irom them is
a possibility in future elections.
^^Mariner, p. 147.
^^interview with Bernard G. Murphy, Budget Officer,
Department of the State Auditor, Boston, 27 September 1974.
These "temporary" appointees work full-time, however.
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incumbent auditor, Thaddeus Buczko, first elected in 1966,
reported spending only $16,257 in winning a landslide vic-
tory in 1970,53 and as shown in Table 11, received no cam-
paign contributions of $500 or more. Although it is
possible that Buczko received some smaller contributions
from some of his patronage appointees in 1970, the small
sum of money required to finance his campaign, and the
absence of any large contributions, provided little incen-
tive for the author to inquire further. In a competitive
campaign in the future, however, the department's patronage
appointees could be a potential source of contributions for
the incumbent. Any inquiry about this will have to wait
until 1978 because the Republicans failed to nominate an
opponent for Buczko in 1974.
Campaign Contributions by Attorney General Quinn's
Appointees
. Next to the governor, the only elected state-
wide executive in Massachusetts who had substantial patronage
at his disposal in 1970 (although it was far less, by com-
parison) was Attorney General Robert H. Quinn. Quinn, a
Democrat, ran for the office in 1970 after having been
elected to that position by the General Court early in 1969.
Republican Elliot L. Richardson, the incumbent, had resigned
to accept a position with the Nixon administration in
53Report filed by the Committee to Re-elect Thaddeus
Buczko State Auditor with the Secretary of State's Division
of Public Records.
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Washington. Soon after Richardson resigned approximately
one-half of his staff resigned also. Over the next several
months other Richardson appointees left the attorney gen-
eral's office and Quinn proceeded to replace them with his
own appointees. By early 1970, when Quinn began to make
preparations for his campaign, the office of attorney gen-
eral was largely staffed by his appointees. ^4 if Quinn
failed to be reelected, most of them would lose their jobs.
One way to retain their positions was to make campaign con-
tributions to Quinn. Most of his professional staff did,
a point which will be elaborated upon shortly.
The attorney general's department employs approxi-
mately 200 individuals, only about 10 per cent of whom are
civil service personnel. The most important employees in
the department are the assistant attorneys general, whom
the attorney general appoints. In 1971 there were approxi-
mately seventy-five assistant attorneys general assigned to
the thirteen divisions within the department. The typical
assistant attorney general works for but a few years in that
^^Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The
turnover of personnel was not quite so swift, however, as to
impair the department's effectiveness; almost one year after
Quinn succeeded Richardson, fifteen of Richardson's staff
were serving under Quinn, as Shinberg pointed out in a letter
to the author, September 14, 1974.
^^The organization of Quinn 's department after his
election in 1970, including the names of his assistant attor-
neys general, can be found in A Manual for the Use of the
General Court for 1971-72, pp. 546-548.
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capacity. Many of them are young men, lawyers who have yet
to establish substantial practices or reputations. The
position does not pay very well; the compensation, for what
is essentially a full-time job, is between $10,000-15,000,
less than that of the division chiefs who are experienced
professionals. 56
According to the campaign finance reports filed by
the two committees which raised funds for Quinn's 1970 cam-
paign, at least fifty of his key appointees—about two out
of three—made campaign contributions. ^ 7 These contributions
ranged in size from $50 to $1,000, with the average contri-
bution being approximately $275. The most common amount
given was $100; there were seventeen such contributions.
Eleven of Quinn's appointees made large contributions, giving
$500 or more. Table 22 identifies the fifty contributors,
who gave a total of $13,475, a substantial amount of money,
but hardly the amount required to finance his race for
^^Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The
author wonders how full-time the jobs are. The compensa-
tion seems low.
^^Reports filed in 1970 by the Quinn Committee and
The Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception Committee with
the Secretary of State's Division of Public Records. Forty-
five of the fifty contributions were given in the names of
the assistant attorneys general. The others, amounting to
$1,225, were given by women who are probably wives of other
assistant attorneys general.
The method employed to determine which assistant
attorneys general made contributions was to compile an alpha-
betical list of these seventy-odd appointees, memorize the
naunes, and then carefully review Quinn's campaign finance
reports. Probably a few contributions were missed.
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William E. Searson III
Dennis M. Sullivam
George Contalonis









































































































































Robert W. Coughlin SpringfieldSpringfield
500
100
and I^T^IV fil^d in 1970 by The Quinn Committee
5?1 General Robert H. Quinn Reception Comittee
Fofthfco^n?^^^^^ Division of Publi; Lco^s
his elLtion friQ7^^''^'^^n°" ^^^'^"•^ department aftern ecti in 1970, see Commonwealth of Massachusetts A
his wife!''^^''^^'"' * surname, probably
« wo!f^^«?^^\r'^^ ^ contribution of $200 in his own name;a man with the same surname, probably his wife, gave $125.
attorney general. Quinn' s 1970 campaign cost in excess of
$200,000, and the contributions from his professional staff
accounted for only about 6 per cent of his total reported
expenditures. Nor was most of the money from his appointees
contributed early in his campaign; more Uian $9,000 of it
was received in October, 1970.^8 Although it is clear that
^<^Two $50-per-person affairs held in April and
October of 1970 helped to finance Quinn' s campaign. The
first took place at Anthony's Pier 4, the second at the Har-
vard Club. Each was attended by several hundred people.
Interview with Shinberg, 10 August 1973. The contributions
from most of Quinn 's appointees were received in either April
or October according to the reports filed by The Quinn Com-
mittee and The Attorney General Robert H. Quinn Reception
Committee with the Secretary of State's Division of Public
Records.
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one source of funds tapped by Quinn to help finance his
campaign was his assistant attorneys general, all of whom
serve at his pleasure, what is not known is why they made
contributions, and to what extent their contributions influ-
enced Quinn
-s decisions to retain them. Quinn 's department
has undergone some turnover and reorganization since the
1970 election, but about four out of five of his appointees
who made contributions to his can^aign were still working
for him three years later, including ten of the eleven
appointees who gave $500 or more. 59 ^any of those who did
not contribute were still with Quinn, too, which is evidence
that a financial contribution in 1970 was not a condition for
continued employment, although Quinn was probably aware of
who gave, and how much. The most plausible explanation for
the contributions which were made is that Quinn 's appointees
wanted to retain their jobs; one way to insure this was to
help elect Quinn. ^0 There are, of course, other possibili-
ties.
^^The organization of Quinn 's department about three
years after the 1970 election is found in Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, i\ Manual for the Use of the General Court for
1973-76
, pp. 556-358.
attempt was made to determine the amounts given
by the nonprofes3ional members of Quinn *s department, but it
is likely that scane of them made campaign contributions,




Rewards for Contributions: Access to
Legislators and AdminiatrafT^
The previous discussions about appointments demon-
strate that elected statewide executives such as the attorney
general, but especially the governor, have considerable job
patronage at their disposal. Although some key legislators
have an influential voice in dispensing some jobs, the aver-
age lawmaker is not in a position to reward campaign con-
tributors with appointments. His vote, however, is sought
after by many. To influence his vote, direct access to a
legislator or members of his staff is extremely helpful, if
not essential. There are many voices clamoring for atten-
tion in the legislative arena, and one must be heard to be
heeded. To accomplish this, lobbyists are employed on Beacon
Hill by a great variety of interest groups.
Among the scores of interest groups employing lobby-
ists are the Savings Bank Association of Massachusetts,
which has retained the services of William F. Malloy for
several years, and the Massachusetts State Auto Dealers,
whose lobbyist in 1970 was Bruce D. Kinlin. The campaign
contributions by these men in 1970 provide the basis for two
brief case studies in legislative access. The author's
attention was first drawn to Malloy after he was singled out
by the Massachusetts branch of Common Cause when that organ-
ization mounted its campaign in 1972 to strengthen the
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state's law regulating the disclosure of money spent by
lobbyists. Kinlin, less well known on Beacon Hill than
Malloy, came to the author's attention rather accidentally
at first. Kinlin '8 name, first noticed on a list of cam-
paign contributors of $500 or more in 1970, was later cited
by a State House reporter as a lobbyist, like Malloy, who
had made numerous contributions to legislators in 1972.
Although both Malloy and Kinlin, on occasion, have reason
to deal with the executive branch, their work involves them
primarily with legislators.
A third case study, dealing with campaign contribu-
tions by numerous bankers in Massachusetts to the state's
treasurer, Robert Q. Crane, was chosen to illustrate access
to administrators who, like legislators, have rewards to
dispense. In Treasurer Crane's case, he has the authority
to decide in which banks state funds will be deposited.
The author is again indebted to State House newsmen, especi-
ally UPI reporter Walter F. Roche, Jr., whose inquiries dis-
closed that Crane's administration of state monies was con-
nected with campaign contributions received by him from
bankers. Malloy will be discussed first, and then Kinlin,
to illustrate access to legislators. Crane will be treated
last, to illustrate access to administrators.
^^Howard White, "Many Legislators Don't File: Funds
from Lobbyists Go Unreported," Boston Globe , 29 December
1972, p. 40.
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Access to Legislators; Lobbyist William F. Malloy .
Perhaps the best measure for evaluating the effectiveness of
a lobbyist before the state legislature is the compensation
which he receives from the clients whose interests he repre-
sents. To the extent this is true. Attorney William F.
Malloy, who has represented a variety of clients for the
past twenty-three years on Beacon Hill, is currently one of
the most effective lobbyists. In a report filed with the
secretary of state in compliance with the statute regulating
the activities of lobbyists, Malloy reported receiving in
excess of $30,000 in 1971 from four clients in return for
his efforts in protecting and advancing their interests.
Malloy reported receiving $10,763 from the Savings Bank
Association of Massachusetts, $16,000 from the Massachusetts
Port Authority, $2,000 from the Massachusetts State Police
Association, and $1,500 from the Massachusetts Fire Chiefs
Association.
Malloy has been registered for years at the State
House both as a legislative agent and legislative counsel.
^^Kenneth D. Campbell, "Citizens' Group Moves to
Curb Lobbyists; Cites Malloy 's Campaign Gifts; Malloy'
s
$1050 Aided Six on Bank Panel," Boston Globe , 16 February
1972, p. 1. What follows relies heavily upon Campbell's
report about the findings by Common Cause/Massachusetts which
had made inquiries into Malloy 's campaign contributions.
^
-^Malloy no longer represents the Fire Chiefs but he
is still retained by the MPA, the State Police, and the
Savings Banks, clients he has served for several years. In
1973, he claimed, his compensation exceeded $40,000. Inter-
view with William F. Malloy, Boston, 11 June 1974.
As a legislative agent he was entitled to represent his
clients to any of the 280 legislators individually; as a
legislative counsel he could appear before legislative
coimaittees at public hearings to testify on his clients'
behalf .64 Because Malloy has multiple clients, his work
involves appearing before several committees and dealing
individually with numerous legislators. For example, as
the legislative counsel for the Savings Bank Association of
Massachusetts, he must deal with the legislature's joint
Committee on Banks and Banking; when he represents the
Massachusetts Port Authority, he must deal with the legis-
lature's joint Committee on Transportation; and when he
represents the Massachusetts State Police Association, he
must appear before the legislature's joint Committee on
Public Safety. Malloy also has occasion to appear before
the House Ways and Means Committee when any legislation is
under consideration that involves the expenditure of state
funds.
In 1970 William F. Malloy made at least fourteen
campaign contributions totaling §2,900 (See Table 23).
^^Chapter 981 of the Acts of 1973 eliminated the dis
tinction between a legislative agent and counsel. Any regis
tered lobbyist today may deal with legislators individually
and testify before committees.
"^Malloy said he used his own money for the contri-
butions, a plausible claim in view of his substantial com-

















































































































































































































































































































































These contributions ranged in size from $50 to $500, the
most common contribution being $100. Most of these contri-
butions went to incumbent legislators in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Twelve lawmakers, ten representatives and two
senators, received contributions from Malloy. All but one,
Representative Theodore M. Herman (Democrat-Worcester)
, were
reelected. All but one of these men were Democrats, a not
surprising fact since both houses of the legislature were
under Democratic control. The eleven lawmakers who were
successful in their reelection efforts were members of either
the House Ways and Means Committee or one of the following
joint legislative committees: Banks and Banking, Transpor-
tation, Commerce and Labor, and Insurance. Among the recipi-
ents were four committee chairmen: the House and Senate
chairmen of the joint Committee on Banks and Banking, the
House chairman of the joint Committee on Commerce and Labor,
and the House chairman of the joint Committee on Insurance.
Malloy' s contributions to the four chairmen were with one
exception, larger than those made to rank-and-file legis-
lators. In addition to his contributions to lawmakers,
Malloy gave $500 toward the reelection campaign of incumbent
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn, a Democrat who had served
as House Speaker in the late 1960 's. He also gave substan-
tially to Representative David A. Bartley's Committee to
Re-elect a Democratic House in 1970. The funds of this
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committee are administered by Speaker Hartley, the most
powerful man in the House of Representatives.
Although Malloy made contributions to members of
several legislative committees, the most obvious fact is
that most of his contributions were made to six members of
one of them—the joint Committee on Banks and Banking. The
committee's House chairman. Representative William A. Con-
nell, Jr., received $500, and its Senate chairman. Senator
Irving Fishraan, received $100. Senator Fred Lamson, the
only Republican to receive a contribution from Malloy, got
$200. Representative Antone S. Aguiar, Jr. and Joseph J.
Semensi each received $100; and Representative Albert L.
Nash got $50.
None of the contributions made by Malloy were in any
way illegal, although some observers have questioned their
propriety. A Boston Globe editorial went so far as to
describe the relationship as "politically incestuous. "^^
There was no statute on the books in 1970 which prohibited
a lobbyist from making campaign contributions to any candi-
date for public office in Massachusetts; nor is there one
today. In 1970 a lobbyist, like any other citizen, was
subject simply to the limitation that he could not give more
than $3,000 in any calendar year toward the campaign of any
^^"All Very Legal and Wrong," Boston Globe , Edi-
torial, 17 February 1972, p. 24.
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one candidate. Today that limitation is $1,000.^7 ^or was
there any provision in the law in 1970 which applied to
state legislators, or any other elected public officials,
which prohibited them from accepting campaign contributions
from lobbyists. In the early 1970 's, however, pressures
mounted to regulate the expenditure of money by lobbyists.
In 1973, the campaign finance legislation enacted included
a provision intended to eliminate any abuse of the testi-
monial dinner. Until this legislation became effective
in 1974, the money expended by lobbyists for the purchase
of testimonial dinner tickets did not have to be reported
by the recipient if, at that time, he was not a declared
candidate for political office. In addition, legislation
was enacted in 1973 which requires all lobbyists to report
expenditures which exceed $35 in any day.^^
It is difficult to believe that contributions of
the size made by Malloy had a significant influence upon
the votes of most legislators who received them. The largest
was $500. These contributions were undoubtedly welcomed
^^Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, effective
January 1, 1974, reduced the maximum contribution per-
missible.
^^Ibid. This provision is further discussed in
Chapter V.
^Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 981.
Chapter 981 became effective on January 1, 1974.
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because they helped to meet the costs of their campaigns.
It is interesting to note, however, that tour of the law-
makers to whom Malloy made campaign contributions (Senator
Lamson, and Representatives Scalli, Guilmette, and Dever)
were unopposed in their 1970 election campaigns. At the
least, the contributions made by Malloy helped to maintain
friendly relations and to facilitate access to members of
the legislature with whom he must deal. It seems likely
that a legislator would be more apt to give his attention
to a friendly contributor than to the representative of a
group who had made no contribution. Access, therefore, is
the most plausible explanation for Malloy 's campaign contri-
butions
.
Access for the Auto Dealers; Lobbyist Bruce D.
Kinlin
. Not all of the interest groups on Beacon Hill which
require access to public officials are as ably represented
as those groups for which William Malloy serves as a legis-
lative agent. The Massachusetts State Auto Dealers, which
represents more than 90 per cent of those individuals who
have franchises to sell new cars in Massachusetts, is prob-
ably one association whose interests are as well represented.
This association is peurticularly affected by decisions made
by the legislature's Committee on Public Safety, the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's office, and
the Title Division of the Registry of Motor Vehicles. The
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rule-making and enforcement decisions by these public
officials in matters such as automobile financing and auto-
mobile safety are of great concern to the membership of the
association. "^0
In 1970, two officials of the Massachusetts State
Auto Dealers, Bruce D. Kinlin and William D. Plunkett, made
substantial campaign contributions to protect and advance
the interests of the membership of their association.
Kinlin, then the association's executive vice president—who
also served as its legislative agent and counsel—gave
$7,800. Plunkett, the association's president, gave $1,500.
A breakdown of their campaign contributions, which totaled
at least $9,300, follows:
Kinlin
Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House $3,500
in 1970 ($500 given in his wife's name)
Representative Fred F. Cain (Democrat-Wilmington) 2,800
Governor Francis W. Sargent 1,000
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn 500
Total $7,800
Plunkett
Governor Francis W. Sargent $1,000
Attorney General Robert H. Quinn 500
Total $1,500
^*^Interview with Bruce D. Kinlin, Executive Vice
President, Massachusetts State Auto Dealers, Boston,
23 August 1973. •
^
^Alexander and Fisher, CRF Listing
.
They may have
given more—to individual legislators, for example—in
aunounts less than $500.
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Together, Kinlin and Plunkett gave $6,300 to support
Democratic legislative candidates, $2,000 toward Governor
Sargent's campaign, and $1,000 to Attorney General Quinn.
The $3,500 contributed by Kinlin to Speaker Bart-
ley's Committee to Re-elect a Democratic House was there-
after allocated to several legislative candidates, whereas
the $2,800 given directly to Representative Cain ($800 for
the primary and $2,000 for the November election) was
intended specifically for his campaign. These contributions
by Kinlin to Cain are particularly interesting because it
was most uncommon in 1970 for a legislative candidate to
receive so much money from one contributor. Kinlin readily
provided an explanation. "'2 ^^in is a past president of the
Massachusetts State Auto Dealers and owns an automobile
dealership in Wilmington, Massachusetts. As a member of
the powerful House Ways and Means Committee in 1970 he was
in a position to be helpful to Kinlin. Moreover, although
Kinlin could appear before legislative committees and
approach ciny representative or senator to represent his
group's position, as a lobbyist he was not allowed on the
House and Senate floors. Cain, Kinlin 's man in the legis-
latxire, could be particularly helpful at times because of
this.
Interview with Kinlin, 23 August 1973.
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Even though the campaign contributions made by Kinlin
and Plunkett were reported in their names, it is questionable
whether Kinlin used his personal funds. Most auto dealer-
ships in Massachusetts are incorporated, and the campaign
finance statute, effective in 1970, prohibited corporate
contributions. The owner or employees of an automobile
dealer could give, and an association could also give. Con-
tributions, however, were supposed to be reported in the name
of the true giver. Kinlin declined to say whether the money
contributed in his name was his, but promised an answer after
he consulted with his legal counsel. 73 One possibility is
that his contributions were from funds made available to him
by the Massachusetts State Auto Dealers. Whatever the case,
the fact is that two officials of an interest group clearly
affected by decisions of the legislature, the Registry of
Motor Vehicles, and the Attorney General's office made sub-
stantial contributions in 1970 to protect and advance their
association's interests. The contributions made by Kinlin
were explicitly acknowledged by him as one way of facili-
tating access to these officials.
Lobbyists such as Kinlin are not the only persons,
of course, who seek access. Nor are legislators, as Kinlin 's
activities remind us, the only public officials with rewards
73Ibid. Kinlin thereafter did not contact the
author, nor the reverse. Plunkett was not interviewed.
'^Ibid.
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at their disposal for campaign contributors. Access to
elected officials, in addition to the governor and attorney
general, can be valuable, too. The following discussion of
the financing of the 197 0 campaign of the Commonwealth's
incumbent treasurer and receiver general, Robert Q. Crane,
is a case in point.
Access to Administrators; The Bankers and Treasurer
Crane
.
The office of treasurer and received general in
Massachusetts is considered one of the minor statewide
offices, and the incumbent is probably unknown to many of
the citizens in the Commonwealth. The treasurer has author-
ity, however, over the placement of state monies, which is
the basis for considerable political influence and provides
a "natural" campaign finance constituency, the banking com-
munity.^^ "Deposits are the name of the game" and the halls
of the State House are, at times, "lined with bankers who
are looking for deposits," according to Deputy Treasurer
Donald P. Frary.^^ The treasurer is responsible for the
deposit of state funds in banks across the Commonwealth.
Most of this money is deposited in checking accounts, but
75United Press International, "State Bankers Happy,"
p. 3. See, also, UPI, "Crane Spreads State's $20M [$30M]
Among Friends' Banks," Boston Herald American , 11 July 1973,
p. 3. Two investigative reporters, Walter F. Roche, Jr. and
Richard M. Gaines, interviewed in Boston on July 25, 1973,
wrote these articles, which were relied upon heavily for
information subsequently presented.
^^UPI, "State Bankers Happy," p. 3.
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approximately $30 million of state revenue is deposited in
short-term interest bearing accounts. And recently, when
Massachusetts enacted a law establishing a state lottery,
this activity was placed under the general direction of the
treasurer, who now also oversees deposits of lottery revenue
in non-interest bearing accounts throughout the state. 77 In
addition to deciding which banks will receive deposits of
state revenue and lottery funds, the treasurer is a member
of the Board of Bank Incorporators. It is within the author-
ity of this three-man board, consisting of the treasurer, tax
commissioner, and banking commissioner, to decide whether new
banks will be incorporated to do business in Massachusetts;
the board also approves the establishment of branches of
existing banks within the state.
e*. 4. . ll^^^'r/^^^^ Bankers Happy," and "Crane SpreadsState's $20M [$30M]," 11 July 1973, p. 3. In mid-1973 theCommonwealth of Massachusetts maintained checking accounts
which ranged from $25 to $100 million weekly in the followingfive banks: State Street Bank and Trust Company, First
National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants National Bank,City Bank and Trust Company of Boston, and the Boston FiveCent Savings Bank. A substantial portion of the $30 millionin state revenue which was deposited in interest bearing
accounts was held by nine banks across Massachusetts: The
Newton-Waltham Trust Company had $1.8 million; The Garden
City Trust Company of Newton had $746,000; The Century Bank
and Trust Company had $540,000; The First National Bank of
Maiden had $500,000, as did The Commonwealth Bank and Trust
Company of Boston and the Capitol Bank and Trust Company;
The Liberty Bank and Trust Company had $450,000; and the New
Boston Bank and Trust Company had $400,000. The four largest
lottery accounts were held by the Newton-Waltham Trust Com-
pany which had $166,272; The First National Bank of New Bed-
ford had $102,530; The Valley Bank and Trust Company had
$187,000; and the First National Bank of Boston had $188,776.
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The incumbent treasurer and receiver general,
Robert Q. Crane of Wellesley, was most recently elected
for a four-year term in November, 1970. Crane, a former
state representative, first beca-^ne treasurer in 1964, when
he was elected to that position by members of the General
Court to fill a vacancy created by the appointment of the
incumbent, John T. Driscoll, to the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority. Crane was subsequently elected by the voters in
1966 for a four-year term, and reelected in 1970. In 1971
he was chosen to serve briefly as chairman of the Democratic
State Committee, a post he resigned when he assumed respon-
sibility for the state lottery.
In Crane's most recent election in 1970 he was
opposed by an unknown Republican, Frederick D. Hannon of
Westwood, whom he defeated easily by better than a two-to-one
margin. In that campaign, Crane reported spending $37,508,
of which only $17,631 was raised that year. The balance came
from the proceeds of a 1966 testimonial, the Robert Q. Crane
Friendship Dinner, which was held to celebrate his fortieth
birthday. At this $50-per-person affair, approximately
$70,000 was raised for Crane's campaign war chest. During
the 1970 campaign, $41,330 was transferred from Crane's
testimonial dinner account, but less than one-half of this
was required for the campaign . His committee reported a
balance on hand after the election of $19,675. Unfor-
tunately, Crane maintains he did not keep a record of those
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individuals who purchased tickets to his 1966 friendship
dinner, a claim which is very hard to believe. Politicians
who expect to campaign again and again, as Crane has done,
are most unlikely to be so careless with such an important
record. (Crane had no legal obligation to reveal his con-
tributors' names.) Sources close to the banking community,
however, have stated that a number of bankers received
tickets through the mail at their offices, and many purchased
tickets to that affair. "^^
Of the $17,631 reported raised by Crane in 1970, more
than one-half came from officials of Massachusetts banks, in
most cases banks in which state revenues are presently
deposited. Thirty-eight campaign contributions, ranging in
size from $50 to $2,000 and amounting to $9,620, were
received from officials of banks which handle state funds. "^^
Five of the largest contributions came from officials of the
New Boston Bank and Trust Company, a small bank with
approximately $10 million in assets, which was allowed by
the Board of Bank Incorporators (of which Crane is a member)
to commence business on April 8, 1969. Less than a year
later, on February 17, 1970, Treasurer Crane authorized a
deposit of $400, 000 in that bank. In the 1970 campaign,
"^^UPI, "State Bankers Happy," p. 3.
79
"^Ibid. The names of these persons, their banks,
and the size of their contributions are listed in the
article.
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Crane received $4,400 in campaign contributions from
officials of the New Boston Bank.^^
It would be erroneous to cite campaign contributions
as the only explanation for Crane's decisions regarding the
deposit of state funds, and his other actions as treasurer.
Crane has a number of friends and political cronies in the
banking business, and the banks with which they are con-
nected have prospered from Crane's decisions. For example,
his predecessor as treasurer, John T. Driscoll, became a
director of the Newton-Waltham Trust Company. In mid-1973
the Newton-Waltham Trust Company had more than $2 million
in state revenue, and more than $166,000 in lottery funds,
on deposit. Another example is the Century Bank and Trust
Company of Somerville, where former state Senator Phili-
bert L. Pellegrini (Democrat-Arlington) is a director.
Pellegrini, a former chairman of the legislature's Committee
on Banks and Banking, serves also as a director of the Cen-
tral Cooperative Bank of Somerville. In mid-1973 the Century
Bank and Trust Company had $540,000 in state funds on deposit
in an interest bearing account, and the Central Cooperative
Bank, $80,000.
°"Ibid. Michael Cyker, a bank director, contributed
$500; Louis D. DiGiovanni, a director, $400; James S.
Hekimian, a director, $500; Allen Jacobs, a director and
former clerk of the bank, $2,000; and Louis G. Pollock, a
director and former president of the bank, $1,000.
®^UPI, "Crane Spreads State's $20M ($30]," p. 3. The
eurticle provides additional examples besides the ones subse-
quently discussed.
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Crane's relationship with the Coolidge Bank and
Trust company of Watertown has also provoked considerable
criticism. 82 until he quit in mid-1973. Crane was employed
part-time for many years as a sales consultant by the Newton
Poods Company, one of many firms controlled by Pood Enter-
prises, Inc. of Canton, Massachusetts. The head of Pood
Enterprises is Eugene Merkert, a director of the Coolidge
Bank, in which $260,000 in state revenue and $65,000 in
lottery funds was then deposited. What remains of the
$70,000 raised at Crane's 1966 friendship dinner is also
deposited in the Coolidge Bank. Crane's connection with
Eugene Merkert and the Coolidge Bank is even more involved.
A co-director with Merkert at the Coolidge Bank is Barthol-
omew W. Cosentino, whose son, Ronald H. Cosentino, gave
$500 to Crane's 1970 campaign. Another son, Kenneth, is a
director of the Century Bank and Trust Company of Somer-
ville, previously mentioned. Crane's critics have charged
that his employment with Newton Poods and his relationship
with the Coolidge Bank in his role as treasurer constituted
a conflict of interest. Crane's resignation from Newton
Foods quieted his critics somewhat. 83
82ibid.
83Ken 0. Botwright, "Pirm's Cslt Returned by Crane,"
Boston Globe , 21 August 1973, p. 3. Crane stated that on
three occasions since 1964 he had been advised by the
attorney general's office that his association with Newton
Foods was "entirely legal and proper."
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In conclusion, it has been shown that Crane's
decisions as treasurer, in some instances, have very likely
been influenced by various considerations-campaign contri-
butions, political ties and friendships, and his former
employment with Newton Poods. The importance of campaign
contributions in most of his other decisions, however, is
less than clear. Prom the perspective of a banker inter-
ested in a deposit of state monies, for example, a campaign
contribution is probably perceived as one way of establish-
ing or maintaining friendly relations, thereby facilitating
access, what is quite clear is that no matter who occupies
the office, the banking community is a potential source of
contributions. It is, in fact, a "natural" campaign finance
constituency. Crane's 1966 testimonial dinner and the
financing of his 1970 reelection campaign demonstrate this.
During his 1974 campaign, however. Crane announced he would
accept no contributions from bankers or bank directors, a
position no doubt taken because of the unfavorable publicity
he has received in recent years. ^4 challenged in the Demo-
cratic primary, he narrowly escaped defeat.
Summary and Conclusions
Because this chapter has necessarily been limited to
examining only two rewards for campaign contributions, jobs
®^
"Democrats in Mass. Treasurer Race," Boston Sunday
Globe, p. 5.
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and access, the reader is reminded that they represent only
some of the ways by which public officials can be responsive
to their campaign contributors. One vitally important
reward, contracts, was not explored at all. Two others,
favorable legislative and administrative decisions, were
touched upon only briefly, and somewhat indirectly, when
access was examined. The reader is reminded, too, of the
varied motivations contributors can have for giving money,
other than seeking such tangible rewards as jobs and con-
tracts. And finally, he is reminded of the difficulties
inherent in establishing any conclusive connection between
campaign contributions and rewards. Nonetheless, two
rewards, jobs and access, were discussed at some length
—
particularly patronage—and some final comments about each
are appropriate.
There is a lot of patronage in state government in
Massachusetts, and an incumbent governor controls most of it.
No other elected statewide executive, by comparison, has
much to dispense, although all of them have some. Of them,
the attorney general has the most. Key legislative leaders,
apart from appointing legislative employees (which was not
explored)
, are in a position to bargain and share in some of
the patronage available to the elected executives, especially
the governor. The patronage available to members of the
Governor's Council is slight, despite their legal authority
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to confirm judicial appointments of the governor, it was
not, however, always that way.
More specifically, it was established that since
Governor Sargent assumed office in 1969 he has made a record
number of appointments to the state judiciary, and that
twenty-two of his first 150 appointees made substantial con-
tributions to his 1970 campaign. Although it is a matter of
judgment, based upon incomplete information, the conclusion
reached was that in some of the cases involving large con-
tributions the appointment decisions were probably influ-
enced by these contributions. The charge of some of Sar-
gent's critics, that many lawyers "bought" their positions
on the bench, is rejected. His special justice appointments
are somewhat more vulnerable, however, to this charge. A
similar conclusion was reached about nine other appointments
to the executive branch made by Sargent which involved his
fifty largest campaign contributors in 1970 (twelve of them
received appointments, but three were named judges)
.
Because so few large contributions were given to
most other elected statewide officials, their patronage,
with the exception of the Attorney General's, was not
examined. In Attorney General Quinn's case, it was estab-
lished that two out of three of his assistant attorneys
general made contributions to his campaign, eleven of them
giving substantially. In these instances, it was concluded
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that they gave to help elect Quinn, thereby insuring their
jobs, although their contributions were probably a minor
factor in Quinn's decisions to retain them. Much is simply
not known, however, which could establish these claims more
conclusively. An additional comment about the attorney
general, not previously mentioned, is worthy of note. The
authority of his office is great, and the incumbent, like
all law enforcement officials, is in a position to be
selective about what laws he enforces, and how vigorously
he enforces them. The chief reward which an attorney gen-
eral has at his disposal is not his patronage, but the
selective exercise of his administrative discretion.
The three case studies discussed in the latter half
of the chapter were chosen to illustrate access to legisla-
tors and administrators, and its connection with campaign
contributions. In the first two, it was shown that lobby-
ists Malloy and Kinlin each made numerous contributions in
1970 to elected officials with whom they had reason to
maintain friendly relations, thereby facilitating access.
Kinlin explicitly acknowledged that access was his reason
for giving. In Malloy' s case, his contributions were given
mostly to chairmen and members of legislative committees
who dealt with matters of concern to his clients. Kinlin 's
contributions were larger than Malloy 's, and he chose to
make fewer, giving most of his money to House Speaker
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Hartley's campaign committee, and to a representative who
was a former president of the Auto Dealers. Each gave to
elected executives, also, suggesting the concern of their
clients with administrative actions as well as legislative
decisions. The third case, involving campaign contributions
by numerous bankers to the reelection campaign of Treasurer
Crane, illustrates even more clearly the importance of access
to administrators by persons whose interests are affected by
administrative decisions. Crane has the authority to help
or hurt bankers. The conclusion reached in this case was
that campaign contributions did not "buy" favorable deci-
sions—although the case of the New Boston Bank appears to
be an exception—but were perceived as useful by the con-
tributors in maintaining friendly relations, thus facili-
tating access.
In conclusion, enough evidence was advanced to sup-
port the judgment that "money talks" in Massachusetts poli-
tics. Politicians are responsive to those who support their
ceunpaigns financially. Some contributors get jobs, others
gain access. Whatever the reward, an important question
which remains is: Is the pxiblic good served? Elected offi-
cials do incur some obligation to their contributors,
especially the larger givers, and when they have an oppor-
tunity, they reward those persons. With these thoughts in
mind, we now are in a position to explore what the response
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has been i„ the Bay State to this question since 1970, and
to speculate about what the imediate future holds for the
financing of political campaigns in Massachusetts.
CHAPTER V
THE BAY STATE RESPONDS: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM SINCE 1970
In 1971 no legislation amending the state's campaign
finance law was enacted. In 1972 a major bill, which would
have provided for fuller disclosure of contributions and
closed the testimonial dinner loophole, died in the Senate
after winning approval in the lower house (the "Truth in
Politics Act"). Just before the General Court prorogued in
that year, however, it gave its approval to other legisla-
tion which placed limits upon most media expenditures by
all candidates for state office (Chapter 810 of the Acts of
1972)
.
In 1973 the proponents of change prevailed again
when even more comprehensive legislation, promising not only
fuller disclosure but more effective enforcement, was enacted
(Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973) . The pressures for reform
continued, nonetheless, and on November 5, 1974, the elec-
torate enacted a substantial revision to the campaign finance
law when they approved an initiative petition which appeared
on the ballot as Question 5 (the Quinlan petition) • Earlier
in that same year, a public subsidy proposal was seriously





Each of these five actions merits
further attention and will now be discussed, beginning with
the ill.fated legislation in 1972 which was intended to
insure fuller disclosure.
The "Truth in Politics Act"
On April 19, 1972 the legislature's joint Conunittee
on State Administration, under the leadership of Representa-
tive John J. McGlynn (Democrat-Medford) and Senator George G.
Mendonca (Democrat-New Bedford), favorably reported H. 5709^
to the House of Representatives. McGlynn maintained that
the strength of this campaign finance legislation, which he
referred to as the "Truth in Politics Act, " was its defini-
tions of "candidate" and "political contribution. "2 Under
these new statutory definitions any person holding public
office was deemed a candidate, and any non-office holding
citizen who was the beneficiary of a fund-raising event
would automatically became a candidate unless he filed an
official disclaimer with the secretary of state within
thirty days after the fund-raising event. Contributions
were defined to include cash contributions, loans, the
deposit of money, and the transfer of funds between politi-
cal committees. Contracts, promises, and agreements of
^For the text of H. 5709, see Massachusetts, Massa-
chusetts Legislative Documents
, House , 1972.
2press release by the Committee on State Adminis-
tration, April 19, 1972.
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campaign support in money or services (even if they were
verbal and not legally enforceable)
, the granting of dis-
counts or rebates beyond those available to the general
public, the cancellation of indebtedness, and the loan of
personnel were also considered campaign contributions.
Insofar as the sale of tickets to fund-raising events was
concerned, the legislation sponsored by McGlynn's committee
required the reporting of the purchase of any ticket costing
in excess of $10, as well as the purchase of tickets which
exceeded $10 in the aggregate. It also required the report-
ing of the purchase of any ticket for goods or services when
the cost was disproportionate to the value of the goods or
services received.^
McGlynn's bill was in his estimation "a tough bill
... but a workable bill." The bill assumed the continued
use of testimonial dinners as a means of raising campaign
funds and that alternate means of financing campaigns, such
as state or federal subsidies, were most unlikely. Because
of the proposed definitions of "candidate" and "political
contribution," and the requirement of full disclosure of all
contributions received by every candidate in mandatory
reports to the secretary of state under penalty of a year's
imprisonment or a $1,000 fine, the bill's proponents
believed that all interested persons would be in a position
to know who gave what to whom.^
3lbid. ^Ibid.
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On the very day McGlynn's bill was reported out of
coznmittee (April 19)
, Governor Francis W. Sargent responded
to a letter from Senator Mendonca, who had earlier invited
Sargent to appear before the Committee on State Administra-
tion to present his ideas concerning the reform of campaign
financing in Massachusetts. 5 m his reply to Mendonca,
Sargent requested that the committee schedule a public hear-
ing at which time he would willingly set forth his pro-
posals. 6 The hearing was never held, however, because on
the very day he wrote Mendonca, Sargent addressed the citi-
zens of the commonwealth on statewide radio and television,
expressing his concern about campaign finance and presenting
his proposals to "allay" suspicion and to restore "confi-
dence" in government. In his address the Governor suggested
that the state's campaign finance statute should be modified
to accomplish the following purposes: (1) to limit media
expenditures by statewide candidates, (2) to prohibit lobby-
ists and most public employees from making campaign contri-
butions, (3) to limit individual contributions to any candi-
date's campaign to $500 annually, (4) to provide for more
complete disclosure of contributions and expenditures, and
^Letter from Mendonca to Sargent, April 6, 1972,
"Sargent Press Kit," April 19, 1972,
^Letter from Sargent to Mendonca, April 19, 1972,
"Sargent Press Kit."
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(5) to establish a campaign finance commission to enforce
the law more effectively.*^
One week after the Governor's proposals, former
Representative Michael S. Dukakis appeared before the joint
committee on State Administration and reacted to them. On
the whole, Dukakis* response was very critical. He main-
tained that the proposed limits on media spending by state-
wide candidates were much too high. He pointed out that the
Governor's proposal to prohibit state, county, and municipal
employees—including judges and clerks—from contributing to
political campaigns had been the law for over eighty years.
He observed that the Governor had been conspicuously silent
about the solicitation of contributions by state officials
for political purposes (a major fund-raising event was
planned for May 21, 1972 under the chairmanship of Albert P.
"Toots" Manzi, a Sargent appointee to the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority)
.
Finally, Dukakis faulted Sargent for
saying nothing about contributions by people who did busi-
ness with the state, or by officials of enterprises regu-
lated by the state.
^
Dukakis made five suggestions to the Committee on
State Administration: first, that lower limits be placed
^For the text of this address, see "Sargent Press
Kit/'
®Press release by Michael S. Dukakis, April 26,
1972.
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on expenditures in campaigns for statewide offices than
those proposed by the Governor; second, that existing state
law, which Dukakis argued prohibited state employees from
making contributions, be observed by candidates and enforced
by state prosecutors; third, that the problem of contribu-
tions from individuals associated with firms doing business
with, or regulated by the state, be attacked; fourth, that
Sargent's expressed intent to broaden the base of campaign
contributions be facilitated by allowing a taxpayer to con-
tribute $1 of his state income tax to the political party of
his choice; and fifth, that the Governor cease his "off
season" fund raising as being neither necessary nor desir-
able. ^ Dukakis maintained that if Sargent was serious about
restoring "confidence" and allaying "suspicion," he should
cancel the major fund-raising event scheduled for May 21,
1972, wind up The Sargent Committee at the earliest possible
time, and distribute its remaining funds to an appropriate
charity. Sargent heeded none of Dukakis' suggestions.
The "Truth in Politics Act" recommended by the Com-
mittee on State Administration was essentially concerned
with full disclosure, and did not address the other problems
mentioned by Sargent and Dukakis. Although it was reported
out of committee on April 19, 1972, it was not approved by
the House of Representatives for about seven weeks. The
^Ibid. lOlbid.
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House finally passed the legislation on June 27, 1972,11 but
the measure died in the Senate, to which it had been referred
less than two weeks before the General Court ended its 1972
session (an election year). 12 ^fter the legislature had
prorogued, a bitter editorial writer referred to the solemn
promises which legislative leaders in both branches had made
at the end of the 1971 session to enact campaign finance
legislation. He reminded his readers of his earlier warning
that if the legislature failed to act favorably upon the bill
it would:
reinforce the often accurate suspicion that theprocess is a quagmire of fear and favor in which
venal pols sell out the public interest forjunkets, gifts, testimonial dinner tickets, cam-paign contributions, and other, more sophisti-
cated forms of boodle. 13
The writer charged that the House passed the McGlynn bill in
"perfect confidence that the Senate would find some way to
kill" it (it died in the Senate Ways and Means Committee)
,
and faulted Governor Sargent for making no effort in the
final hours before prorogation to use his influence. Senate
President Kevin B. Harrington (Democrat-Salem)
, depicted as
of the opinion that the House-passed legislation was
llpeter Lucas, "House-passed Bill Tightens Campaign
Fund Reporting," Boston Globe , 28 June 1972, p. 6.
12"A Clear Case of Fraud," Boston Globe , Editorial,




" was also criticized for failing to
make an effort to get agreement on what he would have pre-
ferred and supported. 14
The legislation sponsored by McGlynn's Committee on
State Administration had bipartisan support in the House,
and was pushed by the Massachusetts branch of the citizens'
lobby. Common Cause, but it lacked strong support in the
Senate, in explaining why the bill reported out by his com-
mittee failed in the Senate, McGlynn claimed that any major
legislation must compete with other equally important legis-
lation for the attention of legislators, but he had diffi-
culty citing the names of leading senators of either party,
with the exception of David H. Locke (Republican-Wellesley)
,
whom he considered supporters of the measure. 1^ The absence
of any significant support by leaders in the Senate appears
to provide a more complete explanation for the failure of
the "Truth in Politics Act" in 1972. Despite its rejection
of that bill, the General Court did give its approval in
1972 to another proposal for amending the state's campaign
finance law.
14ibid.
l^Interview with former Representative John J.
McGlynn (Democrat-Medford)
,
Boston, 6 August 1973. McGlynn
won reelection in 1972, but resigned from the state legis-
lature on April 23, 1973. On that day he was appointed by
Secretary of State John F. X. Davoren, a fellow Democrat, as
Supervisor of Public Records (with tenure) , a position in
which McGlynn became responsible for the administration of
the c2UQpaign finance law.
Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972
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On July 20, 1972 Governor Francis W. Sargent signed
into law Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 which, in essence,
placed limits on the amount of money candidates may spend
during the primary and election for television and radio
time, and for magazine, newspaper, billboard, and postage
expense. 16 Chapter 810 amends Section 17 of Chapter 55 of
the General Laws, and applies only to candidates for state-
wide office, the Governor's Council, and the state legisla-
17ture. Among the new law's provisions is a requirement for
the periodic reporting of expenditures for the above pur-
poses on behalf of all candidates; another requiring the
review of the reports filed to determine compliance; and a
third imposing penalties for violations. This statute, the
only campaign finance legislation enacted by the 1971-1972
General Court, became effective on January 1, 1974.
The major change effected by Chapter 810 is the
ceiling it imposes upon a candidate's television, radio,
newspaper, magazine, billboard, and postage expense during
both the primary and election. The limits applicable to
candidates seeking the nomination are as follows:
l^The subsequent discussion of specific provisions
of the law is based upon the language in the statute. See
Acts and Resolves (1972), c. 810.
1
'^Candidates for national, county, city, and town




^lll'olaAttorney general J^J'gggSecretary of state lOo'SSo
ludltor""
^""^ general 100! 000
Governor's councillor
State senator H'lHState representative
siooo
With one exception, identical limits apply during the
general election period. Because a party's candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor now run as a team once the
nominations have been decided, candidates for governor and
lieutenant governor may together spend no more than $500,000
for the election. Between them, a total expenditure of no
more than $1,100,000 for the primary and election is per-
missible. Insofar as the other candidates regulated by the
new statute are concerned, their total allowable expenses
for the primary and election are as follows:
Attorney general $500,000
Secretary of state 200,000





Chapter 810 also requires all candidates and their
committees to submit to the secretary of state seven reports
during an election year on the following dates: on the
tenth day of March, June, and September; on the fifteenth
and fifth day before the election; and thirty days following
the primary and election. The provision requiring these
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periodic reports was an improvement over the previous law,
which did not require reports of any kind from candidates
for the Governor's Council, Senate, and House until after
the primary and election. Upon receipt, the secretary of
state is required to review them for compliance with the
law's expenditure limits, and to inform the attorney general
immediately of any violations. Any excess spending by a
candidate, or by any person or ccxranittee acting on his
behalf, is subject to a fine of up to three times the amount
of the excess spending.
Chapter 810 can be faulted, however, with respect to
the spending limitations it imposes. Apart from the ceil-
ings on expenditures by candidates for statewide office,
particularly for governor and lieutenant governor, it can
be argued that the limits for candidates campaigning for the
Governor's Council, Senate, and House are rather meaningless
(unless inflation continues unabated)
. In Chapter II it was
^^The number of reporting dates was reduced by
Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973. Candidates for statewide
office are now required to submit only five reports—on the
tenth day of March and June, eight days before both the pri-
mary and election, and on the tenth day of January following
an election year. Candidates for the Governor's Council and
the state legislature are required to submit only three
reports—eight days before both the primary and election,
and on the tenth day in January following an election year.
19a new penalty for excessive spending was stipu-
lated by Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973. Offenders are
liable to imprisonment for not more than one year, a fine
of not more than $1,000, or both.
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established that in 1970 the most expensive Council race
cost $16,788, only one candidate for the Senate spent in
excess of $30,000, and only four House candidates spent more
than $10,000. Moreover, some important types of campaign
expenditures are not regulated at all. Printing, a major
expense for virtually all candidates, is one. Public opinion
polling is another. A third is radio and television "pro-
duction" expense. Although Chapter 810 specifically limits
expenditures for radio and television "time," it omits any
mention of the often considerable expense connected with the
production of such advertising. 20
Chapter 810 was the first campaign finance legisla-
tion of any consequence enacted in Massachusetts since 1962.
Although its limitations upon spending, especially by can-
didates for governor and lieutenant governor, seem reason-
able, and its requirement of reports prior to the primciry
and election appears justifiable, it did not deal with other
problems which were more important. It did not, for example,
treat campaign contributions in any way. The potential for
abuse by candidates of the testimonial dinner, the principal
unregulated source of campaign funds, was not checked by the
statute; full disclosure of contributions, therefore, was
20
"Campaign expenditures for printing, public opinion
polling, and other purposes were made subject to the spending
limitations of Chapter 810, when it was amended by an
initiative petition approved by the voters on November 5,
1974.
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not achieved. Moreover, Chapter 810 did not attack the
problem of enforcement. The responsibility for the review
of all campaign finance reports continued to reside with
the secretary of state, who thereafter was expected to call
violations to the attention of the attorney general, an
arrangement which in the past has not resulted in vigorous
enforcement of the law because of the political nature of
each of those offices. There apparently has not been a
single prosecution for any campaign finance violation since
the law underwent major revision in 1962.^^ Chapter 810
proved to be a first step, however, in amending the state's
campaign finance law. Additional legislation, intended to
deal with these deficiencies, and others, was enacted in
1973 as the Watergate story continued to unfold.
Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973
On December 10, 1973 Governor Francis W. Sargent
signed into law Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, legislation
which amended the state's campaign finance law in several
important ways. The bill, which became effective immediately
because of its emergency preamble, was essentially the same
measure—with one major exception—that had been recommended
by the joint Committee on Election Laws earlier in the
^^Russell F. Landrigan, Chief Clerk, Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, could not recollect any. Interview, Boston,
5 November 1974.
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legislature's lengthy 1973 session. 22 The new law was given
initial approval by the House on a 220-2 roll call vote on
November 1,23 f .^.^^ debated in the Senate in mid-
November. As originally approved by the House, the bill did
not contain a provision for any change in the way by which
the law, if enacted, would be enforced. Representative
George Keverian (Democrat-Everett)
, House Chairman of the
Committee on Election Laws, shepherded the bill through the
lower house and was successful in preventing any substantive
amendment to the committee's version. Keverian argued that,
"All the bases have been touched . . . All policy matters
have been checked with those who can harm it (the bill),"
and threatened not only to vote against the bill, but to
work for its defeat if it were amended on the House floor. 24
Keverian 's bill did not escape amendment, however,
in the upper house. On November 14 Senate Minority Leader
John F. Parker ( Republican-Taunton) introduced an amendment
to the House-passed bill providing for a campaign finance
commission with authority to appoint an administrator,
22For a helpful statement contrasting the law in
effect with the proposal of the Committee on Election Laws,
see the nine-page letter sent to fellow legislators by
House Chairman George Keverian after his committee reported
out its bill. (Mimeographed, undated.)
23jonathan Fuerbringer, "Bay State House Votes
220-2, Initial Approval of Campaign Money Disclosure,"
Boston Globe , 2 November 1973, p. 3.
^^Ibid.
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independent of the secretary of state, with substantial
power to enforce the state's campaign finance law. Parker's
motion was introduced at the request of Governor Sargent.
During a press conference called when the House was consid-
ering the legislation, Sargent had threatened to keep the
legislature in session unless it passed a campaign finance
measure in 1973. Parker's motion to amend prevailed on a
35-0 vote, 25 House concurred with this important
change a few days later. Each house gave its final approval
to Chapter 1173 on November 28, 1973.
The General Court's approval of Chapter 1173 was as
pleasing to the proponents of campaign finance reform as it
was unexpected. Much earlier in the year, a major advocate
of change, the Massachusetts breinch of Common Cause, advised
its supporters that tliis legislation faced "an uncertain
future." They explained that the lawmakers seemed "indis-
posed" to enact any new campaign finance law in 1973, and
reminded their supporters that a similar measure (the "Truth
in Politics Act") had been buried in the Senate Ways and
Means Committee just hours before the General Court pro- .
rogued in 1972. Common Cause also pointedly noted the open
opposition expressed by two prominent House Democrats,
Majority Leader Thomas W. McGee of Lynn and I4ajority Whip
25peter Lucas, "Mass. Senate Votes Campaign Watchdog,
Disclosure, $1 Tax Donation," Boston Globe , 15 November 1973,
p. 10.
William Q. MacLean, Jr. of Pairhaven.26 By August, Common
Cause was more optimistic about the chances for the enact-
ment Of reform legislation. its judgment then was that the
revelations of Watergate would help insure a "thorough air-
Ing" of campaign finance legislation before the General
Court, although it thought that the possibility for passage
of legislation such as Chapter 1173 was only "fair. "27
In brief, the following changes were made in the Bay
State's campaign finance statute by the enactment of Chapter
1173 of the Acts of 1973, aptly titled, "An Act Relative to
the Pull Disclosu^o of Campaign Contributions and Expendi-
tures . "
:
1. The term "candidate" was defined so thatincumbents and non-incumbents who receive
contributions and make expenditures,
whether or not they are announced candi-
dates, are subject to the law's reporting
requirements.
2. A four-member campaign finance commission
was authorized to appoint a director of
campaign and political finance, independent
of the secretary of state, with substantial
authority to enforce the new law.
3. The maximum permissible campaign contri-
bution by an individual to a candidate
and/or his committees in a calendar year
was reduced from $3,000 to $1,000.
-^^Common Cause/Massachusetts, A Report to the People;
The Massachusetts Legislature in the Year of Watergate
,Campaign Finance," undated, pp. 4-5.
27common Cause/Massachusetts, A News Letter
, "Reform
Moves On Beacon Hill," August, 1973, pT~T.
The use of cash was curtailed sharply
Any contribution larger than $100, and
any expenditure larger than $50, mustbe made by check.
Reports of contributions, expenditures,
and liabilities must now be made in advance
of both the primary and election by all
candidates and their committees, in addi-
tion, annual reports in non-election years
were required.
Most of the statutory language dealing
with these reports was modified so that
they will provide more detailed and mean-ingful information to any person reviewing
them.
Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972 was amended
to require fewer reports from candidates
and tlieir committees. Depository candidates
must submit five reports, rather than seven;
non-depository candidates, three, rather
than seven.
The term "contributions" was defined so that
corporations may no longer purchase adver-
tising space in prograun books (ad books)
used by individuals and political parties
in connection with their fund-raising events.
The penalties for violations of the law by
corporations and corporate officers were
increased.
Candidates were allowed to establish only
two campaign committees, rather than three,
as before.
Depository candidates were required to desig-
nate their depository banks "forthwith upon
becoming candidates." The banks are obliged.
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as before, to commence reporting
transactions on behalf of candidates
and their committees twice each month. 28
Several of the aforementioned changes, but not all,
were intended to help achieve the primary objective of the
new law, the full disclosure of campaign contributions and
expenditures. in this category are the provisions which
define "candidate," greatly restrict the use of cash in
campaigns, require reports in non-election years, and
require depository candidates to designate their banks
much sooner than before (items 1, 4, 5, and 11). Several
other purposes were intended, however, by those who drafted
the new law, and they were furthered by other provisions
incorporated into Chapter 1173. More effective enforcement
should be possible because of the provision creating the
campaign finance commission and authorizing the appointment
of a director of campaign and political finance (item 2)
.
The two provisions which forbid the purchase of space in
ad books by corporations, and impose heavier penalties for
corporate violators, should strengthen the law's long-
standing prohibition against corporate contributions (items
8 and 9) . The provision which reduces the number of reports
^^This summary of changes to the campaign finance
statute is based upon a discussion about Question 5 (on the
state ballot on November 5, 1974) found in a publication
mailed by the secretary of state to all registered voters
in Massachusetts, See Official Information to Voters
, pp.
16-17.
For the text of the new statute, see Acts and
Resolves (1973), c. 1173.
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about media expenditures, required by Chapter 810 of the
Acts of 1972, will ease the reporting burden upon candidates
and their committees {item 7) . The influence of large con-
tributors should be lessened by the provision which limits
individual contributions to $1,000 (item 3). The require-
ment of pre-primary and pre-election reports by all candi-
dates (not just statewide candidates as before) will provide
information much earlier, before the voters go to the polls
(item 5) . And finally, the provision limiting each candidate
to two campaign committees, rather than three, and the
requirement of more detailed information (to be reported by
all candidates and their committees on forms devised for the
1974 election by the secretary of state) should facilitate
the review and analysis of campaign finance reports (items
6 and 10)
.
All ot these amendments to the Bay State's campaign
finance statute seem reasonable and should rectify many of
the deficiencies in the previous law. Two of them—those
which define who a candidate is, and provide for the enforce-
ment of the statute—are especially important and worthy of
additional comment.
Fuller Disclosure Possible: "Candidate" Defined
.
Most of the legislators on the Committee on Election Laws
consider the definition of "candidate" in Chapter 1173^9 to
^^A candidate is defined as "any individual who seeks
nomination or election to public office, whether or not such
individual is nominated or elected. For the purpose of this
241
be "the most meaningful reform" of all. The following
statement by a majority of the committee's members supports
this contention more clearly and succinctly than any known
to the author:
The meaning of the word "candidate," alv/ays
confused, was clearly defined for the first
time. A law that placed responsibilities on
"candidates" was of doubtful value if one could
escape its consequences by arguing that one is
not technically a "candidate." And, in fact,
this is what was occurring.
No longer would an individual be able to
"receive contributions euid make expenditures"
without becoming a candidate. No longer was
the filing of nomination papers, the establish-
ment of a non-elected political committee, or
public announcement of one's intent to seek
public office, the legal test of candidacy, if,
in fact, they ever were.
No longer would a public office-holder, an
"incumbent", be able to hold any fund-raising
chapter, an individual shall be deemed to be seeking nomina-
tion or election to such office if he has (1) received a
contribution or made an expenditure, or has given his consent
for any other person or committee to receive a contribution
or make an expenditure, for the purpose of influencing his
nomination or election to such office, v/hether or not the
specific public office for which he will seek nomination or
election is known at the time the contribution is received
or the expenditure is made, or (2) taken the action necessary
under the laws of the commonwealth to qualify himself for
nomination or election to such office, or, if said individual
holds elective public office, whether elected or appointed
to such office, and he has (3) received any money or anything
of value, or made any disbursement resulting from any pur-
chases, made from said individual, or a committee, or a
person acting on behalf of said individual or committee,
whether through the device of tickets, advertisements, or
otherwise, for any fund-raising activity, including a testi-
monial, regardless of the purpose of said activity, held on
behalf of said individual at any time while he holds said
public office." See Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 1173,
Section 1.
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activity, including a testimonial dinner, durinahis term of office, "regardless of the pirpose^
rfceiuts'anr.'^^K' ^''^^"^ reporting the rentede p d disbursements as political con<-yiK»tions and expenditures. 30 P^-^^^^c i tr bu-
This provision of the law, which applies to incum-
bents and non-incumbents alike, does not prohibit fund
raising years in advance of an election, nor does it restrict
the recipient in his use of any funds raised, but it should
serve as a healthy restraint on most individuals and groups
who might otherwise solicit funds or make contributions for
purposes unconnected with the funding of electoral cam-
paigns. Most importantly, by their careful and painstaking
definition of "candidate," the framers of that particular
provision of Chapter 1173 have laid the foundation for much
fuller disclosure. It should now be possible for any inter-
ested party to know who gave how much to whom.
A New Enforcement Ac^ency
. A second provision of
Chapter 1173 which potentially represents a very significant
change in the state's campaign finance statute is the one
which authorized the establishment of a campaign finance
commission and a new enforcement agency, the Office of the
Director of Campaign and Political Finance. Although a
number of persons played important roles in effecting this
change. Representative Francis C. Lapointe (Democrat-Chicopee)
•^^Official Information to Voters
, p. 16.
^^Acts and Resolves (1973), c. 1173, Section 1.
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and the citizens' lobby. Common Cause/Massachuaetts, were
principally responsible. In 1972, Lapointe, a veteran member
of the legislature's joint Committee on Election Laws, filed
the legislative petition providing for the reform (H. 1692),
and worked vigorously for its enactment. Common Cause,
which essentially supported Lapointe's petition in prin-
ciple, while differing with him about some details, organ-
ized an initiative petition drive in 1973 to accomplish the
same end if the legislature failed to enact Lapointe's
petition into law. 32
Other proponents of this reform, although their pro-
posals differed substantially in some cases, were: Senator
John M. Quinlan (Republican
-Norwood)
, who, like Common Cause,
mounted an initiative petition drive in 1973; ^3 Governor
Francis W. Sargent, who first publicly aired his ideas in
32




) The initiative peti-
tion drive proved unnecessary. It was dropped by Common
Cause when the legislature provided for the office by
statute late in 1973.
33unlike Common Cause's, the petition sponsored byQuinlan 's Committee to Reform Election Law was not limited
to addressing the enforcement problem, but proposed many
other substantive changes to the campaign finance law. It
is discussed later in the chapter.
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April, 1972,34 ^^^^ support to the change during the
Senate's consideration of the matter late in 1973; ^5 ^nd the
Boston Globe
,
which continued to report extensively on cam-
paign finance, and lent its editorial support, also, to the
proposed reform. There were a number of individual legis-
lators, in addition, such as Representative Paul H. Guzzi
(Democrat-Newton), who were active advocates. Finally,
Boston attorney Jerome Medalie, a proponent of campaign
finance reform for almost a decade, co-sponsored H. 1692
and worked quietly behind the scene. On the other hand,
support from the legislative leadership for a change in the
way in which the law would be enforced was noticeably absent.
And yet, both houses of the legislature eventually adopted it
by overwhelming votes. While not denying the proponents of
this reform their due, one cannot help but wonder to what
extent public opinion, shaped by the revelations of Water-
gate, was responsible.
"'^Sargent proposed a five-member commission, con-
sisting of the secretary of state emd four appointees by the
governor (no more than two to be members of the same politi-
cal party) to receive campaign finance reports and to oversee
the receipt and expenditure of money by candidates. See
"Outline of Governor Francis W. Sargent's Campaign Expendi-
ture and Complete Disclosure Plan," in the "Sargent Press
Kit.
"
3^The Senate gave its initial approval for a caimpaign
finance commission on November 14, 1973. Senator John F.
Parker (Republican-Taunton)
,
acting on Sargent's behalf, made
the proposal which was accepted on a voice vote. See Lucas,
"Mass. Senate Votes Campaign Watchdog," p. 10.
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Chapter 1173 authorized the establishment of a four-
member campaign finance commission comprised of the secre-
tary of state, the state chairmen of the Democratic and
Republican parties, and the dean of a Massachusetts law
school, to be chosen by the governor. The commission, whose
chairman is the secretary of state, has the authority to
appoint a director of campaign and political finance.
Their choice must be by unanimous vote. The statute author-
izes the full-time director to examine the campaign finance
reports of all candidates and political committees, checking
them for their lawfulness, validity, completeness, and
accuracy. He is further granted subpoena power to facilitate
his investigations, and when he determines the law has been
violated, he is empowered to call upon the attorney general
for appropriate assistance, including the prosecution of
offenders. To enable him to accomplish his task. Chapter
1173 authorizes the director to employ a staff, exempt from
civil service regulations. This full-time staff, consisting
of at least two investigators, an accountant, a secretary,
and a clerk, can be temporarily expanded in election years
by three additional part-time persons. The director is
appointed for six years (and may be reappointed) , is paid
$22,000 annually, must be a resident of Massachusetts, and
cannot engage in any partisan political activity during his
^^The subsequent discussion of the authority of the
commission and the director is based upon c. 1173, Section 1.
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term in office. The campaign finance commission can remove
him at any time by unanimous vote of its members.
Although the law authorizing the campaign finance
commission became effective on December 10, 1973, the com-
mission did not choose a director of campaign and political
finance until less than four months before the September,
1974 primary. Governor Sargent had selected Northeastern
University Law School Dean John C. 0 'Byrne by January 30,
3 71974, but as late as April 12 no candidates for the posi-
tion had been interviewed, nor had Republican State Com-
mittee Chairman William A. Barnstead seen any of the
seventy-five applications submitted to the commission by
persons who were interested in the job.^® The delay can be
explained partially by the forced resignation on March 25
of Barnstead' s predecessor. Otto A. Wahlrab, who lost his
position because of differences with Governor Sargent. Two
months later, on May 27, 1974, the commission chose W. Norman
Gleason, a career state employee who had administered the
Elections Division for six years under Secretary of State
John F. X. Davoren. After Gleason 's appointment, further
delay ensued because Gleason then had to recruit a staff,
and locate, rent, furnish, and occupy suitable space for the
3 7
-"Peter Lucas, "Law Dean to Help Select Election
Fund Chief," Boston Globe , 31 January 1974, p. 5.
^^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "State Panel Picking Campaign
Finance Director May Miss April 30 Deadline," Boston Globe
,
15 April 1974, p. 4.
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newly created Office of Campaign and Political Finance.
Until Gleason's appointment, John J. McGlynn, a Davoren
appointee responsible for administering the campaign finance
law since early in 1973, served as acting director.
Although in office for but a short time, Gleason
demonstrated his intention to exercise his authority and
enforce the new law when he stated that two statewide nomi-
nees. Democrat Paul H. Guzzi (candidate for secretary of
state) and Republican Governor Francis W. Sargent had made
illegal loans to their 1974 campaigns. Chapter 1173,
Gleason claimed, while permitting unlimited personal loans
from a candidate to his own campaign, prohibits any loans
from another individual which total more than $1,000. Sar-
gent had borrowed $40,000 from his wife after he was nomi-
nated, and Guzzi—ironically, very active in drafting
Chapter 1173—had accepted loans totaling $14,300 from four
persons to help finance his primary campaign. Each had
subsequently loaned this money to their campaign committees.
Guzzi and Sargent soon thereafter negotiated bank loans to
repay their initial loans, but the legality of their actions,
and the final disposition of these cases, will not be
settled until after the 1974 election, according to Gleason.
^^See the following five articles written by Jonathan
Fuerbringer for the Boston Globe : "Guzzi Apparent Violator
of Own Campaign Law," 17 October 1974, p. 1; "Guzzi Says
Second Mortgage Will Repay Controversial Loans," 21 October
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Because it barely began functioning in time for the
1974 primary, it is too early to tell whether the new
enforcement agency will fulfill the expectations of its
proponents. Moreover, the very future of the Office of the
Director of Campaign and Political Finance is uncertain
because the voters of the commonwealth approved an initia-
tive petition, providing for further campaign finance reform,
which appeared on the ballot during the 1974 election.
Reform by the Voters; The Quinlan Petition
By their approval of Question 5 on November 5, 1974,
the voters overrode their lawmakers, who had rejected the
petition during the legislature's 1974 session. The deci-
sion by the electorate, which became law thirty days later,
substantially modified several provisions of Chapter 1173 of
the Acts of 1973. There are some unresolved legal questions
about precisely what changes have occurred, especially in
the critical area of enforcement. In addition, the matter
is further complicated because it is unknown how the state
legislature will respond to the voters' decision during its
1975 session.
When the chief sponsor of the initiative petition.
Senator John M. Quinlan (Republics-Norwood) , launched his
1974, p. 3; "Sargent's Loan from Wife May Violate Financing
Law," 23 October 1974, p. 1; "Sargent Explains Loan, but
Aide's Story Differs," 24 October 1974, p. 1; and "News
Analysis: When Is a Loan a Political Contribution?", 29
October 1974, p. 3.
drive on July 9, 1973 for a major reform to the state's
campaign finance law, he maintained that it was the only
vehicle available to the citizens of Massachusetts to achieve
meaningful reform. Quinlan stated:
th; Club dSrira°h^t^
intentionally remained outside
T ^ ^^"s in the Massachusetts
Quinlan, who was proved wrong a few months later when the
legislature enacted Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, argued




.has historically refused to enact effective
campaign safeguards. Year after year, reform
measures die quietly in committee, or pass onebranch of the Legislature with great fanfare,
only to be shelved by the other branch. 41
After a very demanding effort, lasting about sixteen months,
Quinlan 's Committee to Reform Election Law met with success
when their petition was approved by the voters. 42
40
release by Senator John M. Quinlan, July 9,1973
4
^Committee to Reform Election Law, "The Necessity
of Complexity," Norwood, Mass., 1973. (Mimeographed).
A O
Article XLVIII of the amendments to the Massachu-
setts Constitution enables the voters to enact a law by means
of an initiative petition. The procedure does not completely
bypass the legislature. Quinlan 's Committee to Reform Elec-
tion Law gathered more than 75,000 signatures by December 5,
1973. The legislature, obliged to consider the measure, but
prohibited from amending it, rejected the proposed law.Quinlan 's committee then gathered the additional signatures
necessary to place the question on the ballot on November 5,
1974.
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One purpose the petition's sponsors sought to achieve
was to close the loopholes in the campaign finance law. To
do this, the petition included the following provisions:
1. All candidates for office above the city andtown level would be treated alike. Candi-dates for the Governor's Council, the statelegislature, and county offices would nolonger be "non-depository" candidates.
2. All "depository" candidates would be requiredto designate one bank as a depository forfunds and as a keeper of records. These
records would be open to public scrutiny.
3. Candidates would be allowed to have only onepolitical committee operating on their behalf.
4. No candidate would be permitted to receive or
spend in excess of $25 except by check.
5. No vendor would be permitted to accept a cashpayment in excess of $25 from a candidate orhis committee.
6. Chapter 810 of the Acts of 1972, which placedlimits upon certain media expenditures, wouldbe amended to include other expenditures such
as printing and public opinion polls.
7. All firms providing TV, radio, newspaper,
billboard, magazine, advertising, public rela-
tions, printing, opinion polls, computer,
telephone and telegraph services would be
required to report a candidate's purchases of
such services.
8. Candidates would be required to report all
funds received and expenditures made since
the date of the last election for the office
they seek. This report is due upon their
official announcement of candidacy or their
filing of nomination papers, 43
43senator John M. Quinlan, "Initiative Petition-
Changes in the Current Statute." (Mimeographed, undated.)
For the complete text of the petition, and arguments for and
against it, see Official Information to Voters
, pp. 8-25.
A second purpose of the petition's sponsors was to
provide a means to enforce the law more effectively. To
accomplish this, the petition authorized the establishment
of an independent corrupt practices commission consisting
of five persons appointed by the governor for staggered
five-year terms. The corrupt practices commission would
have the authority to investigate alleged violations of the
law, would meet in closed session to avoid damaging publi-
city to candidates whom it was investigating, would have
subpoena powers, and could require cooperation from all
state agencies. If it found "probable cause," it would be
authorized to call upon the attorney general to initiate
the process which ultimately could result in the imposition
of either criminal or civil sanctions by the courts. 44
The third purpose of the petition's sponsors was to
deter violations of the law by authorizing heavier penalties
for violations by both individuals and corporations (includ-
ing their officers)
. Before Chapter 1173 of the Acts of
1973 was enacted, the law provided for a $500 fine and/or
imprisonment for six months for most violations by indi-
viduals. The petition provided that individual violations
would be punishable by a maximum penalty of one year's
imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine. The previous law also
provided that a violation by a corporation was punishable
44Quinlan, "Initiative Petition."
252
by a maximum fine of $10,000. The petition increased this
to $50,000 and made corporate officers liable to the same
penalty as any individual violator. The penalty for cor-
poration officers under the previous law was a maximum fine
of $5,000 and/or six months imprisonment; the petition
doubled the penalty. In addition to these criminal penal-
ties, the petition authorized the corrupt practices commis-
sion to initiate procedures to accomplish the removal from
office of any person who had won election by corrupt elec-
tion practices.
There is no question, in a legal sense, that the
voters' acceptance of Senator Quinlan's initiative petition
substantially modifies many of the provisions of chapter
1173 of the Acts of 1973. Unless the state legislature, at
its peril, decides to amend the electorate's decision, hun-
dreds of candidates in subsequent elections, rather than a
handful, will be "depository" candidates; media expenditure
limitations will be much stricter; hundreds of vendors of
campaign materials and services, never before required to
file reports, will have to; all candidates will be allowed
only one campaign committee; and violators of the law will
be subject to more severe penalties—to mention some of the
more important cJrianges.
4 5Ibid. Chapter 1173 did impose heavier penalties
for violations, but they were not as severe as those author-
ized by the petition. Individual violators were lieJ^le to
one year's imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine; corporations
were liable to a $20,000 fine.
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Quinlan's petition fortunately did not modify one
major reform of Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973, the defi-
nition of who a candidate is, but it did address a second
major reform of that law, the question of enforcement, it
is in this critical area that the legal waters have been
muddied. Chapter 1173, it will be recalled, established a
campaign finance commission; it also authorized a well-
staffed agency, independent of the secretary of state, which
would receive all campaign finance reports and enforce the
law. The agency's director would be chosen by unanimous
vote of the commission. Quinlan's petition, on the other
hand, requires all reports to be submitted to the secretary
of state, and establishes a corrupt practices commission
with investigatory authority similar to that of the inde-
pendent agency's director. At the same time, it did not
expressly abolish either the ccimpaign finance commission or
the Office of Campaign and Political Finance authorized by
Chapter 1173. It did authorize the corrupt practices com-
mission to appoint an executive director and a staff to
46enable the commission to perform its functions. Quinlan,
who made the petition a campaign issue in 1974 when he
The executive director of Quinlan ' s Committee to
Reform Election Laws argues that the corrupt practices com-
mission is intended "to supplement—not to replace—the
present director of campaign and political finance." See
Thomas L. Saltonstall, "In Support of Referendum Question
5," Boston Globe, 26 October 1974, p. 6.
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ran unsuccessfully for secretary of state, has argued that,
"what the initiative petition does not address, it does not
affect."^*' Such a claim, however, does not really clarify
the law. Its meaning, according to others, remains uncer-
tain. 48 Fortunately, there is no statewide election until
197 8, which should give the 1975-76 legislature ample time
to address itself to the problem, it probably will deal with
it early in its 1975 session. 49
Despite the numerous and substantial changes to the
Bay State's campaign finance statute which were accomplished
by the legislature's enactment of Chapter 1173 of the Acts
of 1973, and the voters' approval of the Quinlan petition in
1974, the pressures for further reform have not subsided.
In 1975 the state legislature will once again consider
various proposals for the public subsidy of electoral cam-
paigns, a matter to which it seriously addressed itself
during its 1974 session, when it rejected a proposal for the
public subsidy of one statewide postprimary campaign. Our
attention now turns to it.
47official Information to Voters
, p. 24.
48interviews with John J. McGlynn (who administered
Chapter 1173 until the appointment of W. Norman Gleason)
,
and William B. Sullivan III, Deputy Director, Office of Cam-
paign and Political Finance, Boston, 5 November 1974. See
Mary Thornton, "Quandary of Question 5: What Will It Do to
New Campaign Law?", Boston Globe , 31 October 1974, p. 3.
See also, Jonathan Fuerbringer, "New Campaign Law Won by 2-1
Margin; May Bring Problems," Boston Globe , 26 November 1974,
p. 3.
49interview with McGlynn, 5 November 1974.




Late in 1973, a petition was filed in the House of
Representatives which, if enacted into law, would have sub-
sidized the postprimary campaigns of the nominees of the two
major parties for governor and lieutenant governor. 50 This
legislation, popularly known as the Bartley-Guzzi Bill, was
drafted by Boston attorney Jerome Medalie for Representative
Paul H. Guzzi (Democrat-Newton), a member of the legisla-
ture's joint committee on Election Laws. 51 cuzzi and Medalie
obtained the support of House Speaker David M. Bartley
(Democrat-Holyoke)
,
whose name appeared on the petition as
a cosponsor along with forty-five other persons. The pro-
posed legislation would have authorized the allocation of
$1,000,000 of public funds for the election campaigns of the
Democratic and Republican nominees for governor and lieu-
tenant governor ($500,000 to each team)
. it also would have
allowed each team of candidates to raise an additional
$150,000 in private contributions. The provisions of Chapter
810 of the Acts of 1972, as amended, would still apply; that
is, a party's nominees for governor and lieutenant governor
would together be prohibited from spending more than $500,000
SOpor the full text of the petition, see H. 3066,19/4.
51lnterview with Representative Paul H. Guzzi, Boston,
27 September 1974.
during their election campaign for the purchase of media
time and space, and other services enumerated in that
statute.
The Bartley-Guzzi Bill failed to win passage in
either the House or Senate, but its legislative history is
important because it represented the first serious effort
by the state legislature to provide a public subsidy for
campaigns. It was also the first to have the support of
several prominent politicians. Referred to the legisla-
ture's joint Committee on Election Laws early in 1974, the
Bartley-Guzzi Bill and other proposals for the public
financing of campaigns were discussed at a public hearing
in the Gardner Auditorium on March 27, 1974. At this
hearing—attended by Bartley, who had requested that it be
scheduled during the evening—representatives of Governor
Sargent, Michael S. Dukakis, and Robert H. Quinn expressed
support for the idea of public financing of the 1974 guber-
natorial election. Common Cause, which had submitted an
even more far-reaching proposal, was also numbered among
the proponents. 52 About one month later, on April 23, 1974,
the Election Laws Committee, chaired by Bartley 's appointee,
George Keverian (Democrat-Everett) , voted to recommend to
^^Michael Kenney, "Massachusetts Candidates, Reform
Groups Urge Public Funding for Campaigns," Boston Globe
,
28 March 1974, p. 17.
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the House of Representatives that the subject of public
financing be studied further by the Election Laws Commit-
53tee. The committee's recommendation reached the House
floor on May 28, 1974, and prevailed in a 115-109 roll call
vote, which rejected an attempt by Representative Guzzi to
substitute the original bill for the committee's recommenda-
tion for further study.
Why did the Bartley-Guzzi Bill fail when it reached
the House floor? One reason was that Bartley, originally in
favor of testing the idea of public subsidy, ^5 became less
enthusiastic. Although he voted for Guzzi 's motion to sub-
stitute, Bartley did not fully exercise the power available
to him. In speaking for the motion to substitute, Bartley
spoke not as the House Speaker, but as a representative from
Holyoke. Rather than casting his vote early in the roll
call, he waited until the very end.^^ Guzzi explained that
Bartley 's loss of enthusiasm occurred after the evening
hearing, which was sparsely attended (less than 200 people,
many of them legislative staffers, were present) . The bill
was untimely, in Bartley 's judgment, because there was an
^^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Campaign Reform? Not This
Year," Boston Globe , 24 April 1974, p. 3.
^^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "House Bars '74 Vote Finan-
cing," Boston Globe , 29 May 1974, p. 5.
55peter Lucas, "Bartley to Seek Public Financing
for Test Race," Boston Globe , 19 November 1973, p. 1.
^^Fuerbringer, "House Bars '74 Vote Financing," p. 5
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absence of sufficient public pressure; and the press had not
Vigorously pushed this legislation. 57 a second reason for
the bill's rejection was that it was opposed by Election
Laws Conunittee Chairman Keverian, who had earlier described
the proposal as a radical change, one which would require
time (Which the legislature did not have) to consider the
constitutional issues raised. Besides, 1974 was a bad year
to frame public subsidy legislation, according to Keverian,
because the debate would become enmeshed in personalities. 58
Guzzi explained that Keverian was probably philosophically
opposed to the idea of public financing of elections. 59
The bill fared even more poorly in the Senate. On
June 3, 1974, less than one week after the House voted to
study public financing further, the Senate, in a 22-12 roll
call, voted its initial approval for further study by the
Committee on Election Laws. Senator David H. Locke
(Republican-Wellesley) was apparently the only outspoken
supporter of the Bartley-Guzzi Bill in the upper house. He
unsuccessfully moved, as Guzzi had done earlier in the House,
to substitute the original bill for the Election Laws Com-
mittee's recommendation for further study. During the
2 1/2-hour debate, Locke complained, "What kind of a day is
57interview with Guzzi, 27 September 1974.
58Fuerbringer, "Campaign Reform?", p. 3.
c q
-'^Interview with Guzzi.
it when a Republican senator has to move substitution of a
Democratic Speaker's bill?"60 j^^^^^ ^^^^ unsuccessfully
moved substitution of a Common Cause/Massachusetts proposal
for public financing which went far beyond the Bartley-
Guzzi Bill. That proposal called for a public subsidy of
the primary and election campaigns of all the major-party
nominees for statewide office in 1978. it was defeated on
a 21-11 roll call vote.^^ An earlier proposal by Common
Cause, discussed during the public hearing several weeks
previously, would have subsidized legislative races as well,
and would have cost $6 million. ^2
The Bartley-Guzzi Bill was only a beginning for the
proponents of the public subsidy of electoral campaigns in
Massachusetts. Guzzi, successful in his campaign for elec-
tion as secretary of state in 1974, has already filed a
legislative petition providing for the public subsidy of
all statewide campaigns in the 1978 election. The General
Court will consider it during its 1975 session. Guzzi 's
petition provides for a partial subsidy of the primary cam-
paigns of all candidates. If enacted, the state would match
all private contributions of $50 or less during the primary
^
^Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Public Campaign Funding
Rejected by Mass. Senate," Boston Globe , 4 June 1974, p. 3.
^^Ibid.
^^Kenney, "Massachusetts Candidates, Reform Groups
Urge," p. 17.
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with grants in cash. It also would provide flat grants in
cash to all statewide nominees, while allowing them to raise
a limited amount of money from private contributions during
their election campaigns. 63 The principal private advocate
of public subsidy. Common Cause/Massachusetts, had not, as
of November, 1974, filed any petition. It will do so,
according to its leader, but is undecided about the scope
of its proposal. It may, as in 1974, advocate a subsidy for
legislative candidates, but is concerned that the cost of
such a proposal might lessen its chances of gaining legis-
lative approval. 6^
Summary and Conclusions
It is apparent that there has been a serious and
constructive effort in Massachusetts since the 1970 election
by many public officials and private parties to deal with
the problem of campaign finance by reforming the state's
campaign finance law. Although the response to date has,
for some, been too slow and less comprehensive than thought
necesseiry, no informed observer caai deny that substantial
changes to the law have been enacted, especially by Chapter
810 of the Acts of 1972, Chapter 1173 of the Acts of 1973,
and most recently, by the voters' approval of the Quinlan
63jean Cole, "Campaign Reform Central Issue,"
Boston Herald American , 1 November 1974, p. 8.
Interview with Mary Ann Fenton. Director, Common
Cause/Massachusetts, Boston, 5 November 1974.
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petition. In many ways, the Bay state now has a very good
campaign finance law, indeed, and those persons responsible
for it deserve to be commended. The current law should pro-
vide the fullest disclosure of campaign contributions and
expenditures in the commonwealth's history. Despite the
confusion worked by the Quinlan petition, which undoubtedly
will be resolved by the 1975-76 state legislature, the law
also promises more effective enforcement than ever before.
In addition, the law has curbed the testimonial dinner
racket, checked the influence of large contributors, imposed
a ceiling upon media expenditures, restricted the use of
cash, and improved the reporting system. Unless the pur-
poses of the law are emasculated by interpretation, or
frustrated by half-hearted enforcement, it should serve the
commonwealth well.
As commendable as the reforms enacted in the past
few years are, however, electoral campaigns in Massachusetts
still rely exclusively upon private funding. In Chapter II,
it was established how substantial this funding was, especi-
ally for the major statewide campaigns. In Chapter III, it
was shown that these funds were largely raised by candidates
and their committees from individual contributors, and that
the roles played by political parties and organized interest
groups in funding cemipaigns, by comparison, were negligible.
Furthermore, at least for the major statewide campaigns.
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large contributions were quite important, m Chapter IV,
some evidence was presented to support the contention that
large contributions influenced' some of the decisions made
by public officials with rewards at their disposal. Despite
the promising provisions of the current law, the system of
financing campaigns in the Bay State has not essentially
been changed. Perhaps the most serious flaw in the campaign
finance law is that it does not address these matters ade-
quately.
As long as politicians in Massachusetts, especially
statewide candidates, require large suras of money to finance
their campaigns, and until some new public policy is adopted
which permits more widespread support of their campaigns,
they will continue to rely upon a relatively small number of
contributors. Some form of public subsidy, at least for
statewide candidates, seems to be one reasonable way to
rectify the bias in the system, and to check this situation,
potentially corrupting for candidates and contributors alike.
There are other values at stake, too. Public confidence in
the integrity of the electoral process would increase. The
undeniable advantages of incumbency could be fairly offset.
Competition for public office would increase. A policy that
assured more adequate funding of campaigns would encourage a
larger number of able men and women of modest means, with no
particular access to those who are ready to contribute
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substantially, to run for office. No suggestion is being
advanced to prohibit private contributions entirely, which
not only raises a constitutional question, but would deny
all citizens a way of directly participating in the polit-
ical process. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to ask
politicians who seek the authority to govern us that they
ask for our money as well.
Without further advocacy of the merits of some form
of public subsidy of electoral campaigns in Massachusetts,
nor discussion of some of the difficulties the proposition
raises (and it does)
, the idea deserves a trial. This
nearly occurred in 1974, it will be recalled, when the state
legislature seriously considered, but rejected, the Bartley-
Guzzi proposal for a partial public subsidy of the post-
primary campaigns of the major party candidates for governor
and lieutenant governor. The 1975-76 legislature will con-
sider proposals of this kind, but it ought not limit its
attention only to them. There are other possibilities for
further reform of the way in which campaigns are financed
in the Bay State which merit their attention. A tax incen-
tive that would divert public funds to the state's polit-
ical parties, which in Chapter III were shown to be very
weak, indeed, is but one.
In conclusion, the reader is reminded that we
entrust the formulation and administration of our public
policies to men and women who ask for our support in free
elections. The quality of those candidates, of their cam-
paigns, and the subsequent conduct of the victors at the
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